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Summary of the study 
Research aim and questions 
This research project focusses on the topic of participation in extreme-right movements with the aim 
to obtain an understanding of the underlying mechanisms and processes leading to engagement. 
International and national examples such as the Breivik case, the NSU, the case of Hans Van Temsche 
and the Flemish combat 18 group BBET have indicated the damage right-wing extremist may cause to 
life and property. Although official instances recognize that extreme-right groups are present in 
Flanders (State Security, 2008), it is remarkable to notice that the phenomenon has not received 
much attention within Belgian and Flemish criminological research (De Witte, 2006). It is thus unclear 
to what extent Flemish cases such as Van Themsche and the BBET are exceptional cases of extreme-
right motivated violence or whether these cases are just the tip of the iceberg.  
 
Given the relative unexplored nature of academic research on this field, this study starts with 
answering the descriptive research question: How was the Flemish extreme-right movement 
established in Belgium and what does this movement currently comprise? Subsequently, this study 
contributes to the understanding of criminal prone moral beliefs (i.e. moral support for right-wing 
extremism) and criminal behaviour (i.e. political violence) by answering the questions What 
mechanisms are related to moral support for right-wing extremist violence? And how do these 
mechanisms for moral support influence the actual use of political violence? And which pathways of 
mechanisms lead to participation in right-wing disruptive groups? Finally, the study examines the 
underlying motives and processes leading individuals to extreme-right group engagement where we 
answer the following interpretative research questions What factors contribute to extreme-right 
group engagement and how are these factors constructed throughout the process of engagement?  
What actors are involved in the engagement process and what are their roles within extreme-right 
group engagement? What are the differences in engagement between the diverse extreme-right 
groups in Flanders? 
 
Our study contributes to the research field of extreme-right movements by which we aim to close 
different gaps within the literature. First, a limited number of studies have tested conceptual models 
on extreme-right motivated behaviour (cf. Boehnke, Hagan and Merkens, 1998; Doosje, Van den Bos 
and Loseman, 2012). Grounded on Popper’s (1963) idea of theory testing through falsification, this 
study aims to test an integrated model which combines elements from social psychological and 
sociological traditions that have previously been applied to the study of violent youth groups. 
Second, our study on extreme-right movements can be regarded as a special case within the gang 
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literature. Decker and Pyrooz (2015) argued that much can be learned from the research tradition on 
gangs when we test theories of violent extremism. This study can thus be seen as a modest attempt 
in this regard. By integrating fragmented insight, we hope to stimulate theoretical elaborations and 
the development of more comprehensive perspectives that shed light on preventing or tackling the 
problem of right-wing extremist violence. Lastly, disregarding the study of De Witte (2006), this 
research is among the first to study the career (more specifically the process of engagement) of 
extreme-right activists in Flanders (cf. Billig, 1978; Blee, 2002; Fangen, 1999; Linden, 2009).  As such, 
this explorative study hopes to inspire future research.  
 
Methodology 
The dissertation supports on triangulation of methods and data without the aim to integrate both 
quantitative and qualitative methods (cf. mixed methods). Both methods are used to contribute to 
the complementary purpose to explain the social phenomenon of participation in extreme-right 
movements. Within this study the quantitative (analytical) part supports on secondary data (i.e. 
European Social Survey and the RADIMED survey) and a self-administered web survey. The 
qualitative (interpretative) part, on the other hand, relies on an analysis of 23 face-to-face interviews 
with (former) members of extreme-right movements.  
 
Grounded on the literature study an integrated conceptual model was developed, which was initially  
tested on secondary data, i.e. Radimed survey. The RADIMED survey, which was conducted by our 
research unit, was used to test certain assumptions of the conceptual model. Within this survey, 
variables were added which addressed both extreme-right attitudes and violent behaviour. To this 
end, the analysis of the secondary data served as the ideal test for the subsequent self-developed 
web survey (Elliot, 2015, 176). The latter self-developed web survey was put online between 
December 2012 and April 2013. The basic idea is that as students differ on political attitudes and 
behavior, we would need to find a way that guaranteed maximum variation in terms of right-wing 
extremism. Therefore, a link to the online questionnaire was placed on different web pages for 
targeting extreme-right youngsters on chat rooms of Neo-Nazi groups and extreme-right Flemish 
nationalist student organizations. In addition, the survey was spread through social media and online 
forums of universities and university colleges. The collected data was analysed by, on the one hand, 
logistic regressions which measured the separate effects of the investigated independent variables 
(Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000) and, on the other hand, Structural equation modelling (SEM) path 
analysis to test the intermediate relationship of the mediating variables in the analysis (Bollen, 1989, 
Bollen and Long, 1993).  
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In addition to the analytical part, the interpretative was used to recount the experiences of (former) 
members of extreme-right movements. From June 2014 to April 2015, 23 semi-structured  
interviewed were conducted in accordance to the life story technique of Atkinson (1998) with the 
focus on the process of engagement (entry). Respondents were addressed during ‘one-visit’ 
observations (Zaitch, Mortelmans and Decorte, 2009, 286) or contacted through mail, telephone or 
via social media (i.e. facebook). Concepts were selected on the basis of the literature study. Specific 
attention was paid to the ‘youth and education’, ‘ideology’, ‘membership’, ‘activities’ and ‘violence 
within the group’. Each interview was transcribed in detail and coded openly according to themes 
such as the important events, opinions and phenomena. Subsequently, axial coding was used to 
categorise the relevant codes, which enabled us to compare and reflect on the differences and 
similarities. Despite the apparent limited amount of interviews (23), this analytical method presented 
us with a large amount of rich data. 
 
Results 
Descriptive and analytical part 
Crucial in the understanding of the extreme-right phenomenon is insight into the context in which 
the phenomenon is being shaped. On a macro level, it is noted that the transitional nature of 
globalization, migration and technology has fuelled the situation of the (post-)modern society 
(Jenkins and Gottlieb, 2007). From the seventies, movements have shown their protest against 
immigration. Most of these movements enunciated their concern or criticism on migration as 
degradation of work facilities, culture and Western values (Sela-Shayovitz, 2012). The emergence of 
the internet has not only improved communication, but has equally formed an ideal environment for 
extremist propaganda, practical organization and community building (Pauwels and Schils, 2014). In 
this regard, technological development (i.e. e-mail, mobile phone, internet, etc.) has facilitated the 
spread and internationalization of extreme-right ideology, symbols, clothing style and music (Sela-
Shayovitz, 2012) with the creation of national segments of international extreme-right groups (such 
as Blood and Honour and Autonomous Nationalist).  
 
In light of criminal behaviour, scholars have indicated the impact of participation in deviant groups. 
In accordance to social learning, individuals get shaped through the associations with delinquent 
actors surrounding the individual (Akers, 1998). These delinquent associations might (re-) define 
moral beliefs and provide opportunities for criminal behaviour. On this manner, SEM analysis 
revealed three pathways leading to right-wing disruptive (RWD) group participation. First, the 
reinforcing injustice model implies that an accumulation of negative feelings might progress to a 
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radical world view. The occurrence of such an event is the highest when strains are high in 
magnitude (Agnew, 2004), and strengthened by threatening and selective perceptions. Second, the 
self-control model disregards deprived situations and states that certain people have a stronger 
tendency to participate in risky environments. Therefore, RWD groups may form the ideal 
environment to address feelings of excitement, thrills, provocation and adventure. Lastly, we mark 
that right-wing exposure to racist or delinquent peers prior to participation may trigger RWD 
participation. In this perspective, it is argued that this prior exposure may facilitate or enhance 
attitudes, norms and routine activities associated with right-wing motivated disruptive behaviour. 
 
Interpretative part  
In line with Mellis (2007), this research shows that a cognitive opening is created through the 
interaction of supply (i.e. extreme-right groups) and demand (i.e. individuals attracted to an extreme-
right ideology), nourished by a breeding ground of contextual factors and obstructed by a wall of 
resilience. Triggered by critical events (such as personal victimization), instigators might increase the 
option of (re)considering extreme-right engagement as viable alternative. However, it may also push 
-already searching- individuals (i.e. demand) or ‘cognitively open’ individuals towards the next phase. 
Another option is that the event of victimization may form a direct turning point to a cognitive 
opening. Furthermore, from the moment people become receptive for engagement, further steps 
towards engagement depend strongly on the effectiveness of building bonds with the new social 
network (i.e. socialisation) and the personal penetration of extreme-right cognitions (i.e. frame 
alignment).   
 
Within the process of engagement, supply and demand are as dynamic products constantly under 
the influence of multiple actors. It is within this symbiosis of influences that these dynamic products 
are shaped as receivers of influencing messages. These messages may be directly derived from the 
surrounding environment or indirectly through national or local media. In general, three groups of 
actors can be distinguished, i.e. (1) personal environment (i.e. family and friends), (2) social 
conventional environment (i.e. school, sport and youth movement) and (3) the out-group (i.e. 
political establishment, ideological opponents and police and judicial services). Throughout the life 
career, actors may reinforce or inhibit the propensity of the individual to engage in extreme-right 
groups. Nonetheless, the Flemish extreme-right movement is largely divided in regard of ideology, 
provocative language and style. Dependent on engagement within a certain group, actors may adjust 
their influencing relationship.   
Van der Valk and Wagenaar (2010) mentioned that individuals want to connect with groups which 
satisfy their needs. In the interpretative section of the research, three ideological groups (right-wing 
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nationalist, national solidarists, Neo-Nazi) were distinguished. In an ‘ideal’ situation, individuals 
would have the opportunity to connect with those ideological groups that fit their desire. However, 
aspects such as the presence of a (long-term) supply, legality and accessibility to the group might 
endanger the opportunity to connect. Throughout the reconstruction of activist careers, it appears 
that members have been part of a variety of groups. After initial engagement, members get exposed 
to a plurality of groups which were often previously unknown to them. Grounded on the experiences 
within the group, members continuously choose between remaining active within the extreme-right 
group, leaving the scène or exploring other internal (extreme-right) or external (hooligan, biker or 
leftist) environments.  
 
Recommendations 
Confronted with the growing effect of extremist groups, policy workers are faced with the challenge 
to adequately address the phenomenon. Thus far, response to these repulsive acts has been largely 
based on (short-term) visible symbolical measure in order to show government’s willingness to act 
rather than on structural long-term solutions (Carlsson, 2006). In order to address the problem of 
right-wing extremist delinquent activity on a structural basis, it is important to deal with the causes 
with proper measures at proper time. Consequently, it is crucial to find and adopt a tailored 
prevention approach which takes the life course of radicalising youngsters into consideration and 
targets at different stages of development. Only then can an effective integrated approach be 
developed, together with the efforts of various willingly involved (frontline) actors, to provide a 
solution to criminal activity instigated by extreme-right motives. 
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Samenvatting van de studie 
Onderzoeksdoel en –vraag 
Dit onderzoeksproject spitst zich toe op de deelname in extreem-rechtse bewegingen met het doel 
om inzicht te verwerven in de onderliggende mechanismen en processen die leiden tot deze 
betrokkenheid. Zowel internationaal als nationaal beroert extreem-rechts onze samenleving. 
Illustratief daarvoor zijn de zaak Breivik, het NSU en in Vlaanderen de zaak Van Themsche en de 
Combat 18 groepering BBET die aantonen wel schade rechts-extremisten kunnen aanrichten en dit 
zowel verbaal, fysiek als gericht tegen goederen. Hoewel officiële instanties erkennen dat 
extreemrechtse groepen (vb. Blood and Honour) ook in België manifest aanwezig zijn (Veiligheid van 
de Staat, 2008), is het verbazend vast te stellen dat het fenomeen tot op vandaag zo weinig aandacht 
heeft gekregen in zowel het Vlaams als het Belgisch onderzoek (cf. De Witte, 2006). Het is echter niet 
duidelijk of het geweld van Hans Van Temsche en de BBET alleenstaande cases zijn die 
extreemrechtse attitudes aanhangen, dan wel slechts het tipje van een ijsberg zijn. 
 
Gegeven de relatief onontgonnen aard van dit onderzoek vangt de studie aan met het beantwoorden 
van de beschrijvende onderzoeksvraag: hoe is de Vlaamse extreem-rechtse beweging ontstaan in 
België en hoe is deze beweging momenteel samengesteld? Vervolgens, draagt deze studie bij tot de 
verklaringen deviante morele overtuigingen (i.e. de morele steun voor rechts extremisme) en deviant 
gedrag (i.e. politiek geweld) door het beantwoorden van de vraag Welke mechanismen zijn 
gerelateerd aan de morele steun voor rechts-extremisme? En hoe zijn deze mechanismen ten opzichte 
van morele steun gerelateerd aan het gebruik van politiek geweld? En welke paden van mechanismen 
leiden er tot deelname aan rechtse ordeverstorende groeperingen? Ten slotte, wordt in dit onderzoek 
dieper ingezoomd op de onderliggende motieven en processen die individuen leiden tot toetreding 
tot extreem-rechts groeperingen, waarbij we volgende interpretatieve vragen beantwoorden Welke 
factoren dragen bij aan het proces van toetreding tot extreem-rechtse groeperingen en hoe zijn deze 
factoren doorheen het proces van toetreding geconstrueerd? Welke actoren zijn betrokken bij het 
proces van toetreding en wat is hun rol binnen het proces van toetreding? Wat zijn de verschillen, met 
betrekking tot het toetreden, tussen de diverse groepen binnen de extreem-rechtse beweging in 
Vlaanderen?  
 
Dit onderzoek draagt bij aan het onderzoek van extreem-rechtse bewegingen door diverse lacunes 
binnen de literatuur op te vullen. In eerste instantie heeft de literatuurstudie aangetoond dat een 
minderheid van de onderzoeken zich toegespitst heeft op het testen van conceptuele modellen ter 
verklaring  van extreem-rechts gemotiveerd gedrag (cf. Boehnke, Hagan and Merkens, 1998; Doosje, 
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van den Bos and Loseman, 2012). Gesteund op Popper’s (1963) idee van theorietoetsend onderzoek 
door falsificatie tracht dit onderzoek een integraal model met gecombineerde elementen uit de 
sociaal-psychologische en sociologische traditie te testen. In tweede instantie kan het onderzoek 
beschouwd worden als een speciaal geval binnen het onderzoek naar ‘gangs’. Decker en Pyrooz 
(2015) geven aan dat het onderzoekstraditie op het vlak van gangs bepalend kan zijn bij het testen 
van theorieën over gewelddadig extremisme. Deze studie kan daardoor ook aanzien worden als een 
bescheiden poging om bij te dragen aan deze traditie. Door het combineren van gefragmenteerde 
inzichten, hopen we bij te dragen aan de theoretische ontwikkeling van een meer uitgebreid 
perspectief dat inzicht schept in de preventieve aanpak van rechts-extremistisch geweld. In laatste 
instantie draagt dit onderzoek bij aan het beperkte Vlaamse onderzoek (cf. De Witte, 2006) dat zich 
focust op de levensloop van extreem-rechtse activisten (cf. Billig, 1978; Blee, 2002; Fangen, 1999; 
Linden, 2009) 
 
Methodologie 
Deze scriptie steunt op een triangulatie van methoden en data zonder de intentie om kwantitatieve 
en kwalitatieve methoden te integreren (cf. mixed methods). Desalniettemin worden beide 
methoden gebruikt om tegemoet te komen aan het doel om het sociaal fenomeen van deelname aan 
extreem-rechtse bewegingen te verklaren. Binnen dit onderzoek steunt het kwantitatieve 
(analytische) deel op zowel secundaire data (i.e. ESS and RADIMED survey) en een eigen web survey. 
In het kwalitatieve (interpretatieve) deel, daarentegen, doen we beroep op een analyse van 23 
diepte interviews met (voormalige) leden van extreem-rechtse bewegingen.  
 
Gesteund op de literatuurstudie werd een geïntegreerd conceptueel model ontwikkeld dat initieel 
werd getest op secundaire data, i.e. RADIMED survey. De Radimed survey, die werd uitgevoerd door 
onze onderzoeksgroep, werd gebruikt om bepaalde assumpties van het conceptueel model te testen. 
Binnen de vragenlijst werden namelijk enkele variabelen opgenomen die gericht waren op extreem-
rechtse attitudes en (politiek gemotiveerd) gewelddadig gedrag. De secondaire data fungeerde 
hierdoor als een optimale pre-test voor de navolgende eigen ontworpen vragenlijst (Elliot, 2015, 
176). Deze eigen ontworpen vragenlijst werd online geplaatst van December 2012 tot April 2013. 
Door middel van deze online vragenlijst, die peilt naar de politieke attitudes en gedragingen van 
studenten, werd getracht om een voldoende grootte populatie rechts-extremisten te destilleren. 
Meer specifiek werd de link naar de vragenlijst verspreid op online chat rooms van Neo-Nazi groepen 
en extreem-rechtse Vlaams-Nationalistische studentenverenigingen. Daarenboven werd de 
vragenlijst verspreid via sociale media en online forums van universiteiten en hogescholen. De 
verzamelde data werd geanalyseerd door, enerzijds, logistische regressies die de specifieke directe 
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effecten testen ten opzichte van de afhankelijke variabele (Hosmer en Lemeshow, 2000) en, 
anderzijds, SEM pad analyses die de intermediërende relatie test van de mediërende variabelen 
(Bollen, 1989, Bollen en Long, 1993).  
 
In aanvulling op het analytische deel focust het interpretatieve deel zich op de ervaringen van 
(voormalige) leden van extreem-rechtse bewegingen. In totaal werden in de periode van Juni 2014 
tot April 2015, 23 semi-gestructureerde interviews afgenomen in overeenstemming met de life story 
techniek van Atkinson (1998) waarbij voornamelijk gefocust wordt op het proces van toetreding 
(entry). Respondenten werden gecontacteerd gedurende ‘one-visit’ observaties (Zaitch, Mortelmans 
en Decorte, 2009, 286), per telefoon, mail of sociale media (i.e. facebook). Concepten werden 
geselecteerd op basis van de literatuurstudie waarbij specifieke aandacht uitging naar de topics 
‘jeugd en onderwijs’, ‘ideologie’, ‘lidmaatschap’, ‘activiteiten’ en ‘geweld binnen de groep’. Elk 
interview werd volledig uitgeschreven en open gecodeerd volgens belangrijke levensgebeurtenissen, 
opinies en fenomenen. Vervolgens, werd gebruik gemaakt van axiale codering om de relevante codes 
te categoriseren waardoor vergelijking en reflectie op gelijkenissen en verschillen mogelijk werd. 
Niettegenstaande de schijnbare beperkte hoeveelheid van diepte interviews (23), heeft deze 
methode een enorme hoeveelheid aan waardevolle data opgeleverd.  
 
Resultaten 
Beschrijvende en analytische resultaten  
Cruciaal binnen het begrijpen van het extreem-rechtse fenomeen is het kaderen van de problematiek 
binnen de context waarin het fenomeen zich heeft gemanifesteerd. Op macro niveau is dan ook 
merkbaar dat de veranderingen met betrekking tot globalisatie, migratie en technologie de (post-) 
moderne samenleving vorm hebben gegeven (Jenkins and Gottlieb, 2007). Reeds vanaf de jaren 
zeventig hebben sociale bewegingen de aandacht gevestigd en geprotesteerd tegen de komst van 
immigranten vanuit een bezorgdheid over de aantasting van werkplaatsen, cultuur en Westerse 
waarden (Sela-Shayovitz, 2012). De opkomst van het internet biedt voor deze groepen niet enkel een 
middel om de interne communicatie te verbeteren, maar eveneens vormt het een ideaal instrument 
om de praktische organisatie te verbeteren, extremistische propaganda te verspreiden en de 
gemeenschap uit te breiden (Pauwels en Schils, 2014). Op deze manier heeft de technologische 
ontwikkeling (i.e. e-mail, mobile telefoon, internet, etc.), de verspreiding van de extreem-rechtse 
ideologie, symboliek, kledingstijl en muziek, sterk gefaciliteerd (Sela-Shayovitz, 2014) door de creatie 
van nationaal afdelingen van internationale extreem-rechtse groeperingen (zoals Blood and Honour 
en de Autonome Nationalisten). 
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Wanneer we focussen op het crimineel gedrag wordt in de logistische regressie analyses duidelijk dat 
zowel persoonlijke als situationele invloeden een rol spelen. In lijn met de sociale leertheorieën 
tonen de resultaten aan dat individuen sterk worden bepaald door de associaties met delinquente 
actoren (Akers, 1998). Deze delinquente associaties kunnen zorgen voor een (her)definiëring van de 
morele overtuigingen en leveren opportuniteiten voor crimineel gedrag. In dit perspectief, tonen de 
SEM pad analyses aan dat er drie paden zijn die leiden naar deelname aan een rechtse 
ordeverstorende(RWD) groep. Vooreerst, het zichzelf versterkende onrechtvaardigheid model dat 
impliceert dat een accumulatie van negatieve gevoelens kunnen leiden tot radicale wereldbeelden. 
De kans op het optreden van een dergelijke radicaal wereldbeeld is het grootst als de strains sterk 
beladen zijn (Agnew, 2004) en deze gesterkt worden door bedreigende en selectieve percepties 
(Stappers, Reijnders and Möller, 1990). Vervolgens is er het zelfcontrole model dat, ongeacht de 
gedepriveerde situatie, stelt dat bepaalde personen een sterkere geneigdheid hebben om deel te 
nemen aan risicovolle activiteiten. Dergelijke sensatiezoekers zoeken voor (korte termijn) beloningen 
ongeacht de toekomst (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990). Bijgevolg kan een RWD groep de ideale 
omgeving vormen om aan hun gevoelens van opwinding, avontuur en sensatie tegemoet te komen. 
Tot slot, stipuleren we in het rechtse blootstellingsmodel dat personen die blootgesteld worden aan 
invloeden van racistische peers een grotere kans hebben om in een RWD groep terecht te komen. 
Daarom stellen we dat deze blootstelling zowel faciliterend als versterkend kan werken ten aanzien 
van attitudes, normen en routine activiteiten geassocieerd met rechts gemotiveerd delinquent 
gedrag.   
 
Interpretatieve resultaten  
Uitgaande van het model van Mellis (2007) toont dit onderzoek aan dat personen een ‘cognitieve 
opening’ ervaren door een interactie tussen aanbod (i.e. extreem-rechtse groeperingen) en vraag 
(i.e. individuen aangetrokken tot een extreem-rechtse ideologie), gevoed door een contextuele 
voedingsbodem en belemmerd door een muur van weerbaarheid. Getriggerd door kritieke 
levensgebeurtenissen (zoals het slachtoffer worden van geweld) kunnen personen extreem-rechts 
engagement (her)overwegen als een betrouwbaar alternatief. Niettegenstaande, kan een dergelijke 
gebeurtenis ook een verdere stimulans vormen voor reeds zoekende mensen (vragende of reeds 
cognitief ontvankelijke individuen). Een andere optie is dat de gebeurtenis (i.e. victimisatie) ook een 
direct keerpunt kan vormen voor onmiddellijk engagement zonder voorafgaande aanleiding. Voorts 
blijkt dat vanaf het moment dat personen ontvankelijk worden voor toetreding, verdere stappen 
naar het engagement sterk afhankelijk zijn van de effectiviteit van, enerzijds, het socialiseren met het 
(nieuwe) sociale netwerk en, anderzijds, het doordringen van het extreem-rechts gedachtengoed.  
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Binnen het proces van toetreding is duidelijk dat zowel vraag en aanbod dynamische producten zijn 
die constant onder druk staan van diverse actoren. Het is binnen deze symbiose van invloeden dat de 
dynamische producten gevormd worden en gestalte krijgen als ontvangers van beïnvloedende 
boodschappen. Deze boodschappen kunnen direct afkomst zijn van de zich omringende omgeving, 
maar kunnen ook indirect via de nationale en lokale media kanalen het individu bereiken. In totaal 
zijn er drie groepen van actoren die onderscheiden kunnen worden, i.e. (1) de persoonlijke omgeving 
(familie en vrienden), (2) de sociale conventionele omgeving (school, sport en vrije tijd bewegingen) 
en (3) de out-groep (politieke orde, ideologische opponenten en de politionele en justitiële 
diensten). Doorheen de levensloop kunnen actoren de geneigdheid van individuen om toe te treden 
versterken of afremmen. Vandaar verdienen deze actoren ook de nodige aandacht binnen een 
integrale aanpak van het fenomeen.  
 
Aanbevelingen 
In de zoektocht naar het verhinderen van extremism worstelen beleids- en praktijkwerkers met de 
moeilijkheid om een adequaat antwoord te bieden op het fenomeen. Het antwoorden op deze 
weerzinwekkende daden worden zijn dan ook vaak gebaseerd op symbolische (korte termijn) 
maatregelen die de publieke bereidheid van handelen aantonen, zonder dat een structurele lange 
termijn oplossing wordt aangereikt (Carlsson, 2006). De aanpak van het fenomeen noodzaakt 
adequate middelen voor de oorzaken, aangepast aan de tijdstip waarop de interventie tot stand 
komt. Daarvoor is het cruciaal om een op maat gemaakte preventieve aanpak te bieden die 
opgedeeld kan worden binnen verschillende stadia. Gegrond op de levensloop van de radicaliserende 
jongere kan men een effectieve geïntegreerde en integrale aanpak pretenderen die de bereidheid 
van diverse betrokken (eerstelijns) actoren kan voorzien in de aanpak van criminele activiteiten met 
extreem-rechtse motieven.  
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PART I: INTRODUCTION 
 
Parties and groups on the right-wing fringe of society have virtually been present in society. It is 
however remarkable that, in the aftermath of the Second World War, the 1980s emerged as a period 
of intense interest in the extreme-right discourse (Lubbers, Gijsberts and Scheepers, 2002). In 
particular, as the interest in the old economic left or right cleavage regarding governmental control 
and intervention began to wane in the public discourse, the new wave of immigration opened up 
room for polarization on the cultural cleavage. This polarization led extreme-right groups to focus 
even more on harsh repression, individual freedom, immigration problems, and the mentality of law 
and order (Achterberg, 2006)1.  
 
In an attempt to explain the ‘calamities’ of these angry white rebel movements, researchers have 
been investigating the personal profiles and motives for extreme-right voting behaviour (Billiet et al., 
1990; De Witte, 1991; Hainsworth, 1992; Rees, 1984). For instance, German scholars examined the 
underlying reasons for the chain of violent acts against asylum seekers and asylum centres, especially 
after the collapse of the Berlin wall (Bleich, 2007; Heitmeyer, 1988, 2003; Miller-Idriss, 2009; Watts, 
2001). An equal phenomenon was noticed in Scandinavia were new fascist and Nazi inspired 
movements popped up as extreme reaction against the new wave of immigration (Bjørgo, 1997).  
 
Throughout the years, Belgium has equally been confronted with instances of anti-immigration and 
extreme-right inspired violence (see below). However, unlike other European countries, Belgium has 
not had a research tradition in the field of extreme-right movement. Most research efforts in this 
field have been undertaken from a political perspective (Billiet et al., 1990; Coffé, Billiet, & Cambré, 
2002; De Witte, 1997, 2001; Jacobs & Rummens, 2003). Although these studies have provided us 
with some insight into the prevalence and mechanisms leading to extreme-right voting behaviour, 
little is known about extraparliamentary groups which are disconnected from the electorate level, 
but are located within the same ideological framework. De Witte (2006) was among the first to 
investigate scientifically Flemish extreme-right militant groups. The current study follows up on the 
topic and attempts to contribute to broadening the knowledge about this still widely unexplored 
terrain, i.e. participation in Flemish extreme-right groups. In this section we will present the research 
aims and the research questions. Then, we will describe the relevance of the study by discussing the 
prevalence of the extreme-right phenomenon (i.e. extreme-right opinions and ER related acts) and 
                                                          
1
 Achterberg (2006, 52) argued in this respect that the collapse of communism at the end of the cold war has equally 
created the awareness of the downsizing of collectivism and socialism/communism which might opened perspective for 
anti-communist sentiments. 
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the theoretical as well as the empirical implications of this study. Next, we will zoom in on the 
choices we have made about the research design, the methodology and the research ethics. Lastly, 
we will provide an overview of the structure of the dissertation.  
 
1. Aims and research questions 
Since there is limited scientific and criminological knowledge of the phenomenon of extreme-right, 
this piece of research will first attempt to gain an insight into the contemporary structure of 
extreme-right movements in Flanders. In this descriptive part we address the following research 
question: 
RQ1descriptive : How was the Flemish extreme-right movement established in Belgium and what 
does this movement currently comprise?  
The second aim is studying the roots of ideologically motivated violence. Through a survey targeted 
at the Flemish youth, this study examines the underlying mechanisms for the moral belief in the use 
of right-wing motivated violence and the actual use of violence. This leads to the following analytical 
research questions, namely: 
RQ2analytical: What mechanisms are related to moral support for right-wing extremist violence? 
how do these mechanisms for moral support influence the actual use of political violence?  
 
RQ3analytical: Which pathways of mechanisms lead to participation in right-wing disruptive 
groups?  
The last aim is to understand the motives and processes leading to engagement in extreme-right 
groups. Specifically, we are interested in the group processes which can account for the possibly 
illegitimate behaviour within that group. The relevant research questions are:  
RQ4interpretative: What factors contribute to extreme-right group engagement and how are 
these factors constructed throughout the process of engagement?  
 
RQ5interpretative: What actors are involved in the engagement process and what are their roles 
within extreme-right group engagement?  
 
RQ6interpretative: What are the differences in engagement between the diverse extreme-right 
groups in Flanders? 
These research questions indicate a diversity of concepts ranging from extreme-right to right-wing 
extremism. The concepts will be further discussed in the section on the ‘conceptual and theoretical 
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framework’. The section below outlines the relevance of the study by elaborating on the prevalence 
and the theoretical, criminological as well as the practical added value of a study focussing on right-
wing extremism. 
 
2. Relevance of the study 
2.1. Prevalence of extreme-right in Flanders 
In exploring the impact of the extra-parliamentary extreme-right movement in Flanders, it is 
essential to gain a view of the proportion of present members in Belgium. However, certain obstacles 
impede the collection of such information. The majority of involved groups neither publish 
membership lists nor work with formal membership. Furthermore, members might repel the idea of 
contributing to studies conducted by ‘mainstream society’. Thus, scholars need to be mindful that 
there is a certain ‘unspecified number’ with regard to the extreme-right population. Based on the 
election results and the representative European Social Survey (2015), the proportion of extreme-
right sympathizers was approximated among the Flemish population. In addition, federal police 
statistics were consulted to have an understanding of the prevalence of (possible) extreme-right 
inspired delinquent acts. 
 
Prevalence of ‘extreme-right’ sympathy  
Since the 80s, migration has become a central topic on the public agendas of right-wing parties 
establishing themselves on the political field (Coffé, 2005). Grounded on a radical anti-immigration 
and repatriation discourse of immigrants, political parties started to gain support in diverse Western-
Europe countries (Front National in France, Centrum Democraten in the Netherlands and FPÖ in 
Austria). The same was noted in Flanders where the Vlaams Blok became one of the best electorally 
performing extreme-right parties in Europe (Dewinter and Casals, 2005)2. When we zoom in on the 
electoral score (see Figure 1), the Belgian electorate has shown an enormous difference in frequency 
between Flanders (Dutch-speaking) and Wallonia (French speaking)3. However, strong resemblance is 
noted as regards the temporal evolution of extreme-right, with a steady increase in electorate until 
the peak in 2004. Since then, electoral support has declined and reduced to threshold of 5%.  
 
                                                          
2
 By agreement of the other political parties to exclude co-operation and coalition with Vlaams Blok (i.e. Cordon sanitaire), 
the party was prevented government participation. Other extreme-right parties in Europe had more success. FPÖ, The 
Freedom party of Austria, for instance, was able to translate their high electoral score in 1999 -with almost 27 % of the 
votes- into government participation (Fallend, 2004). The French extreme-right party Front National was not allowed to 
participate at the National governmental level, but in contrast to its Flemish counterpart, it was able to acquire the statute 
of mayor in diverse municipalities and cities in France (De Witte, 2001).  
3
 Belgium is a federal state, which implies that there are separate electoral districts.  Flanders, the Brussels capital region 
and Wallonia have a secluded electoral constituency. 
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Figure 1: Election results of the Vlaams Blok (1978-2004), Vlaams Belang (2007-2014) and Front National (1981-2009), 
source until 2003: Federal Public Service Ministry of Interior (2008), from 2004: Public Governance Flanders (2015) 
 
This decline might point to a decrease in extreme-right support. Nonetheless, fluctuations in voting 
behaviour do not imply the transition in extreme-right sympathy. On the one hand, people might be 
attracted by the extreme-right party to express their protest against the current policy (Billiet and De 
Witte, 1995). On the other hand, right-wing extremists might reject voting due to the fact that there 
is no party which can represent their interest, not even the extreme-right parties (Van Hiel, 2012). 
However, these electoral rates give us some insight into the volume of the breeding ground of 
possible sympathizers with right-wing political ideas.  
 
Drawing on the secondary data from the European social survey, we can observe the evolution of 
extreme-right orientation over a period of 10 years. The results of the temporal comparison in light 
of extreme-right identification in Belgium are shown in Figure 2. The figure indicates that the 
percentage of respondents who identify themselves as ‘extreme right’4 remains relatively stable over 
10 years during which an average of 3.27 % of the Belgians labelled themselves as extreme-right. 
When the extreme-right identification is divided by region, Flanders (3.35) seems to have the highest 
average score, followed by Wallonia (3.2) and Brussels (2.47). What is noticeable is that even in the 
heyday of the extreme-right party Vlaams Blok in 2004 (24.15 %) and Front National (8.12%), an 
equal marginal number of respondents, respectively 3.7% and 1.8%, labelled themselves as extreme-
right.  
 
 
 
                                                          
4
  The respondents received a left-right scale where they could position themselves from extreme-left (0) to extreme-right 
(10). In this study extreme-right was operationalised on the score 9 and 10.   
0
10
20
30
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
4
Election results of extreme-right parties in 
Belgium  
VB in National parlement
VB in Flemish parlement
FN in National Parlement
FN in Walloon Parlement
Introduction     29     
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Extreme-right identification, source: European Social Survey (2015) 
 
Although the above results indicate a marginal impact of extreme-right in the population, the 
question remains as to how this extreme-right proportion compares to that in other European 
countries. Figure 3 illustrates that Belgium can be considered as one of the lowest scoring countries 
concerning extreme-right orientation. In this regard, Belgium can be placed in the same category as 
its surrounding countries, i.e. the Netherlands (4.5), Germany (2.4), France (6.9) and Great-Britain 
(3.1). In general, it is observed that the countries who score lower than the average score (8.7) are 
mainly located in the north and the west of Europe. Exceptions are Hungary (7.6), Lithuania (5.8) and 
Russia (7.1). In contrast, the highest scoring countries are located in the middle, the south and the 
east of Europe with Kosovo (40.0) and Albania (23.2) being the highest scoring European state or 
country. Israel (23.1) which is considered an Asian country was also included in the questionnaire and 
it has the third highest score.  
 
 
Figure 3: Prevalence of ER in Europe, source: European Social Survey (2012) 
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Prevalence of ‘extreme-right’ related delinquent activities 
Compared with the two previous types of prevalence, it seems more difficult to measure that of 
extreme-right related delinquent acts in Belgium. During the research, it turned out that registered 
data do not take the ideological background of the perpetrator into account. Therefore, this study 
relies on fragmented data for an image of the prevalence of extreme-right related acts.  
 
The statistics from the criminal police indicate that there exists an annual inflow of 463 registered 
‘extreme-right’ related criminal files which record both the decrease in racist and xenophobic acts 
and the increase in Homophobic criminal acts (see Table 1). The Interfederal centre for equal 
opportunities in Belgium (2013) explained that the result might be biased by the increased attention 
paid to the phenomenon of Homophobic violence. Nevertheless, the centre made reference to the 
‘EU LGBT Survey’ of the European Union agency for fundamental rights, emphasizing that this result 
is only the tip of the iceberg. In this survey, 35% of the Belgian LGBT population indicated that they 
have been discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation. The latter illustrates the discrepancy 
between the reported criminal activities and the actual perceived incidents, pointing to the 
phenomenon known as under-reportage. It is clear that victims of discrimination are still reluctant to 
report this criminal activity. Their reluctance may result from the ‘normal’ notification thresholds, 
such as time, money and courage, and the fear of victimization, shame and pride (Interfederal centre 
for equal opportunities, 2013). Besides the problem of under-reportage, these results fail to reveal 
any information about the perpetrators of these criminal acts, thus making it impossible to analyse to 
what extent criminal perpetrators are influenced by an extreme-right discourse.   
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Discrimination 518 537 505 493 453 369 410 442 321 496 
Racism & 
Xenophobia 
507 529 501 466 401 318 349 362 254 391 
Homophobia 0 0 0 4 9 13 25 44 32 65 
Not 
determined 
11 8 4 23 43 38 36 36 35 38 
Negationism 0 0 2 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
Revisionism 0 1 1 4 4 0 1 1 5 2 
Table 1: Criminal statistics by the Federal police (2015) 
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Seen from the relative marginal percentage of self-identification (3.35%), the Flemish extreme-right 
population can hardly be called a big movement. The statistics suggest that concerning these 
discriminatory acts extreme-right or right-wing extremist groups and individuals might have both a 
direct and an indirect effect on the outcome of right-wing inspired violence acts. The direct effect can 
be measured by the direct involvement of members in criminal activities. On the other hand, 
individuals might indirectly instigate criminal activities created through their strong ‘awareness’ of 
immigrant problems.  
 
2.2.Theoretical relevance 
There are diverse reasons for which this study is argued to carry significant conceptual and 
theoretical implications. First, this research has affirmed Popper’s (1963) idea of theory testing 
through falsification. More specifically, the study has tested the usefulness of the integrative 
theoretical approach (see part III, Chapter 2 and 3) to explain right-wing extremist beliefs and 
behaviour. In doing so, next to a limited number of studies which have tested the conceptual models 
on extreme-right motivated behaviour (cf. Boehnke, Hagan and Merkens, 1998; Doosje, Van den Bos 
and Loseman, 2012), this piece of research has contributed to expanding the understanding of 
criminal prone moral beliefs (i.e. moral support for right-wing extremism) and criminal behaviour (i.e. 
political violence). Second, the study has lent support to the research tradition on gangs to 
investigate how the ‘Eurogang’ definition can be applied in the research on extreme-right groups (see 
part III, Chapter 3). Third, the interpretative part (see part IV) has drawn upon Wiktorowicz’s model 
which combines the insights from both social psychological and social movement theories to 
investigate engagement in Islamic inspired extremist groups. In this perspective, the research has 
testified to the theoretical insights of diverse manifestations of extremist group engagement. 
 
2.3 Criminological relevance 
Past research has indicated possible consequences of engaging in deviant groups (Melde and 
Esbensen, 2011). Similar to the outcome of research on gangs, engagement in extreme-right groups 
can lead to diverse possible negative effects. Participants in these groups will become extremely 
vulnerable subjects through not only the growing exposure to confrontational violence but also the 
increasing propensity to use illegal acts (Van Donselaar, 1995). Furthermore, individuals might also 
face the risks of losing certain political or occupational rights, such as the berufsverbot or a 
professional ban in Germany (Dressler, 2012). This professional ban is not directly implemented in 
Belgium. Nonetheless, persons convicted for racism or discriminatory acts might receive severer 
punishments with the possibility of deprivation of their civil and political rights (Deklerck et al., 2009). 
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Consequently, this might implicate that convicted individuals may have less opportunities on the job 
market in that they cannot present a certificate of good conduct.  
 
2.4 Policy relevance 
Policy on the prevention of anti-establishment movements in Flanders could, as proved by the 
international literature, impact on the level of violence within the population (Bleich, 2007; Boehnke, 
Hagan and Merkens, 2007). In this regard, policy makers must bear in mind that the level of anti-
immigration protest and violent activity might influence the life satisfaction level within the society. 
In Germany, Knabe, Ratzel and Thomsen (2013) revealed that regions with a high prevalence of 
extreme-right sympathy5 had significantly lower levels of life satisfaction among foreigners. As such, 
it can be expected that polarized sentiments within these regions may trigger escalation of both 
parties (i.e. natives and immigrants). Policy makers should, therefore, not ignore signs of polarization 
and look for suitable crime and social policies as necessary complements to a safe and open-minded 
society (Knabe et al., 2013). 
 
3. Scope of the research    
3.1. The theoretical approach to radicalisation and extremism  
Before going into the definition of terms as ‘extreme right’ and ‘right-wing extremism’, the concept 
of extremism is explained more deeply throughout the process of radicalisation. Radicalisation is a 
concept that has been extensively used in academic fields after the events of 9/11. It is in light of 
these events that the term is often equated with Islamic inspired forms of radicalisation, extremism 
or terrorism. Nonetheless, scholars have indicated that the concept is applicable to diverse 
manifestations of radicalisation (Easton et al., 2013). In this perspective, Gielen (2008) pointed out in 
her definition three manifestations of radicalisation, i.e. religious, political, and social and cultural 
radicalisation6. In our research context we find the definition by Geeraerts (2012, 26) particularly 
relevant and it states that: 
 
Radicalisation is seen as a process whereby an individual comes to embrace values and opinions 
about a certain topic (e.g. animal rights, Nazism or religion) that gradually become more extreme and 
                                                          
5
 This sympathy level was measured by the amount of support for extreme-right parties. 
6
 Regarding this manifestation of radicalisation, the example of single-issue movements such as the ALF (Animal liberation 
Front) can be noted (more information on this specific topic is provided in Janssen, 2013 [Dutch] and Jamison and Lunch, 
1992). A more concrete example of an extreme case of radicalisation is the case of Volkert Van der Graaf. On 6 May 2002, an 
environmental activist Van der Graaf shot the politician Pim Fortuyn to death. Van der Graaf indicated that he conducted his 
act for society, where Fortuyn was seen as a threat because the latter supported fur farms and had negative opinions on 
immigrants. 
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hence start to deviate more from the normative opinions, while at the same time finding it more 
difficult to accept opposite opinions. This may lead to ideological violence like terrorism. 
 
Geeraerts (2012) points out that the process is not one-dimensional, which implies that several 
factors may impact radicalisation. A crucial aspect within the definition is the alienation of 
mainstream society. However, it remains unclear to what extent individuals need to be ‘alienated’ or 
‘deviated’ from (mainstream acceptable) norms. In that respect, the reference category of 
‘mainstream society’ itself is not free of radicalisation. Historical emancipation efforts, such as the 
French revolution or the Apartheid battle in South-Africa, might easily be seen as the radicalisation 
processes which drastically changed the society (Easton et al., 2013, Van de linde and Rademaker, 
2010). These changes point to the relativeness of ‘radicalisation’ as determined by context, time and 
perception. An example of that dynamic aspect in a Belgian extreme-right context can be found in 
the Belgian Francophone league for Human rights. In its annual report, it was indicated that over the 
years government parties have implemented most aspects of the controversial 70-point plan of the 
Vlaams Blok. In the aftermath of the national breakthrough of the Vlaams Belang in November 1991, 
the Vlaams Blok constructed a plan which proclaimed to solve the ‘immigration problem’. It included 
a plan to repatriate gradually non-European foreigners to their countries of origin, for the sake of the 
protection of the Flemish identity and the preservation of the principle of “own people’s first” (Coffé 
and Dewulf, 2014). The 70-point plan was called unacceptable by the government parties in 1992; 
nevertheless, it appears that the ideas have stood the test of time (Demeulemeester, 2015).  
 
Another crucial point within Geeraerts’ definition of radicalisation is the gradual willingness to use 
unconventional measures. Concerning this aspect, scholars mark the difference between radicalism 
and (violent) extremism (Moghaddam, 2005; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008). In the phase of 
radicalism proponents are fond of the emancipating rights which often criticize or contradict the 
current mainstream (liberal democratic) value (Schmid, 2013). Precisely due to this critical view, 
radicalism and radical views are perceived as negative or even hostile to mainstream society. 
However, despite the fact that individuals operate at the ‘fringe’ of society, radical actors (i.e. as 
individual or group of individuals) accept to work within the legal framework of society. This latter 
point shows that extremism differs from radicalism. As such, extremism can be regarded as the 
superlative of radicalism, advocating a certain acceptance, support or actual use of violence to reach 
goals.  
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Finally, Geeraerts (2012) indicated that the process of radicalisation is individually based. In line with 
this aspect, individual’s radical cognitions may not overlap with those of the group. In other words, a 
radical individual could be a member of extremist groups and vice versa. This situation, however, 
could create a cognitively imbalanced situation with regard to the targeted means to achieve the aim 
(Opp, 2009). This suggests that the role of group cannot be underestimated within the evolution of 
individual radicalisation (Borum, 2011).  
 
In general, radicalisation has to be seen as a gradual (evolving through time, but not deterministic), 
complex (composed out of different causes) and dynamic (fluctuating over time7) process. Due to its 
dynamic character, it is often difficult to place individuals and groups within a certain defined phase. 
Moreover, Van Donselaar (1995) remarks that groups often publicly portrait themselves as radical 
(front-stage), while they might secretly propagate an extremist discourse (back-stage). Against this 
theoretical backdrop, our research delineates right-wing extremist behaviour as superlative of the 
extreme-right discourse, where moral beliefs justify criminal acts. A more detailed definition of right-
wing extremism can be found in part I, Chapter 1. 
 
3.2. The theoretical approach to extreme-right and right-wing extremism 
Notwithstanding the fact that research on extreme-right has not encountered considerable difficulty 
in selecting appropriate cases, scholars have, however, struggled to convincingly define the concept 
(Linden, 2009, 10). There are a number of reasons accounting for this. Firstly, the concept of 
extreme-right is both academically and politically loaded. Extreme beliefs are positioned as opposed 
to those of the mainstream (Mudde, 2010), and hence, are inherently disconnected from the 
democratic society. Dependent on the context, certain groups within the extreme-right movement 
may be ‘radical but tolerable’ or ‘extreme and intolerable’. In this range of acceptability it is 
noticeable that various labels (i.e. populist, radical right, far right, extreme-right, anti-immigrant, etc.) 
are used to determine the level of detachment from society (Van Donselaar, 1995). Secondly, social 
evolution has made it difficult to delineate the concept of extreme-right. While the term was 
previously predominantly associated with an ultraliberal economic position, nowadays it has shifted 
to allude to an increased focus on migration grounded on the ethnic cultural cleavage. This 
dynamism may complicate the historical comparison of extreme-right groups. Thirdly, as Mudde 
(1996) indicated in his review on extreme-right definitions, there are multiple concepts (i.e. racism, 
xenophobia, anti-communism, etc.) which can be added to the umbrella concept of extreme-right. 
However, scholars do not distinguish between the definers (i.e. essential elements of a definition) 
                                                          
7
 The African National Congress, for instance, has changed from being an aggressive and violent movement to a political 
party embedded in the democratic system (Easton et al., 2013) 
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and the descriptors (i.e. certain characteristics or beliefs) of the social phenomenon (cf. Esbensen 
and Maxson, 2012, 6). This implies that including certain descriptors (e.g. anti-communistic 
discourse) might falsely exclude extreme-right oriented individuals who do not agree with certain 
aspects of the extreme-right discourse.  
 
Despite the complication to define the concept of extreme-right, we considered it important to 
adhere to a benchmark to delineate the scope of our research. In taking the previous comments into 
account, three important definers have been filtered out. As a result, the concept of an extreme-right 
orientation can be defined as a framework of values and beliefs which contradict the political 
establishment, in the interest of defending the nation against national traitors. In this definition, we 
firstly mention the polarization aspect of anti-establishment groups which refers to an ideology 
which criticises –and possibly rejects- the mainstream political order and the contemporary 
democratic system (Linden, 2009; Fermin, 2009; Neumann & Rogers, 2007). Second, the definition 
points out that people strive for defending their own nation. In this regard, dependent on the 
cultural or the ethnic orientation, the nation in this research context might be interpreted as a 
Flemish nation or a nation of white people. Thirdly, the aspect of national traitors indicates the 
identification with the in- and out-group (Bjørgo, 1997). In this regard, Van Donselaar draws a 
difference between people alien to the nation (ethnic out-group) and people hostile to the nation 
(ethnical in-group, politically oriented out-group) (Van Donselaar, 1995, Van Donselaar and 
Rodriguez, 2008). In the descriptive section (part II, Chapter 1), we will elaborate on the 
aforementioned aspects of ‘extreme-right’ and ‘right-wing extremism’. 
 
3.3. Defining the Flemish extreme-right movement 
Flanders along the line of geographical demarcation 
As indicated above in the prevalence section, Belgium has as Federal structure which consisted out of 
a Dutch (i.e. Flanders) and French-speaking (Wallonia) part. Notwithstanding the possible interest of 
doing research in Wallonia, we opted to limit the scope of the research to the geographical area of 
Flanders. Firstly, it is noted that in the aftermath of the Second World War, the impact and 
resurrection of the extreme-right movement (and political party) has been more noticeable in 
Flanders than in Wallonia. This aspect is tackled in the descriptive part of the dissertation. Secondly, 
the federal structure has ensured that Belgium has become a state with subnations which have 
acquired more autonomy over the last decades (Billiet, Maddens and Beerten, 2003). In regard of 
movements this implies that active groups are determined by and inherently connected to this  
‘homogenous’ Dutch speaking subnational context. Lastly, connected to this subnational context, we 
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point out that a large majority of the extreme-right movement is promoting the subnational Flemish 
identity. Therefore, rather than comparing the situation with Wallonia, our aim is to concentrate on 
this geographically and symbolically demarcated context.  
 
The extreme-right movement 
As we will further explore in the descriptive section of this dissertation, Flanders has dealt with an 
influx of sub-institutional, extraparliamentary forms of right-wing inspired groups, ranging from 
militant groups operating in the shadows of the extreme-right party Vlaams Belang to Neo-Nazi 
skinhead groups. However, these groups are connected within a broader Flemish extreme-right 
movement with a shared ethnic-cultural ideology8. As such, in line with Koopmans and Statham 
(1999, 228), but adapted to our study, we define the extreme-right movement as those social 
movements and subcultural groups which mobilizes an ethnic-cultural framing of national identity 
against the idea of the (sub)nation as a politic and civic community.  In contrast to the personal 
orientation of extreme-right, this definition denotes the mobilization capacity of ‘groups’ within the 
broader ‘movement’.  
 
3.4. Conceptual approach of extreme-right and right-wing extremism 
Taken the theoretical approach into account, the conceptualisation of right-wing extremism focuses 
on those aspects of an aberrant extreme-right ideology important in the prevention of criminal 
behaviour. Therefore, we operationalized the concept of right-wing extremism by the use of the 
concepts of (1) moral beliefs supporting the use of violence inspired by rightist motives; (2) the actual 
use of political violence; and (3) participation in informal right-wing inspired disruptive groups. These 
measures were chosen because of their self-nomination character. Due to the recurrent political and 
societal claims of the extreme-right connection with Nazism and Fascism, it is often difficult to 
scholarly define this highly contested concept of extreme-right. Therefore, interpretation of the 
concept ‘extreme-right’ was left open to the respondents and, as such, the personal self-labelling. 
Second, as this piece of research has a criminological instead of a political focus, we chose to analyse 
the mechanisms that instigates rule-breaking behaviour with an extreme-right motivation rather 
than unravel the ideology of extreme-right groups.  
 
                                                          
8
 In line with Mudde, ideology is used to refer to the normative ideas on man and society as propagated by a certain group. 
As such, ideology is seen as the body of normative(-related) ideas about the nature of man and society as well as the 
organization and purposes of society (Mudde, 2002, 19) 
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4. Research design and methodology 
4.1. Research Design 
As Newmann and Benz (1998) noted, research has become less polarized in quantitative and 
qualitative practices. Researchers have gradually stepped aside from insisting on the marked 
ontological and epistemological differences between positivism and constructionism paradigms, and 
even attempted to integrate mixed methods (Creswell, 2003). Our research draws on both 
quantitative and qualitative methods for two separate study designs. We believe they are 
complementary to each other in exploring the social phenomenon of extreme-right. The following 
section will elaborate on the specific focuses in view of the postpositivism and social constructivism 
research paradigms.  
 
Quantitative, analytical approach 
In line with the account of postpositivism, this study has the aim to determine effects of possible 
causes as reductionist set of hypothesis (Creswell, 2003). Through validated measurements of moral 
beliefs and political violence, this study can contribute to the understanding of the objective reality 
(Firestone, 1987), which is the key epistemological difference from the qualitative method. While in 
quantitative research referent groups are used to compare certain claims of truth (e.g. 
perpetrators/non-perpetrators), qualitative research states that there is no access to reality other 
than the researchers’ interpretation of reality (Sale et al., 2002).  
 
Given the explanatory nature of the research in the Flemish context, a deductive analytical design 
was set up on the basis of previous empirical work (see part III, Chapter 2 and 3). However, 
constrained by the imperfection in the data (i.e. response rate, selection bias, etc.), we sought to 
falsify hypotheses. When the hypotheses are falsified, we can argue with great certainty that the 
theoretical assumptions are incorrect. Yet, there is another case in which there is a high probability 
that the assumptions are found in line with the reality. The latter falsification principle of Popper 
(1963) highlights the limitation of measures to prove theoretical assumptions with absolute 
certainty. Agreeing with Popper, Billiet (2008, 56), however, also recognizes that the dogmatic 
character of testing theoretical assumptions can create opportunities for new theoretical elements 
which would otherwise have eluded us. In this sense, our research is innovative in attempting to test 
and shape the knowledge on the social phenomena in the objective reality. 
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Qualitative, interpretative approach  
In contrast to the objective reality, qualitative purists contend that knowledge is constructed out of 
multiple realities (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004) where investigator and investigated cannot be 
separated as independent entities (Sale et al., 2002). As such, the investigated, as the source of 
reality, can be accounted for his or her construction and perception of social reality (Johnson and 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Hammersley, 2002). Starting from the individuals’ point of view, this study is 
interested in the description and the characteristics of the interpretation of social behaviour by 
members engaged in the extreme-right movement. Our choice of the qualitative method is also 
supported by past  studies on extreme-right that have highlighted the importance of qualitative in-
depth research to obtain rich data of both group descriptives and personal motivations (Van den Bos 
et al. 2009; De Witte, 2006; Blazak, 2001). 
 
As stated above, in view of the ontological and epistemological differences between the quantitative 
and the qualitative methods, we conducted two separate studies, with each targeting at different 
aspects of the social phenomenon. The study as a whole was not intended to grant a complete 
empirical cycle of deduction and induction, as stated by De Groot (cited in Billiet, 2008, 37-56). 
However, the interpretative part can shed light on the inductive approach, while the empirical 
section can lead to the establishment of theoretical and criminological insights (Mortelmans, 2009). 
 
4.2. Methodology 
Data collection 
1) Secondary data 
Due to the limited amount of information on the extreme-right movement in Flanders, we primarily 
opted to use secondary data. Although the data were originally collected for other purposes, certain 
elements of the secondary data were suited for the purpose of this dissertation.  
 
First, to indicate the prevalence of the extreme-right phenomenon (see above) we relied on the 
European Social Survey (ESS).Financed by the Fifth Framework Programme of the European 
Commission, the European Science Foundation and academic funding bodies in each participating 
country9, this international cross-sectional survey was conducted repeatedly in 20 European 
countries. As individuals were selected by strict random probability, a representative sample was 
obtained of Belgian and Flemish respondents above 15 years (ESS, 2015). In this dissertation, 
predominant interest lies in the extreme-right orientation of the Flemish population, both in terms of 
                                                          
9
 This joint funding ensured that the survey was designed and carried out to a high standard, see ESS (2015)  
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evolution and magnitude (see above). Moreover, the spatial distribution of the survey provided 
grounds for interstate comparison. As such, we were able to benefit from this publically available 
data without high costs (i.e. time and money) (Elliot, 2015, Heaton, 2003). However, no additional 
questions were retrieved concerning extreme-right beliefs or behaviour.  
 
Second, the RADIMED survey, which was conducted by our research unit, was used to test aspects of 
the conceptual model. At the outset of this piece of doctoral research, our research unit was 
assigned by the Belgian Ministry of Interior to conduct research into the role of new social media on 
radicalisation (Pauwels et al., 2014). Within this project our research unit decided to set up a survey 
investigating different forms of radicalisation (more detailed information on the RADIMED survey is 
provided in the analytical part (Chapter 2). In this survey, variables were added to address both 
extreme-right attitudes and violent behaviour. In fact, the analysis of the secondary data served as 
the ideal test for the subsequent self-developed web survey. The combination of the secondary and 
the primary data ensured that our conceptual model was tested on different populations, which 
improved the generalizability of the results (Elliot, 2015, 176). We were aware that scholars have 
pointed out the possible disadvantages of using secondary data (Heaton, 2003). However, the 
majority of arguments10 were not applicable to this study in that although the research was 
conducted by another researcher within our research unit, joint meetings were scheduled to discuss 
the questionnaire and the procedure of the study. As such, the RADIMED survey offered the ‘first-
hand’ secondary data. A minor point of criticism of the secondary data is that the purpose of data 
collection was slightly different (Heaton, 2003, 285). This implied that it was unable to test our 
complete extreme-right conceptual model. As a consequence, an additional web survey was added 
to test the latter model.  
 
2) Web survey 
The role of the internet has become omnipresent in modern-day society. Even the manner in which 
people communicate and interact has increasingly affected our daily lives (Elliot, Fricker and 
Schonlau, 2002; Conway and McInerney, 2008). The same is noticeable in the academic world, where 
scholars have addressed the benefits of conducting surveys on the Web (Schmidt, 1997, Greenlaw 
and Brown-Welty, 2009). The advantages of using web surveys include (1) the limited use of 
                                                          
10
 Heaton (2003) offered an overview of the drawbacks of secondary data; i.e. the often difficult accessibility of the data 
(data was accessible to the researcher), problem in understanding the dataset (researcher was closely involved in the 
preparation of the research), different purpose of data collection (there is little difference regarding the purpose, and, in 
addition, both the RADIMED and self-developed questionnaire were administered as questionnaires aimed at measuring 
political attitudes). Finally, problems in regard of sampling and data quality were not applicable due to the strong 
connection to the research.  
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monetary resources (Bethlehem, 2010), (2) speed of data collection and dataset storage (Das, Ester 
and Kaczmirek, 2011), (3) the simplicity of data transfer (Manfreda and Vehovar, 2008), and (4) the 
automatic data input limiting the risk of human errors in the input of data (Schmidt, 1997). In the 
meantime, criticism has also been voiced concerning the response rate (Denscombe, 2009; Nulty, 
2008) and under-coverage and (self-) selection bias (Bethlehem, 2010). More detailed information on 
data collection is provided in the analytical part (Chapter 2 and 3). However, it should be noted that 
the method of web survey enabled us to reach a broad population of Flemish youngster, even those 
‘hidden’ from mainstream society (i.e. non-student, non-working population). As a result, we did 
reach an extreme-right population via internet forums and social media, and could compare an 
extreme-right population of respondents with a non-extreme-right population.  
 
3) In-depth face-to-face interviews 
3.1. Document analysis  
Since the available scientific data were limited, we started with collecting relevant archive 
documents on extreme-right groups and individuals. The collection came from three main sources. 
First, an archive study was conducted in the State Archives of Beveren which keep a repository of 
grey literature including newspapers, national magazine articles, leaflets, pamphlets and photos of 
extreme-right group demonstrations or actions. In addition, we gained access to the old criminal files 
of extreme-right groups11. These files are mainly used to contact respondents and as background 
information during the interviews. Second, other stored information was collected from the Archive 
and Documentation Centre on Flemish Nationalism (ADVN) where detailed documentation (e.g. 
published magazines of groups, photos, newspaper articles, leaflets and notes of activities) was 
found. Lastly, websites and online forums were used to gather information on (1) the social genesis 
of the movement, (2) the expressed ideology, and (3) the relations and perception of other extreme-
right groups. The information was not collected for analytical purposes12 but provided background 
information during the interviews. 
 
3.2. Targeting the ‘hard-to-reach’ population  
As explained later in this dissertation, the extreme-right movement is characterized by, on the one 
hand, groups with an open character and, on the other hand, clandestine groups which are more 
                                                          
11
 The State Archives of Beveren not only collect documents and information on right-wing networks, they are also in 
possession of official records of right-wing actors as well. It is through these old cases of right-wing related violence or 
delinquency that we gained an understanding of groups such as the ‘Vlaamse Militanten Orde’ (VMO). 
12
 Most information on extreme-right groups is grey literature which is often fed with subjective information. For this reason 
we did not want to ‘contaminate’ the research by subjective information. In other words, these documents were used for 
informative purposes in support of the face-to-face interviews. 
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difficult to reach. The aim of the research, however, was to gain an insight into the broad picture of 
extreme-right movement. Hence, we opted to make use of a combination of the ‘warm call’ and ‘cold 
call’ approaches (Sadler et al., 2010).  
 
At first, the ‘warm call’ ensured that the researcher stepped into the field to observe and establish 
contact with subjects within their setting. From November 2013 to April 2015, 20 ‘one-visit’ 
observations (see Appendix 1 for more details) were made during the public appearances of the 
extreme-right movement (Zaitch, Mortelmans and Decorte, 2009, 286). These observations took 
place during debates, demonstrations, lectures, a criminal trial13 and other Flemish nationalist 
meetings (such as the Ijzerbedevaart and Ijzerwake). During these (participatory) observations we 
favoured an overt approach (see below on research ethics). As such, the researcher presented the 
research as a social science project that focusses on Flemish nationalism and right-wing aspects of 
the movement. Important in the initial stage of the research was to develop rapport with the 
‘leaders’ or other ‘key figures’ in the movement. These figures served as the ‘gatekeepers’ to other 
members within the extreme-right movement by the use of the snowball sampling technique (see 
Appendix 2) (Emmel, Hughes and Greenhalgh, 2007). Nevertheless, this technique turned out to be 
inefficient due to an imbalanced selection of respondents which only targeted a certain segment of 
the extreme-right movement (i.e. right-wing nationalist) and neglected other segments (i.e. Neo-Nazi 
and National solidarist groups) (Van den Bos et al., 2009; Sadler et al., 2010, 371).  
 
In order to counter the imbalance arisen from the use of the ‘warm call’, the ‘cold call’ approach was 
adopted focusing on contacting individuals with whom no prior relationship had been established 
(Sadler et al., 2010, 371). On the basis of the archive study, individuals were contacted through mail, 
telephone or social media (i.e. facebook). Though this method we were able to target (former) 
members of clandestine groups, without the consent of the leaders or other key figures within the 
extreme-right movement. More information on the advantages and disadvantages regarding this 
method of data collection is presented in the interpretative part.  
 
3.3. Face-to-face interviews 
In search of the ideal method to collect data on identifying motivations and perceptions of extreme-
right individuals, we resorted to the in-depth qualitative method to expand our knowledge (Yin, 
2009). Given the marginalisation of extreme-right people’s voice within society, the interviews can be 
seen as an important tool to recount their experiences, which are often suppressed by mainstream 
                                                          
13
 From the 11
th
 December 2013 I followed the trial of the Combat 18 group called BBET, which stands for ‘Blood Bodem Eer 
en Trouw’ (translated Blood Soul Honour and Loyalty).  
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society. In this way, we will deepen the understanding of the social and mental world of extreme-
right individuals by exploring interactions, processes, behaviours and feelings contributing to active 
engagement (cf. Boeije, 2005, 36).  
 
In line with the life story interview technique of Atkinson (1998), focus was placed upon the career of 
the activists. This approach serves as a vantage point from which the personal experience and the 
activists’ career over time can be better understood (Atkinson, 1998, 126). As such, the interviewee 
takes the role of a narrator of his/her life, while the researcher’s role is to guide the conversation 
following semi-structured interview questions on the basis of a topic list (see Appendix 3). More 
information about the interview technique can be found in the interpretative part of the dissertation.  
 
Data analysis  
1) Quantitative data analysis  
For the analytical questions, we made use of the statistical analysis software packages of SPSS and 
Mplus. The former was used to perform logistic regression analysis, while the latter was used to 
manufacture path analysis for internal causal relations between the diverse theoretical constructs. 
 
1.1. Logistic regression analysis 
Given the constellation of the dependent variables, we were unable to perform linear regression 
analysis. The two dependent variables, i.e. moral support for right-wing extremism and political 
violence showed a highly skewed distribution because the majority of respondents had low scores on 
the dependent variables.  
 
Due to the skewedness of the original scale variable of moral support for right-wing extremism, we 
categorized the scale variable into a low, medium and high moral support category. Given the fact 
that the dependent variable is a trichotomy, we primarily opted for the ordinal regression equation 
technique. The precondition for the execution of the ordinal regression states that the effect 
parameters need to be identical for every subgroup of the dependent variables (Kampen, 2007). 
Nevertheless, the test of parallel lines turned out to be significant, inhibiting us to use ordinal 
regression. As a viable alternative to the ordinal regression technique, we opted to use multinomial 
regression equation. This technique is a generalisation of the binary logistic model and allows us to 
gain an insight into the direct effects of the available set of independent variables (Retherford & 
Choe, 1993; Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000). The generalisation of the model implies that the reference 
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category is used with respect to the two other categories. In this study, we chose to compare the 
medium and high levels with the reference category (i.e. low moral support).  
 
In zooming in on the other dependent variables of political violence, it is noted that the majority of 
respondents gave a negative answer to the question on self-reported political violence. As the data 
was extremely skewed, the original scale of political violence was dichotomised. Logistic regression 
analysis was used to examine the separate effects of the investigated independent variables (Hosmer 
and Lemeshow 2000). This binary logistic regression is especially appropriate when the dependent 
variables are self-reported data. As such, the estimated effect was measured of a series of 
independent variables on the probability of having committed political vandalism (i.e. the odds ratio 
of having committed political violence). These odds ratios reflect the increase in the change in the 
dependent variable with respect to the value of the independent variable (Menard, 1995). More 
specifically, they indicate the odds14 of the event of political violence (coded 1, political violence) in 
relation to a reference category (coded 0, no political violence).  
 
Regarding data analysis it is important to control for possible contaminations. Consequently, an 
initial data analysis was performed, through the evaluation of the correlations, to check on 
multicollinearity. These tests on multicollinearity ensure that the independent variables should be 
independent from each other (Farrar and Glauber, 1967). Moreover, multivariate diagnostics were 
run to check for multivariate outliers. Outliers may bias our results towards extreme cases 
(Starkweither and Moske, 2011). Finally, due to the fact that logistic regressions measure the 
probability, the model should be fitted correctly. This implies that only the meaningful variables 
should be included. As such, a stepwise method was used to estimate the logistic regression (Hosmer 
& Lemeshow, 2000). 
 
1.2. Structural equation Modelling 
In addition to the logistic regression technique, structural equation modelling (SEM) was employed 
to test the model fit of our conceptual model. SEM was used in this dissertation as an extension of 
the analysis conducted in SPSS. It should be noted that similar attention was given to the possible 
terms of ‘contamination’. Within the SEM technique, path analysis was used to get an insight into the 
complexity of the interrelationship between independent variables. Through a series of conducted 
structural equation models we were able to test the intermediate relationships of mediating 
                                                          
14
 When the odds ratio gives a score higher than 1, a positive effect is measured. In contrast, an odds ratio <1 indicates a 
negative effect. The interpretation of odds ratios can be made easier by converting them to percentage terms using the 
following formula: [(Exp(B)-1] × 100%. (Pauwels et al., 2014) 
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variables in the analyses (Bollen, 1989, Bollen and Long, 1993). In so doing, these path analyses 
investigated the extent to which the model is reliable by measuring the model fit of the predicted 
data on matrices which contain the actual data (Muthén and Muthén, 2012). The basis for that 
model was inputted by the modeller/researcher at the start. As such, we started from a set of 
theoretical conceptual models which were tested by the use of the software programme Mplus 
(Muthén and Muthén, 2012). To assess the best fitted model we used model modification (i.e. 
modification indices) which led to stepwise improvement of the model fit.  
 
2) Qualitative data analysis  
In contrast to the analytical procedure of the quantitative research, qualitative analysis did not 
immediately follow after the collection of all data. In line with Creswell’s (2007) analytical spiral, the 
research process continuously alternates between data collection and data analysis. As soon as the 
interviews were transcribed by the use of the software program F4, it was important to 
systematically classify the information of the interview. This technique of data management not only 
safeguarded the transcription of the interview, but also classified additional information such as the 
notes on the interview. These memos were convenient for three reasons. First, the memos were 
used to document more information on the interviewees, such as non-verbal communication, 
clothing, tattoos, etc. Second, memos were used to make notes of the informal conversations before 
and after the interview. During the research, it was well noted that interviewees started to mention 
names and events after the recording began. Although the focus of the interview was not to 
reconstruct events, the notes did provide interesting information which could be picked up in the 
subsequent interviews. Third, the memos revealed information about the interview settings. 
Although most interviews were conducted in a public place, in order to ensure safety, some of the 
interviewees persisted on recording the interview in their own homes. This provided the opportunity 
to take a look at the natural ‘habitat’ and interesting books, posters, or other symbols which were 
exposed in the respondents’ home. Moreover, an insight could be yielded from the manner in which 
respondents display their beliefs by, for instance, decorating their houses with symbols. Finally, 
memos formed an ideal source of self-criticism directly after the interview (Decorte, 2009, 458). 
These notes contained a wealth of practical information, including disturbing noise during interviews 
and topics which were not (sufficiently) addressed15 during the interview, etc.   
 
Another manner to critically scrutinise the research is peer debriefing and the establishment of an 
audit trail. It is through the latter technique of transparency towards other researchers that the 
                                                          
15
 When certain topics were not addressed during the interview, I re-approached the respondent by mail or telephone in 
order not to miss anything out.  
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research might produce reliable results to be replicated or tested in other research (Maesschalck, 
2009, 142-143). Although the research was conducted by only one researcher, the research unit and 
the guidance committee played an important role in checking the topic list, the questionnaire, the 
coding procedure and the analyses over time.  More specifically, I benefited from the offered 
expertise of a qualitative researcher who took the time to audit the procedures on a regular basis. 
This critical peer (i.e. fellow academic) perspective during the research ensured the ideal ‘neutral’ 
scope, which enhanced the reliability of the research results. Moreover, during the intense period of 
‘immersion’ into the extreme-right movement, these moments of debriefing with peers were crucial 
in positioning my role as a researcher in the project.  
 
When it comes to the analyses of the collected data, we relied on an open and axial coding system. In 
the first phase, meaningful segments were coded at a stringent detailed level which enabled a 
multitude of categories (Burnard, 1991). These units were then openly coded, but at the same time, 
correlated to the topic list. Grounded on the retrieved data, the codes were gradually re-evaluate 
and refined. In other words, the combination of a predetermined topic list and an inductive bottom-
up coding procedure led us through an extensive, but relatively structured form of coding 
(Mortelmans, 2007). Moreover, the use of the qualitative software program NVIVO strongly 
facilitated the processes to change or adapt codes (Welsh, 2002).   
 
After recoding and adapting the codes, we started to group categories of codes (cf. axial coding 
procedure). It is through this reduction of data that insights were gained into conceptual similarities 
(Decorte, 2009, 456-457). This contextualisation manifested itself through the inventories of 
characteristics of each category which describe or define certain concepts. As such, these themes 
function as the criteria for systematically comparing interviews (Boeije, 2002, 397). In contrast to the 
phase of open coding, the phase of axial coding focussed more on testing the codes of the open 
coding phase against new material. Consequently, new codes were created or assimilated 
(clustering) by which a structure of codes (cf. nodes) and subcodes (cf. child nodes) emerged (Bowen, 
2008, 144). During the data analyses more nodes were coded than reported in this dissertation. This 
is because the scope of this research determines that we only focus on those codes relevant to the 
research questions.  
 
Finally, in order to bring the data to a higher level of abstraction the last phase focused on selective 
coding of the data. In this research phase we tested the relations between different categories by 
searching for contradicting cases to counter certain preliminary conclusions (Boeije, 2006). For 
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instance, in the specific case on the topic of ideology we analysed whether all visions on migration 
were equal. Most respondents motivated their perspective out of cultural motives. Nonetheless, 
some respondents additionally motivated their anti-migration aspect because of racial motives. 
Therefore, in our analysis (see interpretative part) we focussed further on the difference between 
these two motivations for anti-immigration perspectives. Despite the fact that more data could be 
analysed (e.g. concerning other research questions related to the use of violence), we reached a 
point of data saturation in relation to the data on the engagement process. This means that 
additional data would become redundant from the deviant perspective (Bogdan & Biklen, 2006, 84-
85). 
 
5. Research ethics 
Inherent to social research is the requirement to comply with the ethical considerations. In order to 
meet these quality demands, an ethical protocol was established by the Ethical committee of the 
faculty of Law of Ghent University. This piece of research has complied with 6 basic principles of 
social research (Verplaetse et al., 2015)  
 
5.1. Respect for integrity, quality and transparency 
Ramcharan and Cutcliffe (2001) stipulate that a poorly designed study is in itself an unethical 
practice. Therefore, it is crucial that the data are designed, collected and analysed under appropriate 
conditions. However, a well-designed study does not directly imply that the researcher has respected 
ethical assumptions, as shown by the Milgram experiment. Ethical considerations need to be seen as 
a crucial presupposition for a reliable and high quality research without the intent to physically or 
mentally harm respondents. With the aim of preventing the respondents from possible harm, we 
excluded the use of covert research (Bulmer, 2001). Although we considered the advantages of 
covert research on extreme-right individuals by studying them in their natural environment, a human 
centred overt research was preferred (Herrera, 1999). Covert research might have produced an 
unwanted effect on the general public involved in the research; nonetheless, the majority of people 
were often not aware of my presence because the observations were made in openly accessible 
events. However, when contact was made or questions were asked by people who were present and 
observed, they were informed about the conducted social study to safeguard the integrity and 
transparency.  
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5.2. Informed consent  
Another important aspect to overt research is the ethical guideline of informed consent. Scholarly 
debate has focused on the question as to whether researchers need to inform respondents of the 
exact nature of the research process (Corrigan, 2003; Wiles et al., 2005).  While a minimum amount 
of instructions on the research might be misleading, informing the respondents thoroughly of the 
formal procedure, however, on the other hand, might risk them losing interest in the research (Heath 
et al., 2009). In addition, some individuals may encounter difficulty in fully understanding the 
information that is given (Corrigan, 2003, 774). As such, we need to prevent that some aspects of the 
research may be detrimental to the conducted research and the reliability of the results.  
 
In order to encourage the respondents to cooperate while keep them appropriately informed of the 
research process, the research was addressed to the respondents as a project to be conducted in 
social sciences with the focus on the Flemish right-wing movement. At first we did not want to 
emphasize too much on the criminological perspective of the research. Nonetheless, when 
respondents asked more details about the project and research field, it was communicated that the 
research was embedded in the criminological field with the focus on comparing different groups 
within the Flemish right-wing movement. Moreover, in the qualitative research phase we avoided 
using the term ‘extreme-right’, considering the fact that not every respondent labels him/herself as 
such. In addition, we were interested in how the respondents labelled the concepts and to what 
extent their label differed from the extreme-right label.  
 
In practical terms, we respected in both the quantitative as the qualitative study the process of 
informed consent. First, the questionnaire provided a global introduction with information about the 
research, the research funding (i.e. funding by Ghent University) and the aim of the research (Health 
et al., 2009, 23-26). Second, during the interview period we opted to explain and record the informed 
consent to the respondent (O’Gorman, 2010, 522). Therefore, the respondents were fully aware of 
the fact that the interviews were recorded (with their consent) and that the data were to be used for 
research purposes. Moreover, respondents were informed that the interview would discuss some 
aspect of their activist career. They were also told that they could stop the recording or leave the 
research scene whenever necessary. Finally, it was explicitly mentioned that the recorded interviews 
would be used to facilitate the analysis of the interview.  
 
48     Angry white rebel? Study on the mechanisms and processes of participation in ER groups      
 
5.3. Confidentiality and anonymity  
Another aspect to the ethical considerations is maintaining confidentiality and anonymity. 
Confidentiality refers to the restriction of passing on detailed information to others, while anonymity 
is related to the protection of a person’s identity. Heath et al. (2009, 34) remark that in social 
research confidentiality is merely seen as distributing information to others (e.g. in articles), but 
nevertheless without the notion that the information stems from a specific individual. For instance, 
although our research did not focus on restructuring illegal activities, some individuals provided 
detailed information on certain events. With the research grounded on the ethical principles at the 
start of the interview, respondents were convinced that the information they provided would not 
reach others, such as the police16. Meanwhile, anonymity was ensured with the use of three 
techniques. First, there was only one document with the real names of the respondents. In other 
documents, the respondents are referred to with pseudonyms. Second, we opted to include only 
minimum information in the publicly available documents. Lastly, the transcriptions of the interviews 
were also anonymised to avoid that during the crosscheck of the coding reliability, fellow researchers 
could discover the identity of the respondents.   
 
5.4. Voluntary participation 
Alongside the principle of informed consent, equal ethical importance should be given to the aspect 
of voluntary participation. As indicated above, the interviewees were informed that at any time 
during the interview they could leave the setting. Nevertheless, this does not exclude other possible 
involuntary involvement of participants. For instance, as the ethical protocol describes, young people 
under the age of 16 cannot give consent (Verplaetse et al., 2015). This study only focussed on 
respondents above the age of 16. Furthermore, all respondents were free to participate without any 
form of coercion.  
 
5.5. Preventing damage to respondents and researcher 
By abiding by the aforementioned ethic rules, potential damage to the respondents can be 
prevented. However, damage is not merely related to not following procedural rules. Respondents 
also need to be protected against themselves both during and after the interview (McCosker, 
Barnard and Gerber, 2001). Much has already been written on the ideological discourse of the 
extreme-right movement. However, the aim of this research is not to magnify personal extreme 
ideological vision which could damage and stigmatize the broad extreme-right movement. We were 
thus fully aware of the importance to place the related expressions in context.  
                                                          
16
 Regarding this matter, adjustments would be made if respondents gave information about planned actions.  
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On the part of the researcher, within the context of extremist voices in society, the researcher must 
not be blind to possible dangers. Therefore, during the research safety measures were undertaken. 
Firstly, as indicated above, we preferred to conduct the interview in public places (e.g. pubs) where 
witnesses can be found to the conversation. However, eight respondents preferred to conduct the 
interview at home, without any ‘witnesses’. Second, in cases where we expected a certain risk for the 
researcher (e.g. interviews in respondents’ home or with interviewees having a criminal past), peers 
(e.g. fellow researchers, friends or parents) were given the task to make contact (e.g. sent a text or 
call) with the researcher after approximately 3 hours. Finally, information was given to the peers on 
the meeting place where the interview took place. To preserve anonymity, we did not disclose the 
name of the interviewee to peers. However, a brief description of the activist career and the initials 
of the researchers were mentioned in case of unexpected incidents.  
 
5.6. Independent research  
The last principle of the ethical protocol focusses on the independence of the research. Funded by 
the university, the research was not influenced by other parties outside of the university and there 
was no conflict of interest. This aspect of independency was also mentioned in the informed consent 
where exclusive funding of the research was attributed to the University.    
 
6. Structure of the PhD 
This dissertation will start with the chapter on an elaborate historical and theoretical overview of the 
extreme-right phenomenon in Flanders. The historical construction of the contemporary movement 
dates back to the independence of Belgium and was re-established after the Second World War. In 
relation to the European extreme-right movement we will determine whether the identified 
categories of the extreme-right movement can also be applied to the right-wing segment of Flemish 
society. Moreover, we will focus on the presence of social movements, and subcultural networks in 
the Flemish society and their relationship to violent activities. Furthermore, building on the literature 
review, we will investigate which sociological and (social) psychological mechanisms are related to 
right-wing extremist activity (i.e. membership and violence). 
 
Chapter Two introduces the conceptual model grounded on the theories of social bonding, 
procedural justice and differential association to contextualise political violence. Relying on this 
conceptual model, we will examine the net-effects of the various theoretical variables using logistic 
regressions. The variables will be tested on both the readiness to use right-wing extremist violence 
(moral support for right-wing extremism) and the actual behaviour (self-reported political violence). 
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Subsequently, we will analyse to what extent moral support for right-wing extremism influences 
actual behaviour. 
 
Chapter Three will further explore the insights derived from past theoretical and empirical 
contributions regarding participation in violent extremist groups. We will seek to establish an 
integrated framework useful for studying participation in right-wing disruptive groups. We will also 
analyse the interrelationship of the mechanisms mediating attitudes. We will propose that these 
mechanisms further increase the likelihood of right-wing disruptive group membership through the 
proximate mechanism (i.e. moral support for right wing extremism and exposure to racist peers).  
 
Chapter Four, an interpretative chapter, will examine how people become engaged in radical or 
extremist groups. Scholars have attempted to explain this engagement from a multitude of social-
psychological perspectives to understand the pathology of an ‘irrational’ behaviour. In contrast, 
social movement scholars have countered this research claim focusing predominantly on the rational 
explanations for the engagement. Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford (1986) strongly criticise the 
social-psychological approach to movement participation, stating that these scholars have neglected 
interpreting individual grievances. This chapter intends to provide a thoroughgoing understanding of 
the process of engagement in extreme-right groups by combining insights from social psychological 
and social movement theories.  
 
The last chapter, Chapter Five will offer the concluding remarks which elaborate on the still many 
uncharted areas of research, thus point out future research directions. This chapter will also make 
recommendations for policy workers to (continue to) pay attention to this neglected manifestation of 
extremism (cf. Islamic radicalization). 
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Source: State Archive Beveren, demonstration by the VMO against guest workers
17
 on 04/10/1980  
 
 
We asked for workers, we got people instead 
-Max Frisch- 
 
                                                          
17
 Translation of quote: work in own region = work in own land, guest workers go home! 
58     Angry white rebel? Study on the mechanisms and processes of participation in ER groups      
 
1. Introduction 
Almost seventy years after the fall of the Nazi regime, extreme-right groups are still able to shock 
public opinion at both the politically engaged18 and non-politically engaged levels19 of society. 
Framed within the emotionally loaded history of the Second World War, contemporary right-wing 
extremism still has to contend with its association with mass murder, annihilation and conquest (Van 
der Valk and Wagenaar, 2010). Recently the international media drew a great deal of attention to 
right-wing extremist political parties after the attack on 22 July 2011 by the right-wing terrorist 
Anders Behring Breivik. These acts, and the description in Breivik’s manifesto of various right-wing 
extremist parties in Europe as being of a like mind with him, were further confirmation of these 
associations (Van Driessche and De Lobel, 2011).  
 
In recent years right-wing extremism has also raised major concerns in Flanders. In 2002, for 
example, there was the case of skinhead and extreme-right militant Jürgen Goris, who was known for 
his connection with the Flemish section of Blood and Honour20. Goris was convicted for the double 
murder of two young men at a party close to the city of Mechelen21 (Noppe, 2012). Four years later, 
the eighteen year old Hans Van Themsche drew even more attention after his rampage through the 
city of Antwerp, where he intentionally shot three non-white people (Janzing, 2007). These 
extremist-related acts are certainly not a new phenomenon within Flemish society. Right-wing 
extremism has actually a long history in Flanders and goes back to the independence of Belgium in 
1830 which gave rise to Flemish nationalism, a political stream within the Flemish movement (De 
Witte and Klandermans, 2000). During the First World War and the inter-war period radical 
movements such as the Verdinaso22 and Vlaams Nationaal Verbond23  began to emerge (Van 
Donselaar, 1995). Despite its stigma after the Second World War, right-wing extremist militant 
groups such as the ‘Vlaamse Militanten Organisatie’ (VMO) were able to re-establish themselves in 
society. In the 1990s, and especially since the election of 24 November 1991, also known as ‘Black 
Sunday’, right-wing extremist ideology in Flanders also became established within the political 
landscape through the victories of the right-wing extremist party ‘Vlaams Blok’24 and the libertarian 
party ‘ROSSEM’. This rise of the political right and the related commotion within society created new 
opportunities for Belgian studies in the field of right-wing extremism (Billiet and De Witte, 2001; De 
                                                          
18
 Consider, for instance, the recent media attention about the electoral successes of the Greek Golden Dawn  
Party and the French Front National.  
19
 Such as the skinhead movement, neo-Nazi organisations, etc.   
20
 Blood and Honour is a neo-Nazi organisation which was founded by Ian Stuart Donaldson, leader of the white power skin
head band Screwdriver.  
21
 City located in Flanders, in the province of Antwerp. 
22
 Alliance of Diets National Solidarists. 
23
 The Flemish National Alliance. 
24
 Vlaams Blok (translated as ‘Flemish Bloc’) is the old name for the current Flemish Interest Party (Vlaams Belang). 
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Witte, 1991, 1992, 1997, 2001; Gijsels, 1992; Scheepers, Billiet, and De Witte, 1995; Spruyt, 1995; 
Swyngedouw, 1992, 2000). Research, however, has mainly been limited to the fields of politics and 
sociology which concentrate on the political rise of right-wing extremism, without pointing to the 
social danger of the non-electorally engaged extreme right groups.  
 
Criminological and (socio-) psychological research in this area is very scarce in Flanders (De Witte, 
1997, 2001; De Witte and Klandermans, 2000; Jacobs and Rummens, 2003; Noppe, 2012). Focussing 
on these disciplines may explain, as international research has shown, the reasons why people turn 
to extremist groups (entry), support or even commit violent acts during their engagement and - from 
a preventive point of view- also why people tend to leave these groups (exit) (Bjørgo, 1994, 1997, 
1998, 2004, 2011; Heitmeyer, 1988; Heitmeyer and Hagan, 2003; Koopmans, 2006; Mudde, 2002; 
Sela-Shayovitz, 2011). 
 
From a criminological perspective, the purpose of this article is to close this gap and gain insight into 
the presence of non-electorally engaged or extra-parliamentary extreme-right groups in Flanders. 
Different acts in diverse European countries (e.g. Germany, Scandinavia, Netherlands, UK, Ukraine) 
against asylum seekers or other ‘enemies’, have shown that the activity of extreme groups within 
Flemish society does not have to be minimalized (Bleich, 2007; Heitmeyer, 1988; Heitmeyer and 
Hagan, 2003; Miller-Idriss, 2009; Watts, 2001). Knabe, Ratzel and Thomsen (2013) indicate that 
increases in right-wing extremism within a native population can significantly reduce the life 
satisfaction of native people and immigrants within that society. This article will therefore start with 
a literature study posing the following question: ‘Which extreme-right groups exist in Belgium and 
what are the characteristics of individuals within these extreme-right groups?’ To answer the latter 
question this article will focus on three levels: the external (macro), social (meso) and the individual 
(micro) levels (Veldhuis and Bakker, 2012). However, before focussing on the different levels, the first 
section of this article will explain the difficulties in determining a clear definition of right-wing 
extremism. Many scholars have discussed its real meaning, but have not come to a universally 
accepted definition. This section will identify the problems and indicate the selected perspective for 
this article. The second section will focus on four categories within the European extreme-right 
movement as indicated by Goodwin, Ramalingam and Briggs (2012). A historical analysis will 
determine whether these categories can also be applied to the right-wing segment of Flemish 
society. Based on changes in society after the Second World (macro), some patterns of increasingly 
profound radicalisation can be differentiated throughout Flemish history. The third and last section 
will concentrate more on the social groups (meso) and individual (micro) level factors associated with 
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a right-wing orientation. Research in the fields of sociology and psychology can tell us more about 
factors associated with a right-wing orientation.  
 
2. Defining ‘right-wing extremist orientation’ 
During recent decades, scholars have discussed the exact definition of the concept of 'right-wing 
extremism’ without reaching a clear consensus (Fermin, 2009; Heitmeyer and Hagan, 2003; Van der 
Valk and Wagenaar, 2010; Van Donselaar, 1995). Miller-Idriss (2009: 97), for instance, concludes in 
her study of contemporary right-wing radicalism that 'there are many types of right-wing radicals, 
but […] these groups reflect distinct subcultures within right-wing extremism and radicalism'. This 
makes it difficult to give one clear definition which includes all aspects of the complex social 
phenomenon of ‘right-wing extremism’ or ‘right wing radicalism’ (Goodwin, Ramalingam, and Briggs, 
2012).  
 
At the most basic level we can say that ‘right-wing extremism’ refers in the first place to the 
competing political categorisations of left and right. Where the left can be seen as progressive, the 
right has a more conservative ideology. Both ends of the spectrum include people who express a 
radical worldview and are far away from the centre, namely the democratic constitutional state (Van 
Donselaar, 1995). On the right-wing side, for instance, extremists strongly prefer a world with fewer 
civil rights for the nation’s minorities and for women (Sidlow and Henschen, 2008). The 
interpretation of the concept may, however, not be limited to this static position within the political 
spectrum (Huijgens, 2004). Right-wing extremism is actually greatly influenced by social and cultural 
changes within society (Van der Valk and Wagenaar, 2010). The contemporary meaning of the 
concept of ‘right-wing extremism’ is, for instance, different from its meaning fifty years ago. Van 
Donselaar and Rodrigues (2008) define extreme-right sympathisers as people who have an aversion 
to elements that are either ‘alien’ or ‘hostile to the nation’. The ‘alien’ aspect relates to the cultural 
diversity that people experience. During the Second World War this category was mainly associated 
with ‘Jews’ and 'gypsies’. Nowadays it has been extended to the general class of ‘ethnic minorities’, 
with a fixation on the Muslim population (Van Donselaar, 2009). The ‘hostility’ aspect, on the other 
hand, refers to the (political) enemies in the same ethnic group as the extremists. Depending on the 
time period and the ideological perspectives of the group, issues such as anti-liberalism, anti-
socialism or anti-communism will be included. In this context Billig mentioned the relative position 
within the democratic system: 'Though a convincing definition of right-wing extremism has not been 
found, research work on political parties of the right has not had serious problems in selecting 
appropriate cases' (Billig cited in Linden, 2009: 10). Nevertheless, a clear definition of the concept is 
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needed to place the phenomenon in the social field. 
 
When considering the concept of ‘right-wing extremism’, it is necessary to look at the complex and 
dynamic process of radicalisation which may lead to various (violent or non-violent) outcomes. 
Noppe, Hellinckx, and Van de Velde (2011) created a model which integrated the process of 
radicalisation, the staircase model of Moghaddam (2005), the model of Mellis (2007) and the 
pyramid model of McCauley and Moskalenko (2008). They thereby distinguish three phases, namely 
the phases of radicalism, extremism and terrorism. The latter phase is to be seen as the ultimate 
outcome and is rarely achieved. Radicalism on the other hand refers to the more ideological aspects 
without the intention of committing violent acts. Scepticism towards democratic institutions, support 
for Flemish independence and even fear or hatred towards foreigners are perfectly legal and are in 
themselves mostly not punishable if there is no behavioural manifestation which causes harm 
towards individuals or society. These radical attitudes or beliefs do not suddenly emerge, but arise 
from other historical issues within the radicalised person’s life. 
 
Within this context, Mudde (2002) states that the difference between radicalism and extremism is 
the fact that the first is opposed to the constitution, whereas the latter is hostile towards the 
constitution. Right-wing extremism is thus seen as the reinforcing step of radicalism and refers to the 
support and/or use of right-wing extremist related violence. This social phenomenon is often used as 
a set of complex multiple interrelated elements to explain the larger concept (Fermin, 2009; Miller-
Idriss, 2009). Even central elements such as racism or xenophobia do not necessary have to play a 
role (Bjørgo, 1997). In this contribution we will however concentrate on two basic elements of right-
wing extremism as described by Wilhelm Heitmeyer (1992) in his book Rechtsextremistische 
orientierungen bei jugendlichen, namely considering (1) an ideology of inequality between people as 
a nature given principle, and (2) an acceptance of violence as a legitimate form of political action 
(Heitmeyer cited in Bjørgo, 1997, p. 21). Relying on international research, it is possible to include - in 
addition to this definition - some optional elements such as authoritarianism, intolerance towards 
minorities, anti-communism/socialism, anti-liberalism, nationalism, anti-Semitism, racism and 
'xenophobia’ that correlate with the concept of right-wing extremism (Altemeyer, 1998; Bjørgo, 
1997; Noppe, 2012). The latter can therefore be seen as an umbrella concept which covers a large 
number of complex, interrelated criteria which can be brought together under a dynamic heading. 
Mudde (2002) mentions that it is very difficult to find a consensus on the exact definition of the term 
because the term is not only used for scientific but also for political purposes. Related to that 
dynamic concept, the next section will however focus on groups which are associated with a right-
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wing extremist orientation in the form of a discriminating ideology and the acceptance or use of 
violence. 
 
3. The changing focus of right-wing extremism in Flanders 
After the Second World War, Belgium was confronted by extreme groups, both on the left and the 
right side of the political spectrum. Although extreme-right groups were active in both the Dutch and 
French areas25 of Belgium26, only Flanders had to deal with a persistent right-wing infiltration into 
society and the democratic system. There are three reasons for this.  
 
Van Donselaar (1995) notes that Flanders and Wallonia have a different view of the collaboration 
with the Germans during the Second World War. The period after the war was dominated by the split 
between ‘good’ people (allies) and ‘bad’ people (collaborators). The collaboration with the Germans 
seemed much more brutal in the French areas where it was compared with betrayal. The repression 
of these collaborators after the Second World War was also noticeable in Flanders, but nevertheless 
there were some justifications which could be made. To this end, collaboration was actually strongly 
linked to disloyalty towards the Belgian state, which was considered positively in the eyes of Flemish 
nationalists and played an important role in the resurrection of right-wing extremism in Flanders.  
 
A second reason and also a consequence of the Second World War, is the presence of war memorials 
in Flanders (monuments, museums, war cemeteries, etc.). These places formed an ideal focus for the 
reunification of national and international extreme-right movements. On 10 March 2007, for 
instance, the Dutchman Stefan Wijkamp27 organised a neo-Nazi gathering in a German military 
cemetery in Lommel28, where he performed the Hitler salute in front of three hundred neo-Nazis (De 
Morgen, 2008). These places are known for their unique history, and form an ideal focus for right-
wing extremist groups to celebrate their ‘heroes’.  
 
Flanders has seen, in contrast to Wallonia, an enormous electoral breakthrough by extreme-right 
political parties. As mentioned earlier, the extreme-right party ‘Vlaams Blok’ succeeded in a strong 
breakthrough in Flanders after ‘Black Sunday’. The party experienced a steady electoral increase 
which in 2004 led to their peak of almost a quarter of the votes of the Flemish people (24, 15%), 
when they were considered one of the strongest extreme-right parties in Europe. The Walloon party 
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 Such as the Front de la Jeunesse (1974-1983) and the Westland New post (1979-1984). 
26
 Belgium consists of a French-speaking area (Wallonia), a Dutch-speaking area (Flanders), a small German-speaking area (t
he German-speaking Community) and a bilingual zone within the region of the capital, Brussels. 
27
 Is an extreme-right activist and look-alike of Hitler. Therefore, he is also known as the ‘Hitler of Kerkrade’. 
28
 Flemish city, in the province of Limburg.  
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‘Front National’, on the other hand, could only convince 8.2% of the French-speaking part of Belgium 
(Coffé, 2005), The ‘Front national’ has now disappeared from the political stage, and although the 
successor of the Vlaams Blok, the Vlaams Belang is still active in Flanders, their success has stagnated 
and declined over the years. However, it is a sign that an extreme-right breeding ground is present 
within the Flemish society. Relying on this, the article will investigate the situation in Flanders. The 
following section will focus on the various extreme-right groups in Flanders, related to the European 
context.  
 
3.1. A European perspective 
Social scientists in Europe have carried out a number of studies into the profiles and motives of 
people who engage with or vote for political parties with a right-wing extremist orientation. These 
studies give us an insight into the prevalence of the phenomenon (the question of how many people 
have felt attracted towards the right-wing extremist views of political parties) and the factors 
associated with these views (covariates). Nevertheless, the phenomenon of right-wing extremism is 
not limited to political parties.  
 
Goodwin et al. (2012) indicate that there are four categories within the right-wing extremist milieu in 
Europe, namely political parties, social movements, networks and lone wolves. These categories are 
not mutually exclusive, but each has a different perspective on ideology and the use of violence 
within their right-wing extremist setting. The first category includes the political parties who pursue 
the goal of shaping public policy through their elected members. Individual members may be linked 
with violence or criminality, but the parties themselves strive to operate within the law.  
 
Within the second category, Goodwin et al. note that social movements contain people who identify 
themselves within a large network of people with a similar ideology who support an extreme-right 
ideology outside the political parties. However, they still seek to mobilize public support and are, as 
such, not formally involved in violent activities. These movements can also be seen as a channel for 
recruitment for both political parties and networks.  
 
The third and newer category includes the smaller social and cultural groups or networks acting 
independently from political parties and the social movements. Within these networks, we find 
‘racial revolutionaries’ with a national-socialistic ideology and identification with Nazi Germany. 
Bjørgo (1997) distinguishes these racial revolutionaries from the national democrats who are not 
based on Nazi ideology, focus primarily on anti-immigration themes and prefer to work within the 
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democratic political system, at least to the outside world (front-stage). This category is called a 
‘specialty group’ within the typology of gangs in the United States. Maxson and Klein (1995) state 
that such groups are small (with 50 or fewer members), were founded at the beginning of the 1990s 
and focus mostly on violent offences and crimes against the property of non-white ethnic minorities. 
Klein (2001) indicates that the so-called traditional gangs cannot be detached from the American 
context. Weerman and Dekker (2005) mention within that context that these European groups 
rather consist of more informal youth groups and networks. This category contains what they 
describe as ‘troublesome youth groups’.  
 
The fourth and last category is that of the lone wolves, who tend to act on their own, in complete 
isolation. This phenomenon suggests that factors other than an evolving process of radicalisation, 
charismatic leadership, socialisation experiences and other group processes can lead people to 
commit crimes related to extreme right wing views. Flanders was, as previously mentioned, 
confronted with this phenomenon with for instance the rampage of Hans Van Themsche in 2004. The 
category of lone wolves does not fall within the scope of this research, which involves people within 
extreme-right groups, and so will be excluded. In this article we focus on the three remaining 
European categories of extreme-right groups and investigate whether these can be found within the 
history of Flemish society.  
 
3.2. Re-emergence of Flemish nationalism 
The Belgian independence in 1830 forms a starting point for the Flemish movement. This originally 
linguistic movement reacted against the ‘Frenchification’ of the Belgian state and wanted to obtain 
recognition and equal rights for the Dutch language (De Witte and Klandermans, 2000, p 702). At the 
beginning of the twentieth century and certainly after the First World War the movement began to 
develop a more cultural nationalistic ideology, which even led to the establishment of a Flemish 
nationalistic political movement called Vlaams Nationaal verbond (VNV)29 and evolved in an extreme-
right-wing direction with an anti-Belgian ideology (De Witte and Klandermans, 2000, p 702).  
 
On 24 August 1930 the ‘ijzertoren’ was inaugurated in the West-Flemish city Diksmuide as a 
monument to peace with the slogan ‘No more war’ on all four sides of the tower (De Wever, 2008). 
Only nine years later, on 1 September this slogan turned out to be a utopian ideal. What followed 
was a period of mass murder, annihilation, conquest, treason and collusion which destroyed the 
message of peace from the inter-war period (Van der Valk and Wagenaar, 2010). The repression of 
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 Translated as the Flemish National Union. 
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the collaborators after the Second World War led to the apparent disappearance of Flemish 
nationalist groups such as ‘Verdinaso’ and ‘Vlaamse Nationaal Verbond’, which were present during 
the inter-war period. There were, however, still some Flemish patriots who appreciated the 
collaboration and the corresponding disloyalty towards the Belgian state (Van Donselaar, 1995). A 
few years after the end of the War, important Flemish Nationalistic symbols from the inter-War 
period, such as the ‘ijzerbedevaart’30 and the Flemish National songfestival (Vlaams Nationaal 
Zangfeest)31 were reorganized and became symbols for the revival of Flemish nationalistic ideology 
(De Wever, 1997).  
 
Extreme-right political parties and organisations in Flanders have always been closely related to 
Flemish nationalism, in contrast to Wallonia where such parties and organisations conducted a more 
Belgian national unionistic discourse (Coffé, 2005; Swyngedouw, 1998). The first signs of this Flemish 
nationalistic revival after the Second World War were found in the early 1950s with diverse attempts 
to form a political party. At the beginning of the 1950s this was realised with the formation of the 
‘Volksunie’32. The hard repression of collaborators after the war led to resentment among the 
nationalistic population. One of their main demands was the right to amnesty. It is therefore not 
surprising that Flemish nationalists felt the urgency to organise a common ideological group in the 
form of a political party or organization. Within the period of searching for that political voice in the 
democratic system, Flemish nationalists wanted to set up a militant organisation – outside the 
context of a political party - that could guarantee their security. At the beginning of the 1950s this 
organisation called the ‘Vlaamse Militanten organisatie’ consisted of approximately 30-40 members 
and had the purpose of protecting the political gatherings of the Volksunie (Verlinden, De 
Schampheleire, and Thanassekos, 1991). In 1971, VMO leader Bob Maes decided to dissolve the 
organisation due to intimidation from the judicial authorities, the ‘left-oriented’ social media and 
internal struggles regarding the lack of discipline of some members33 (Claes, 2006).  
 
3.3. Transition and radicalisation of Flemish nationalism 
During the 1970s it became clear that the Flemish nationalist organisations had to deal with a 
process which Van Donselaar (1995) refers to as the ‘adaptability dilemma’, that is the balance 
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 Annual pilgrimage in memory of the Flemish soldiers from the First World War. 
31
 A singing festival with the aim of gaining more attention for Flemish music, including on the radio. They want to show       
that Flemish music is more than pop music and promote classic battle songs and anthems such as the  
Flemish Lion. A traditional element is the speech of the Algemeen Nationaal Zangverbond chairman, in which   current Flem
ish aspirations are formulated. 
32
 The Flemish National political party was active from 1954 until 2001 and had great electoral success in the  
1970s and 1980s. 
33
 Such as the confrontation with the Walloon party FDF where a member of the FDF was murdered. 
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between a strong profile without being criminalised or a more pragmatic course to suit the 
democratic system. The latter profile, however, had the potential to create resentment among the 
more radical members. This was the case with the Volksunie, where radical right supporters 
disagreed with the leftist course of the party which had created new opportunities within the 
political field and finally resulted in the founding of the political party ‘Vlaams Blok’. This also points 
to the instability of these groups and confirms the social genealogy theory that extreme right-wing 
groups arise not haphazardly, but generally from other right-wing (extremist) formations (Van der 
Valk and Van der Schans, 2011). As mentioned previously, the VMO had also had to deal with 
internal squabbles leading to the dissolution of the Vlaamse Militanten organisatie in 1971. In that 
same year Bert Eriksson restarted the VMO and changed the name to the ‘Vlaamse Militanten Orde’ 
(Claes, 2006). This was the beginning of a more radical stance of the extreme-right militant 
organization. They no longer focused solely on the Flemish aspect, but became more involved with 
demonstrations against drugs, guest workers, abortion and anti-Flemish demagogy (Claes, 2006). On 
4 May 1981 the VMO was condemned for organising paramilitary camps and as such functioning as a 
private militia with the intent to use violence. 
 
The extreme right-wing also expanded during this period, with the creation of new Flemish 
nationalistic movements. Social movements such as the Nationalistische Studentenvereniging 
(Nationalist Students’ Association, NSV) and Voorpost34 (Vanguard) were founded in 1976 and 
formed an ideal means for explaining their ideas to Flemish youngsters. NSV is currently the biggest 
student association within Flanders and maintains close ties with the political party Vlaams Belang 
(De Witte, 2006; Van der Valk and Van der Schans, 2011). It can also be seen as one of the channels 
for recruitment for future political members. A second channel for recruiting ideologically engaged 
people is the extreme-right militant organization Voorpost, which strives for reunification between 
Flanders and the Netherlands. The main activity of both social movements is to conduct legal 
demonstrations without spreading a fascist or racist ideology.  
 
3.4. Revival of Nazism 
During the mid-1980s, Europe had to deal with a massive wave of immigration which evoked a strong 
sense of resentment against immigrants. This resentment even resulted in Scandinavia and Germany 
in widespread worship of the Nazi regime and the ‘Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei‘ 
(NSDAP) and criminal acts against persons and their property (Bjørgo, 2002; Boehnke, Hagan, and 
Merkens, 1998). Many of these incidents were initially minimalized until the police arrested 
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Chapter 1: The Flemish extreme-right movement: State of the art     67     
 
 
 
participants in the racist youth scene in Oslo and Kristiansand, who turned out to be thirteen years 
old, or even younger (Bjørgo, 1997). This came as a huge shock to the parents of the teenagers, who 
decided to collaborate with other parents in the same situation by starting a parental network group. 
This network finally formed the basis for the Norwegian project ‘Exit – Leaving Violent Youth Groups’ 
which supports youngsters in their disengagement from violent (or violence-prone) groups. Later on, 
similar exit projects were started in Denmark (Exit Copenhagen) and Sweden (Exit-Sweden) (Bjørgo, 
1997; Bovenkerk, 2011; Kimmel, 2007). Nevertheless, this problem was not limited to Scandinavia, 
but also arose in Eastern and Western Europe where it has been the subject of specific academic 
interest. In Germany especially, people were confronted with a revival of extreme right wing groups 
and with various violent acts against asylum seekers and asylum centres (Bleich, 2007; Heitmeyer, 
1988; Heitmeyer and Hagan, 2003; Kimmel, 2007; Miller-Idriss, 2009; Watts, 2001). Following the 
Scandinavian example, Germany decided to start an exit project called ‘Exit-Deutschland’. These 
projects focus mainly on the assessment of the disengager’s safety and are more accessible than 
other governmental projects because they can operate independently. This is one reason why 
disengagers do not see these NGO projects as coming from the ‘enemy’.  
 
Within a Flemish context, it is noted that the increasingly expanding support for the ‘Vlaams Blok’ 
after ‘Black Sunday’ created enormous public concern. However, this turned out to be merely a 
footnote in the rise of racial revolutionary groups. In line with Scandinavia, Germany and the UK, 
Flemish people started to get confronted with violence from the extreme right. Nick Lowles, editor of 
the renowned international anti-fascist magazine Searchlight, attributes this activity in Europe to the 
internationalization of the skinhead scene during the late 1990s (Humo, 2003). It was the first time 
that Flanders had to deal with such an openly racist scene with various meetings to ‘honour’ their 
leaders.  
 
One of the most important groups was Blood and Honour. This neo-Nazi group had their origin in 
Great Britain and referred to the slogan of the Hitler jugend ‘Blut und Ehre’. In 2001 two sections 
arose in Flanders with the recognition of the English headquarters, namely Blood and Honour 
Flanders, and Blood and Honour Midgard (Noppe, 2012). As with the English Blood and Honour 
section their main activity was the organization of white power music and national socialist black 
metal meetings which also attracted people from the metal scene. Flanders turned out to be the 
ideal place for reunification of the international Blood and Honour organization due to the fact that 
the organisation could not be convicted by the judicial system35 (cf. Germany36). Moreover, the police 
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and judicial institutions initially had the impression that they could do nothing to forbid these 
meetings (De Standaard, 2010). However, due to the magnitude of these meetings and certainly after 
an undercover documentary by the German journalist ‘Thomas Kuban’, the public opinion gradually 
started to show their disgrace and dissatisfaction. The images of Kuban’s work provided a horrifying 
picture of neo-Nazi skinheads shouting slogans such as 'Sieg Heil’ and performing the Hitler salute. 
These meetings in Flanders were limited to expressions of xenophobia, discrimination and 
segregation. However, there are some examples of violence related to the Flemish section of Blood 
and Honour (see Noppe, 2012). The activities of Blood and Honour peaked in 2007 and 2008, when 
they organized concerts in Flanders which were attended by 300-600 people (State security, 2010). 
Their activity has reduced greatly since then, but there are still some core members present in 
Flanders.  
 
Around these movements float splinter groups such as Combat 18. This organisation also has an 
international dimension, with a section in Flanders. Currently 17 members of the Flemish section are 
awaiting trial for arms trafficking, assault and battery, in the so-called the BBET trial, referring to a 
magazine called ‘Blood, Soil, Honour and Loyalty’ (BBET) published by the Flemish part of the Combat 
18 network. The latter group is suspected of being a paramilitary group with the intention of 
committing terrorist actions (Noppe, 2012). The BBET group seems extinguished and replaced by a 
new fascist group, namely the Autonome Nationalisten37 (AN) with members of right-wing extremist 
groups such as Voorpost and Blood and Honour 
 
Apart from Blood and Honour, there are also groups such as the Nieuw Solidaristisch Alternatief38 
(NSA) who are primarily not based upon a racial revolutionary image. The NSA has however opted for 
a more ‘hostile to the nation’ approach with a focus on the system and the government as enemies 
of right-wing supreme ideology. Because of their common enemy, members of organisations such as 
Blood and Honour or Combat 18 are often present at various activities of the NSA (State Security, 
2010). 
 
3.5. A different relationship to violence 
But what makes social movements or networks so different from political parties such as Vlaams 
Blok/Vlaams Belang? Firstly, there is the entirely different approach towards violence. Where the use 
of violence towards ethnic minorities is preached through the white power music of the 
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 Autonomous Nationalists. 
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 New Solidarist Alternative. 
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revolutionaries, the absolute abstention of violence is advocated by leaders of the political parties at 
least to the outside world (front stage). A good example of this was the reaction of Filip De Winter, 
an important member of the Vlaams Belang, to the fact that his name was mentioned in the 1,516 
page manifesto of Anders Behring Breivik. De Winter reacted against this labelling by saying that ‘his 
only weapon is a pencil to vote’ (Van Driessche and De Lobel, 2011). Secondly, as previously 
mentioned, political parties must set out on a particular road, balancing on the edge of legality and 
searching for the balance between having a strong profile without being criminalized, and following a 
more pragmatic course within the democratic system (Van Donselaar, 1995). The party Vlaams Blok, 
for instance, was banned in 2004 from political activity because of their racist propaganda. Non-
politically engaged groups on the other hand, have more ‘freedom’ although they also run the risk of 
criminalisation. Thirdly, international scholars have indicated that ideology is sometimes present to a 
lesser extent within the networks of racial revolutionaries (Bjørgo, 2002). This is mainly because 
these groups tend to consist of young people in search of their own identity and a group into which 
they could fit, rather than searching for a common meaning. There is however always some 
connection between the extreme group and the radicalized person. Van der Valk and Wagenaar 
(2010) mention, within this context, the mirror effect, where these youngsters connect with people 
whom they strongly want to resemble. It is clear that non-white people, for example, will not join 
extreme right wing groups. People stay within their ‘environment’.  
 
It seems clear that Flanders has a long tradition of groups or political parties which can be placed on 
the far right of the political spectrum. This article will focus on two categories within the European 
framework of Goodwin et al. (2012). Referring to the research question, the aim is to gain insight into 
extreme-right groups and factors relating to persons within these groups. This also excludes the 
category of political parties because they have already frequently been investigated in the political 
field and they tend to concentrate mostly upon a political ideology which strives to operate within 
legality. From a criminological point of view it is therefore more interesting to look at social 
movements and networks. In the following section, this article will highlight the factors associated 
with those individuals who are involved in extreme-right movements and networks. 
 
4. Factors associated with involvement in extreme right wing groups 
International qualitative research with former members of extreme groups in Scandinavia and 
Germany has given us insights into ideas related to right-wing extremism. The results of previous 
research have indicated that a minority of right-wing extremist offenders have broad ideological 
ideas. The majority of members are not politically active, but sympathize with a few ideas that are 
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typical of political parties with a right wing orientation (Huijgens, 2004). Although radicalised persons 
have no ‘one size fits all’ identity, scholars have tried to offer different potential explanations for the 
radicalisation process. External factors such as political, cultural and economic circumstances 
constitute our broad environment, but have no direct relationship with personal behaviour. General 
phenomena such as individualisation, modernisation, globalisation, and de-territorialisation of 
religion have certainly had an impact on mechanisms at a meso and micro level (Veldhuis and Bakker, 
2007). This section concentrates solely on the explanations at these levels which are closer to the 
right-wing orientation of the individual and the extreme-right group.   
 
4.1. Discontent 
During the 1950s and 1960s there was a discussion within sociology about the causal interrelation 
between anomia, authoritarianism and ethnocentrism. McDill (1961) stated that these three 
dimensions formed what he called a ‘negative weltanschauung’, a negative worldview related to a 
form of discontent (Van de Velde and Pauwels, 2010). All three components of this worldview have 
already been shown to have high correlations with right-wing extremist attitudes. 
 
The first traces of research on extremism in society began after the Second World War. The events of 
the war also had an impact on the way that scholars studied these subjects. Macro level approaches 
were replaced by research at the micro level, and research methods such as surveys found their 
place in the scientific world. In 1950, for instance, Adorno et al. developed a psychological 
explanation stating that individuals with an ‘authoritarian personality’ appear to have a strong 
connection with far right ideology (Adorno cited in Gielen, 2008). Severe punishment and the 
dominance of parents over their children during their upbringing means that children do not dare to 
criticize their parents, which leads to authoritarian and submissive characteristics in children. These 
people, from dissatisfaction with their own position which they experience as weakness, consider 
others as weak or immoral. They distinguish other social or ethnic groups as outside their own group 
(Gielen, 2008). People with an authoritarian personality are often supporters of nationalism and have 
ethnocentric attitudes. Sociological research by De Witte (1999), for example, suggested that 
authoritarian attitudes have a strong influence on biological racism, because these people fear 
everything that is different from their own community. Authoritarian people may also perceive 
homosexuals as threatening because they have a great belief in traditional role relationships, such as 
male superiority and female inferiority (Whitley and Ægisdóttir, 2000).  
The concept of anomia owes its definition to the original concept of ‘anomie’ as described by 
Durkheim and Merton. These scholars referred to a state of society (macro) and ‘the breakdown of 
those moral norms that limit desires and aspirations’, called anomie (Deflem, 1989: 629). Srole 
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(1956) described the concept of ‘anomia’ as a state of mind expressed by individuals (micro) and ‘a 
subjective feeling responding to societal dysfunctions’ (Van de Velde and Pauwels, 2010: 112). 
According to Srole (1956) this concept of anomia contains five interrelated sub-dimensions (De 
Witte, 2001; Jacobs, Abts, Phalet, and Swyngedouw, 2001). Firstly, he mentioned the dimension of 
‘political powerlessness’ referring to the discrepancy between the citizen and the political leaders. 
Secondly, ‘social powerlessness’ is defined as the view that social reality is chaotic and unpredictable. 
Thirdly, the anomic individual experiences a generalised socio-economic retrogression. The fourth 
dimension includes normlessness and meaninglessness regarding the institutionalised norms and 
values. Finally, Srole (1956) indicates that social isolation, in which social support in the immediate 
vicinity seems to disappear, is also related to anomia. Research has indicated that right-wing 
extremist ideology seems to correlate with the dimension of political powerlessness (De Groof, 
Debusscher, Derks, Elchardus, and TOR, 1999; Scheepers, Eisinga, and Felling, 1994). Previous 
research has indicated that this dimension of anomia strongly correlates with right-wing extremism 
attitudes (De Witte, 2001; Hagedoorn and Janssen, 1983). German research by Boehnke, Hagan and 
Merkens (1998), for instance, demonstrated that this concept has an indirect influence on right-wing 
extremist acts such as vandalism.  
 
The final concept within the perspective of a ‘negative worldview’ is ethnocentrism, which includes 
two dimensions, as it refers to a positive attitude towards the ‘in-group’ and within that same 
context a related negative view of the ‘out-group’ (Hooghe and Reeskens, 2006; Jacobs et al., 2001; 
Meuleman and Billiet, 2005; Willems, 1995). Research has already indicated that ethnocentrism may 
lead to negative stereotypes, negative prejudices and negative behaviour towards minorities (Bircan, 
2012). Tajfel and Turner (1974) indicate in their social identity theory that the shared experiences, 
values and norms of the group play a major role in the development of the social identity and status 
of the group in relation to its enemies. They refer to a psychological process that is involved in in-
group socialisation and is related to the path that individuals take when entering a group (Guimond, 
2000). Scheepers and Eisinga (1989) have built upon the theory of Tajfel and Turner, stating that 
there is not only a positive identification, but that the concept also contains a negative identification 
towards the ‘out-group’ (contra-identification). The ‘in-/out-group’ relationship allows people to 
break down the barriers to committing violent acts (Heitmeyer and Hagan, 2003; Van der Valk and 
Wagenaar, 2010). Previous Flemish research has already shown that ethnocentric attitudes have a 
high profile within the NSV (De Witte, 2001). Through identification with the group, the group 
protects itself against all its enemies (Goodwin et al., 2012). Enemies can, however, by certain 
actions, undermine the value of the group, so that the group feels threatened in its social identity. 
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The research of van den Bos, Loseman and Doosje (2009) shows that youngsters who experience 
more of a threat to their group support right-wing ideology to a greater extent. Moreover, these 
youngsters are more positive towards right-wing extremist violence. 
 
It is not surprising that individuals who are connected with extreme-right movements and networks 
hold as what McDill (1961) calls a ‘negative worldview’. These extremist groups are already located 
at the far right side of ‘mainstream’ society and therefore hold anti-establishment ideology. 
Extremists are therefore seen as people who (1) fear everything that is different from their own 
society, (2) experience a large distance from political leaders and the political system and (3) have a 
strong identification with their own group. 
 
4.2. Perceived injustice 
Youngsters seem to experience a great deal of ‘injustice’ in their lives (Van den Bos et al., 2009). 
Research in the 1980s conducted by Eisinga indicates that people with a relatively low educational 
level are more likely to feel economically threatened and also are more likely to vote for right-wing 
extremism parties (Eisinga cited in Gielen, 2008). However, there is not much empirical evidence that 
confirms a relationship between social-economic background and extremism (Vermeulen and 
Bovenkerk, 2012). As well as absolute deprivation, Gurr (1970) distinguishes in his book, Why Men 
Rebel, the concept of relative deprivation where a person compares their own situation with the 
situations of others. In this concept the focus is not on absolute standards (such as educational level 
or being unemployed or poor), but a person’s assessment of their own environment. Modern 
theories still make use of this concept of relative deprivation as an explanation for attitudes that 
correlate with right-wing extremism. Within their theoretical model Van den Bos et al. (2009) 
included the concept of ‘perceived injustice’, mentioning that feelings of relative deprivation and 
procedural injustice could lead to negative emotions towards society. These negative emotions can 
be expressed in the form of intended or actual use of violent and/or offensive behaviour. Two levels 
of relative deprivation can be distinguished, individual and collective deprivation. The first refers to 
an assessment of one’s own situation as negative compared with that of other individuals. Within 
this deprivation, the individual can, however, still be motivated to change their situation. Youngsters 
may, on the other hand, have the idea that they are unlawfully excluded compared to other groups. 
This connects to a negative connotation with one’s own group, which leads to social protest and 
collective action when certain goals are not achieved (Meertens and Prins, 2010). This perceived 
deprivation may lead to a stronger bond and positive thoughts within the group, allowing a greater 
degree of camaraderie and safety. In addition to the concept of deprivation, Van den Bos et al. 
(2009) also point to the importance of the concept of ‘procedural injustice’. They show that people 
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are more susceptible to radicalisation when they feel that their group is mistreated. These negative 
emotions towards society have a strong impact on the radicalisation process of youngsters. 
Perceived unlawful treatment could lead to positive attitudes towards radical ideologies, perception 
of the authorities as less legitimate and growing ethnocentric and superiority sentiments.  
 
4.2. Feelings of national superiority  
As previously mentioned, Flemish nationalism has always had a close relationship with right-wing 
extremism. Nevertheless, this relationship can by no means be seen as a causal relationship. 
Pennings and Brants (1985) state in their research that right-wing extremism is characterised by 
strong anti-leftist opinion because of its supporters’ rejection of multiculturalism and 
internationalism. Extreme-right wing groups are seeking instead to promote their own Flemish 
nationalistic in-group. This form of nationalism is often associated with feelings of superiority 
towards the Flemish people or the so-called superior race. Results from Scandinavian research into 
former members of extreme right wing groups have indicated that various extremists were 
convinced that they belonged to a superior group (Kimmel, 2007).  
 
4.3. Thrill-seeking behaviour 
Ethnographic research has suggested that ideological motivations are not the main reason for 
entering troublesome youth groups, but that new members are mostly motivated by opportunistic or 
criminal thrill-seeking motives (Bjørgo, 2002; Watts, 2001). People join as a reaction to personal 
frustration, searching for recognition, identity seeking and thrill seeking, and in search of adventure. 
Bjorgo (1997) mentions that some members of extreme groups are often socially frustrated 
youngsters who experience their own situation as discriminating and unjust. Together with 
perceptions of injustice, group threat or wishing to restore traditional values, these extremists may 
emerge to commit acts of violence. Bjørgo stated that this category is characterised by private 
problems, early school drop-outs and unemployment. These persons largely focus on and show 
willingness to commit violent acts (Van der Valk and Wagenaar, 2010).  
 
4.4. Age 
Results from research within Scandinavia and Germany indicate that perpetrators of extreme-right 
violent acts are mostly between the ages of twelve and twenty-five (Bjørgo, 2002; Boehnke et al., 
1998; McGowan, 2006). During this period the youngster is confronted with both bodily and mental 
changes. Research in Scandinavia, for instance, indicates that participation in neo-Nazi skinhead 
groups is often part of taking a first step towards adulthood (Kimmel, 2007). At the age of sixteen a 
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teenager is often confronted with situations which are newly legal, such as the use of alcohol, 
cigarettes and having sex. These legalisation ages vary across the different European countries, but 
form a certain reference point or symbolic ‘rite of passage’ (Hodkinson and Deicke, 2007). 
Secularisation, expansion of education and new styles of fashion and music in recent decades have 
ensured that identity and social status are no longer taken for granted. Efforts to create a personal 
profile within the contemporary modern social and economic system have a high risk of failure 
(Heitmeyer and Hagan, 2003; Hodkinson and Deicke, 2007). In comparison to elderly people, the 
mind-set of youngsters is often less nuanced and more divided into a strict separation of right and 
wrong. International ethnographic research has shown that the majority of members leave a group 
at the beginning of their twenties (Bjørgo, 1997; Gielen, 2008; Kimmel, 2007; Watts, 2001). However, 
if they remain in the group for a longer period, it is more likely that they will become strongly 
indoctrinated with right-wing extremist values such as xenophobia or the superiority of the Flemish 
nation or white race. Bjørgo (1997) indicates that there are some ideological activists within groups. 
They are long-term members of the group and often fulfil a leading role within the group. 
 
4.5. Peer influences  
Subcultural theories argue that youngsters experience uncertainty and injustice associated with their 
search for their own identity. In order to solve this, they create their own communities outside 
‘mainstream’ society (Hodkinson and Deicke, 2007). The finding that right-wing extremist related 
crimes are often carried out by youngsters indicates that there are in fact things other than ideology 
(belonging to a group, sensation seeking etc.) among these groups. Social relations with friends are 
extremely important for the development of attitudes and engagement in deviant behaviour 
(Hawkins, 2000; Hill, Howell, Hawkins, and Battin-Pearson, 1999; Vernberg, Jacobs, and Hershberger, 
1999). Sutherland (1947), for instance, states in his differential association theory that delinquency is 
actually a consequence of attitudes in favour of illegal acts. These attitudes have been seen as the 
mechanism by which delinquency is socially transmitted by way of social relations among peers. On 
the other hand, Warr and Stafford (1991) indicate in their study of data from the National Youth 
Survey, that peer attitudes certainly affect delinquency, but that the effect is actually smaller than 
the behaviour of peers. During early adolescence, the influence of delinquent peers plays an 
important role in the development of individual behaviour, since most delinquent behaviour is 
carried out in a group.  
 
5. Conclusion 
A good look at the history of right-wing groups in Flanders makes it clear that groups with a right-
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wing extremist orientation have never actually been expelled from Flanders. They were, however, 
often wrapped in a broader Flemish nationalist framework. Goodwin et al. (2012) mention that right-
wing extremist groups in Europe can be divided into four categories, where political parties, social 
movement, networks and lone wolves can be distinguished. 
  
Extreme-right political parties are part of a long-lasting tradition within Flemish society, beginning 
even long before the Second World War. Repression after the war, however, caused a public absence 
of extreme right wing parties. At the beginning of the 1950s, however, Flemish nationalism started 
slowly but surely to recover the sympathy of Flemish nationalistically minded people. The creation of 
the political party ‘Volksunie’ was their political response to the severe repression after the war, with 
the aim of enforcing the right to amnesty. The party gradually gained more sympathy during the 
1970s, but had to deal with internal problems between the left and right of the party. This eventually 
led to the separation of a radical right segment, which formed the extreme-right party ‘Vlaams Blok’. 
From the 1990s and at the beginning of the new millennium this party began to obtain very good 
electoral results with a maximum of a quarter of the votes of the Flemish people in 2004. It is 
remarkable that both parties (i.e. Volksunie and Vlaams Blok) had to deal with the ‘adaptability 
dilemma’. These political parties lived on the edge of legality in a search to find a balance between a 
strong profile without being criminalised or a more pragmatic course within the democratic system. 
The latter had the potential to create resentment among the more radical members, as was the case 
with the Volksunie. The party Vlaams Blok on the other hand was even banned in 2004 from political 
activity because of their extreme racist propaganda. This also points towards the instability of these 
groups and confirms the social genealogy theory that right-wing extremist groups arise not 
haphazardly, but usually from other right-wing (extremist) formations.  
 
In addition to the political parties, social movements also had their impact on the political field by 
supporting political representatives. The Vlaamse Militanten Organisatie39, for instance, had the 
initial goal of supporting the Volksunie through legal demonstrations. At the end of the seventies, the 
latter militant organization was strengthened by two new groups, namely the NSV and ‘Voorpost’, 
established in the seventies and forming an ideal organisation for the recruitment of youngsters and 
indoctrinating them into the Flemish or Diets ideology. Nevertheless, just as with political parties, 
these movements strove to operate legally in the eyes of the outside world by participating in legal 
demonstrations which could however end in civil unrest.  
 
                                                          
39
 By this we mean the first and less radicalised VMO. 
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Flemish social and cultural networks caused even more civil unrest with their illegal actions and 
white power concerts. Flemish national democrats are predominantly found in groups such as VMO 
and NSA where they focus on an anti-democratic ideology. Racial revolutionary networks like Blood 
and Honour and Combat 18, on the other hand, focus more upon a neo-Nazi ideology propagated by 
white power music. However, though no serious acts of violence occurred during these activities, it 
was clear that these concerts with xenophobic and discriminatory expressions were unacceptable 
within society. The Vlaamse Militanten Orde40 can also be placed under this latter category. After the 
change of name this group no longer solely focused on legal demonstrations, but became a more 
radical private militia.  
 
In addition to the European model of Goodwin et al. (2012), Flanders has also had to deal with the 
actions of lone wolves. For example, the actions of Hans Van Themsche, who shot three non-white 
people, show that this category is also present on the far-right side. The latter category was excluded 
within this article, because the research primarily focuses on individuals within right-wing extremist 
groups. 
 
The tragedy related to the Second World War, also caused a switch within research. Personal life 
events turned out to be a very interesting study of object. Concepts specific to individuals such as 
anomia, authoritarianism and ethnocentrism were therefore seen as the factors related to a form of 
discontent. These factors of personal dissatisfaction are also related to a right-wing orientation, in 
which it is seen that these people tend to experience much dissatisfaction with current asylum 
policies, society, government and the world in general. Such discontent is expressed only in regard to 
the ‘enemies’, the out-group. People within this area also tend to glorify their own values and the 
norms of their in-group, their ideological kin. The lack of identification with the out-group ensures 
that people may easily break down their barriers in order to commit illegal or even violent acts 
against others. Friends who support or show a willingness to commit violent acts within their own in-
group could force others to take a further step towards illegality. Alongside such negative 
worldviews, these extremists often experience feelings of perceived (procedural) injustice and 
threats to their personal situation and/or the situation of their related group. Feelings of being 
mistreated by the government or governmental institutions can only increase the gap between the 
radical individual or group and ‘mainstream’ society. This growing gap only reconfirms the picture of 
others as the representation of everything that is bad and their own group as the only right way. 
They experience this way of living and their (Flemish and/or white) origin as superior.  
                                                          
40
 After the change of name Vlaamse Militanten organisatie became the Vlaamse Militanten Orde. 
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As an exploratory study in the field of right-wing extremism, a few recommendations for further 
research may be suggested. First, it is clear that right-wing extremism is a complex social 
phenomenon that covers a large number of interrelated elements. Considering the dynamic 
construct of the concept, right-wing extremism is defined by two fixed elements, namely an ideology 
of inequality between people and an acceptance of violence. This can be supplemented by optional 
elements. Secondly, a distinction should be made between the categories of extreme-right groups in 
relation to the support and/or use of violence. Whilst political parties publicly strive to work using 
legal means and without the use of violence, social movements and certainly networks may hold a 
more radical profile where support for violence can be preached. At the white power concerts of 
Blood and Honour, for instance, diverse individuals performed the Hitler salute and spread words of 
hate towards Jews or immigrants. Flanders also had to deal with demonstrations of the VMO41, 
Voorpost and NSV which often led to violent conflicts. Thirdly, further research in Flanders is needed 
in order to verify whether the characteristics are also applicable to the individuals within the Flemish 
social movements and networks. Through such theory-testing research we can gain insight into the 
attitudes of these Flemish militants in order to investigate their environment and their perspectives 
on violence.  
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“But he did not kill her, because in between dream and act 
there are hindering laws and practical issues, 
and even melancholy, that no one can explain 
and that comes at night, when we all go to sleep”  
 
-Willem Elsschot
42
- 
                                                          
42
 English translation of poem by Willem Elsschot, ‘the Marriage’. In appreciation of the contribution made by Dr. Jaap Van 
Donselaar 
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1. Introduction 
International conflicts for political, religious or cultural reasons like the Arab spring and the Syrian 
uprising also leave their mark on European countries such as Belgium. Currently more than seventy 
Syria fighters have returned and are running the risk of prosecution. The discussion about the 
criminalization of these youngsters also sheds light on radical Islam groups like sharia 4 Belgium. The 
focus of both politics and academic research doesn’t however solely need to concentrate on the 
danger of jihads. Academic research, especially after 9/11, seems to focus mainly on Muslim 
extremism and appears to worry less about the left-right polarization within their own society. 
Processes of globalization and mobilization of the last decades have, however, ensured that a wide 
diversity of people with different (religious) beliefs, cultures and identities characterize our current 
multi-cultural society. It also ensures that standing up for one's own identity and freedom of speech 
has an increasingly important role within modern society, such an important role that certain 
opinions or expressions may cross the line and disregard other fundamental rights (e.g. prohibition of 
discrimination43) within our liberal democracy. This contribution will therefore focus on personal 
morality and the effect of an aberrant right-wing morality on criminal behaviour. These attitudes 
favourable to rule breaking are seen within the light of classical theories such as differential 
association and social bonding theory, but also in contemporary influential theories, such as the 
situational action theory (SAT), as important causes of crime (Wikström, 2010) 44. Different studies 
have found that morality is significantly related to offending (Bottoms, 2002; Hirschi, 1969; Wikström 
& Svensson, 2010; Antonaccio & Tittle, 2008) and Bottoms (2002:24) even stated that if real 
criminologist are to be true to their calling, they have to be interested in morality of individuals. Our 
contribution will therefore focus on Flemish youngsters’ moral support towards right-wing 
extremism45. We have opted for Flemish youngsters between the age of 16 and 25 for two reasons. 
First, research in Scandinavia and Germany has indicated that perpetrators of right-wing extremist 
violent acts are mostly between the ages of 12 and 25 (Bjørgo, 2002; Boehnke, Hagan & Merkens, 
1998; McGowan, 2006). To get a glance on the population of political offenders we have opted to 
focus on youngsters. Second, Flemish youngsters are rather neglected within the research on 
extreme political attitudes (some examples of research on Flemish youngsters: De Witte, Hooge, & 
                                                          
43
 As mentioned in article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
44
 Attitudes favourable to rule-breaking have already been studied by Sutherland (1947) and Farrington (1986) as causes of 
criminal behaviour. More recent research on the impact of morality by Wikström (2010) also includes these attitudes as 
moral rules of persons (i.e. what do persons perceive as right or wrong to do in a certain situation). In this article moral 
support for right-wing extremism is a an attitude favourable to rule breaking behaviour.  
45
 Right-wing extremism is defined in this contribution by two basic elements: (1) an ideology of inequality between people 
as a nature given principle and (2) an acceptance of violence as a legitimate form of political action(De Waele, 2013: 17-19; 
based on Heitmeyer cited in Bjørgo, 1997, p.21) 
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Walgrave, 2000; Vettenburg, Elchardus, & Put, 2011). This research will therefore contribute to the 
current gap in literature on right-wing extremist sympathies among youngsters.  
 
2. Integrated theoretical framework 
More than 35 years ago Elliott, Ageton, and Canter (1979) argued that theories depending on a single 
variable (cf. strain, self-control, etc.) are only capable of explaining a small percentage of the variance 
in crime or criminal behaviour. It took scholars, however, until the late eighties to come up with 
important attempts to develop integrated theories of offending. Thornberry (1989) soon reflected on 
this development within criminological theory building and mentioned that theoretical integration is 
important to discover communalities in seemingly competing theories. Nevertheless, he also warns 
that scholars might run the risk of developing theoretical mush in which the fundamental purpose of 
theory constructions is neglected. Scholars who want to integrate theories focused, according to 
Thornberry, too much on reconciliation of the differences in spite of explaining a particular 
phenomenon. Our study therefore focusses on a conceptually integrated approach to explain the 
actual use of political violence. This means that we will include theoretical concepts of strain, 
procedural justice, social control and social learning to analyse their effect on the abovementioned 
dependent variable. 
 
Within this contribution we will focus on a multifactorial social fact that requires an independent 
explanation, depending on a multi-disciplinary approach. Rather than testing competitive theories, 
we argue in light of Bernard and Snipes (1996) that different theories are conceived for making 
different, but not contradictory predictions.  Furthermore, research has revealed that competitive 
testing of two or more theories to increase the knowledge about certain criminal behaviour did not 
lead to a wide array of test that yield conclusive results (Bernard & Stripes, 1996; Liska, Krohn & 
Messner, 1989). This study, therefore, wants to contribute to a more comprehensible and accurate 
model of political violence by investing in the complementarity of the different predictions of 
political violence. It is, however within this context, necessary that integration of different concepts 
should be built around an internal causal logic that makes a distinction between proximate and more 
distal factors (Bouhana and Wikström, 2010). The key message of an analytical approach to moral 
support for political violence is to take causation, human agency and the person-environment 
interaction more seriously to advance our knowledge about (political) violence, its causes and 
prevention. This has implications for the study of political violence: it is important to gain not only 
insights into what is referred to as the ‘causes’ but additionally to what can be referred to as ‘the 
causes of the causes’ of moral support and political violence (Wikström, 2010). Drawing on Jon 
Elster’s (1989) proposal to explain social action around individuals’ desires, beliefs and opportunities 
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/ constraints, we argue that an analytical sociological framework may offer an organizing paradigm to 
the study of political violence. Pauwels, Ponsaers, and Svensson (2010) and Wikström (2012) have 
argued for an analytical criminology, which shows very clear links to the analytical approach in 
sociology in order to provide more in-depth causal explanations of crime as social action. This 
contribution will give an explanation for both moral support for right-wing extremism and for the 
actual use of political violence depending on diverse theoretical concepts (see Figure 4), namely (1) 
social integration, (2) procedural justice and perceived legitimacy, (3) perceived discrimination, (4) 
personal attitudes and/or beliefs and (5) peer influences.  
 
 
Figure 4: Conceptual integrated model of moral support for right-wing extremism 
 
2.1. The role of social integration 
Criminological research has a broad tradition regarding the impact of the social environment. 
Kornhauser (1960), for instance, already described in the sixties that people who lack integration 
with society search for substitute intermediary structures. Right-wing parties, movements and social 
or cultural networks could form a perfect replacement for broken bonds with parents, school or 
other institutions. Control theory has traditionally pointed to the importance of social bonds of the 
individual to society. In the late sixties, Hirschi (1969) pointed to the positive bonds of the individual 
with his/her parents, school and society as main reasons why people do not commit criminal acts. He 
stated that attachment to parents, commitment to school, involvement and conventional beliefs 
restrained individuals from committing delinquent acts. Although empirical tests of the social bond 
theory have sometimes used weak measures, there is evidence that the elements of the social bond 
are inversely related to the commitment of crimes (Kempf, 1993). Participation in a coherent social 
network built around social institutions such as family, school or individuals provides a means to 
enable people to live with critical situations (Boehnke, Hagan, & Merkens, 1998).  Laub and Sampson 
(1993) noted that it is not the social bonds in themselves but the social control resulting from these 
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bonds that prevent youth from committing crimes. In that context, they state that the absence of 
informal social bonding such as parenting styles (supervision, warmth, consistent discipline), 
emotional attachment to parents in childhood, school attachment and attachment to peers and 
marital stability may have an important impact on the tendency to commit criminal acts (Laub &  
Sampson, 2005). Regarding this theoretical background, it is hypothesised that low levels of social 
integration (social bonds with parents, parental control, school bonds, social integration at school, 
family disadvantage and school performance) may increase the chances of morally supporting right-
wing violent acts. Research by Hagan, Mekens and Boehnke (1995) on right-wing extremist 
orientation among East and West-German youth points out that insight into informal social control 
and school achievement can be extended beyond the explanation of crime to include extreme 
political orientation. They indicate that both parental control and school achievement effects a right-
wing extremist orientation, through the intervening role of delinquent drift. Hopf, Riecker, Sanden-
Marcus & Schmidt (1995) indicated that right-wing oriented people reported considerably more 
rejection by their parents and are often experiencing absence of loving personal attention. We, 
therefore, argue that social bonds with the family and school are important conditions that foster 
law-abiding through the individual’s trust in the police as a legitimate element of law enforcement. 
Absence of social bonds, on the other hand, might foster extreme political beliefs and actual law-
breaking behaviour.    
 
2.2. Perceived personal and group discrimination as strains 
Different theories have discussed the influence of injustice on criminal behaviour. One of the leading 
theories of injustice is Agnew’s general theory of strain (GST)(2006), were perceptions of injustice are 
seen as possible stressors. The situation of strain or negative treatment by others leads to negative 
emotions, particularly anger and frustration, which necessitate coping strategies. In response to 
strain, one might be able to develop negative emotions (e.g., anger) towards other individuals or out 
groups (Heitmeyer, 2003; Van der Valk and Wagenaar, 2010). GST identifies three main sources of 
strain: (1) situations that block positively valued goals (e.g., money, status, autonomy); (2) situations 
that remove positively valued stimuli (e.g., loss of spouse, theft of valued possessions); and (3) 
situations that produce negative stimuli (e.g., discrimination).  
 
In their study on perceived discrimination Taylor, Wright, Moghaddam & Lalonde (1990) discussed 
the discrepancy between personal and group discrimination. It appeared that out of a variety of 
minority groups, individual members had consistently higher rates of group discrimination than 
discriminating feelings aimed at themselves. Taylor et al. argued that this discrepancy is due to 
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minimization of group members about their own personal experience with discrimination. Being 
called a racist name is an example of personal discrimination, whereas the belief that members of 
one’s racial group are discriminated against in job interviews reflects an awareness of group 
discrimination. The study of Bourguignon, Seron, Yzerbyt & Herman (2006) on discrimination of 
African immigrants and Belgian women showed that perceived personal discrimination is negatively 
related to self-esteem. Such negative emotions could have deleterious consequences for an array of 
outcomes, including depression, anxiety disorders, high blood pressure, and other mental and 
physical health outcomes (Schnittker & McLeod, 2005; Williams, Neighbors, & Jackson, 2003). 
Research has also turned out that racial discrimination may be seen as a stressor that leads to 
delinquency among minority groups (Simons, Chen, Stewart and Brody, 2003). It is therefore likely 
that other kinds of discrimination and injustice affect delinquency and problem behaviour in general 
and not only in minority groups. This study, therefore, hypothesis that perceived discrimination will 
increase the negative emotions (i.e. moral support for right-wing extremism) that contribute to 
political violence.  
 
2.3. The role of legitimacy  
According to the procedural justice model, confidence and compliance depend largely on perceptions 
of fairness (Tyler, 2006). Perceived procedural justice concerns the integrity and fairness of the justice 
system. It constitutes a firm and durable set of attitudes toward the legitimacy of the institution 
(Reisig & Lloyd, 2007). Trust in the police's procedural justice and legitimacy has previously been 
identified as an important factor that contributes to compliant behaviour. Procedural justice theory 
has stressed the importance of institutions treating people fairly: by treating people fairly, 
institutions contribute to the acceptance of norms. Therefore we consider the absence of trust and 
legitimacy to be potential causal factors in the explanation of political violence. Several scholars have 
found an association between perceptions of police legitimacy on the one hand and different forms 
of public support for the police such as the willingness to cooperate with them and abiding by the 
law on the other hand (Tyler, 2006; Reisig, Bratton, & Gertz, 2007). According to Tyler, police 
strategies have to centre attention on building public trust so they will be perceived as legitimate and 
thus voluntary obedience will be achieved (Hough, Jackson, Myhill & Quinton, 2010). Analogous to 
social bond theory, procedural justice theory examines why people conform to the law, instead of 
asking why people are motivated to break the law. Yet, unlike social bond theory, procedural justice 
theory accepts that controls are weakened by structural constraints. These constraints are situated 
at the institutional level: the police, the criminal justice system, and so on can treat people unfairly, 
which may have consequences for the committing of (violent) crimes. The fact that procedural justice 
theory recognises the importance of strains, especially strains caused by institutions of law 
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enforcement, makes it an important candidate for theoretical integration of social bond and strain 
theory.  
 
2.4. Interpersonal attitudes and beliefs as mediators  
Individual beliefs and attitudes are considered to be important mechanisms that intervene in the 
relationship between social integration, perceived legitimacy and perceived discrimination on the 
one hand and the moral support for right-wing extremism on the other hand. The present study 
highlights several belief systems and attitudes as intervening mechanisms: religious authoritarianism, 
low self-control, and anomia. 
 
In ‘The Authoritarian Personality’, Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson & Sanford (1950) originally 
conceptualised authoritarianism as a relatively stable intrapersonal trait which results from enduring 
intrapersonal conflicts rooted in childhood experiences of harsh education. It was believed that the 
authoritarian person would suppress his feelings of anger toward his father and family and would 
later on replace it by an idealization of the situation in which he grew up. Consequently, the potential 
fascist was seen as a weakling who wanted to overcompensate his weak position by an exaggerated 
admiration for power and character (Gielen, 2008; Linden, 2009). It is out of these feelings that 
fascist and/or authoritarian persons project their repressed aggression on people whom they 
perceive as weak or immoral, especially ethnic minorities, homosexuals and women (Adorno et al., 
1950; Whitley & Ægisdóttir, 2000). As the concept of authoritarianism and its operationalization were 
subject to many criticisms, Altemeyer (1998) tried to provide a more concise and clear definition of 
the concept: he conceptualised authoritarianism as a value syndrome that means three distinct 
elements: (1) conventionalism, which is a high level of compliance with social norms; (2) an emphasis 
on hierarchy and submission to authority; and (3) a ‘law and order’ mentality which legitimises anger 
and aggression against those who deviate from the social norms. Altemeyer (1981, 1988) neglects 
the idea of authoritarianism as an intrapersonal characteristic. Instead, he believes that 
authoritarianism consists of a set of coherent attitudes which is learned from peer groups and similar 
socialising agents (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988). Scholars have been using the concept of authoritarianism 
for determining extreme-right voting and extreme-right (political) activism. De Witte (2006), for 
instance, stated that extreme-right voters are being attracted to the authoritarian image of these 
political parties because they provide simple, straightforward solutions to problems of insecurity and 
crime. This authoritarian vision is mostly rooted within a discourse of negative attitude towards 
immigrants. Within their research on ethnic prejudice, Elchardus and Siongers (2010) confirmed that 
authoritarianism has a strong effect on ethnocentrism (i.e. negative attitudes toward out-group) and 
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feelings of national identity. Cohn and Modecki (2007) even found that authoritarianism was related 
to adolescent offending through its impact on a measure of negative attitudes towards the criminal 
justice system. 
 
Another individual-level mechanism that is related to violent behaviour in general and thus may also 
apply in the context of political violence is low self-control. Self-control is an inhibitory factor that has 
previously been described as the opportunity, the ability, to resist the drive for immediate 
gratification. Hirschi and Gottfredson (1990) conceptualised the absence of self-control as a 
multidimensional trait that consists in yielding to immediate gratification, in preference for simple 
tasks, risk-taking behaviour, impulsiveness, volatile temper, self-centeredness. Hirshi (2004, 543) 
redefined the concept as the “tendency to consider the full range of potential costs of a particular 
act”. Empirical studies have shown that the dimensions of risk-taking behaviour, impulsiveness and 
volatile temper have consistent effects on self-reported offending, including violent offending (Pratt 
& Cullen, 2000). The present study will provide insight into the possibility that low self-control 
explains individual differences in political violence. Previous qualitative studies have also pointed to 
the importance of thrill-seeking motives in violent behaviour committed by right-wing extremists 
(Bjørgo, 2002; Watts, 2001). This study, therefore, wants to investigate whether low self-control only 
has an impact on delinquent actions or also affects the willingness to undertake right-wing 
delinquent acts. 
 
Srole (1956) described the concept of anomia as a state of mind expressed by individuals (micro) and 
as ‘a subjective feeling responding to social dysfunctions’ (Van de Velde & Pauwels, 2010: 112). 
According to Srole, this concept of anomia contains five strongly interrelated sub-dimensions.46 
Research has indicated that right-wing extremist ideology mainly seems to correlate with the 
dimension of political powerlessness (Scheepers, Felling, & Peters, 1989; Vande Velde & Pauwels, 
2010). De Witte (1999) has shown in its study about subtle racism that political powerlessness can 
have a strong effect on both authoritarianism and negative attitudes towards foreigners. Boehnke 
Hagan, and Merkens (1998) studied risk factors related to right-wing orientation and were among the 
first to empirically test the relationship between social bonds, anomia and right-wing extremist acts 
such as vandalism. In that, they indicated that anomic aspirations indirectly increase both a right-
wing orientation as well as school vandalism/ violence through their effect on delinquent drift caused 
                                                          
46
 First, he mentioned the dimension of ‘political powerlessness’, referring to the discrepancy between the citizen and the 
political leaders. Second, ‘social powerlessness’ is defined as the view that social reality is chaotic and unpredictable. Third, 
the anomic individual experiences general socio-economic retrogression. The fourth dimension includes normlessness and 
meaninglessness regarding institutionalised norms and values. The fifth and last dimension of anomia is social isolation, in 
which social support in the immediate vicinity seems to disappear. 
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by the time spent in the leisure settings that are exposed to delinquency and right-wing extremism 
(Hagan, Merkens, Boehnke, 1995). Subjective alienation or anomia owes its definition to the concept 
of ‘anomie’ as described by Merton and is an individual-level counterpart of the concept of anomie. 
These scholars referred to a state of society (macro) and ‘the breakdown of those moral norms that 
limit desires and aspirations’, called anomie (Deflem, 1989: 629). As German studies have indicated 
that anomic aspirations tend to have effect on both moral support for right-wing extremism and 
school vandalism/ violence, we hypothesize that Flemish youth with high levels of anomie tend to 
have both high levels of moral support for right-wing extremism and political violence.  
 
2.5. The role of exposure to peer racism and peer delinquency as situational component 
The role of peers in the aetiology of juvenile delinquency and violence is especially prominent in 
social learning theories (Akers, 1998; Bruinsma, 1992; Warr, 2002) but highly contested in control 
theories (Hirschi & Gottfredson, 1990; Kornhauser, 1978; Hirschi, 1969). Differential association with 
delinquent peers is one of the strongest predictors of self-reported delinquency, and therefore we 
expect that this also applies to the study of political violence. The association with racist and 
delinquent peers provides two specific contexts of exposure to settings in which the use of violence 
either in general or for political reasons is supported. They are not only important in social learning 
theory, however, but also routine-activities/lifestyle theory (Laub & Sampson, 2003; Pauwels & 
Svensson, 2013). From a routine activities/lifestyle perspective peers are important as they may be 
responsible for the situational instigation to commit an act of (political) violence. In the present study 
we take into account peer delinquency and peer racism as important indicators of exposure to 
criminogenic moral settings, shaping the individual’s routines and thus their lifestyle (Ceccato & 
Wikström, 2012; Pauwels & Svensson, 2013). Racist peers are assumed to influence political violence 
by providing definitions and attitudes which are tolerant of violence and by reinforcing delinquent 
behaviour through group processes. Peers can provide these rewards to stimulate the law-violating 
behaviour of their friends in group processes (such as loyalty and prestige in extremist groups) Peer 
racism refers to racist ideology in the peer group. It is thought that racist attitudes of peers may 
affect one’s own attitudes similarly to the way in which peer delinquency affects one’s own 
delinquency.  
 
2.6. Moral support for right-wing extremism 
As mentioned above a multitude of studies have found that measures of antisocial moral beliefs are 
significantly related to offending (Bottoms 2002; Hirschi 1969; Stams, Brugman, Deković, Van 
Rosmalen, Van der Laan & Gibbs, 2006; Svensson, Pauwels, and Weerman 2010; Antonaccio and 
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Tittle 2008). Bouhana and Wikström (2010), for instance, mention within their research on terrorism 
as moral action that one has a certain tendency to commit violent acts. They consider that 
individuals with law relevant moral values will not see crime as an alternative action. So delinquent 
actions will only be seen as an alternative action when one has non-law relevant moral towards a 
certain action. Nevertheless, violent action does not solely depend on the moral support for certain 
delinquent activity and low self-control. According to Wikström’s SAT, exposure to action relevant 
features of the setting, relevant opportunities, action relevant moral context and frictions also 
determine whether one proceeds to violent activity. Research on right-wing violence has mostly 
been focussing on ‘soft’ measures of right-wing extremism by measuring the acceptance or readiness 
to use right-wing violence. This study, however, allows us to study the effect of one’s moral support 
for right-wing violent acts on the actual self-reported political violence. 
 
3. Hypotheses 
Bearing on these five theoretical concepts, we present the following conceptually integrated model 
for the explanation of moral support for right-wing extremism (see Figure 4). Within this model we 
make a clear distinction, based on integrated situational action theory of Boehanna and Wikström 
(2008), between proximate/direct (‘causes’) and more distal causes (‘causes of the causes’). The aim 
of this exploratory study is to get an insight into the direct effects of the aforementioned theoretical 
concepts on both moral support for right-wing extremism and politically motivated violence. The 
strength of these effects will be tested by adding new variables to the multiple blockwise regression. 
The order of introducing the variables into the equation is defined by the theoretical model. 
Specifically we set out to test the following hypotheses: 
 
H1: Social integration is negatively related to moral support for right-wing extremism and the use of 
political violence 
 
H2: Perceived personal discrimination and group discrimination are both positively related to moral 
support for right-wing extremism and political violence. 
 
H3: Police procedural justice and police legitimacy are negatively related to moral support for right-
wing extremism and political violence, ceteris paribus 
 
H4: Personal beliefs/attitudes (moral support for violent extremism, religious authoritarianism, 
impulsiveness, thrill-seeking, and political powerlessness) are positively related to moral support for 
right-wing extremism and political violence, ceteris paribus 
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H5: Exposure to racist attitudes of peers and peer delinquency are positively related to moral support 
for right-wing extremism and political violence, ceteris paribus. 
 
4. Data 
The present study is the largest study of moral support for political violence conducted in Belgium. 
The questionnaire consists of multiple scales derived from different theories and is especially 
designed to test theories of political violence.  The study aims at gaining insight into the relationship 
between attitudes towards right-wing extremism and self-reported political violence among Belgian 
youths and young adults. Data were collected (1) through a large-scale web survey of adolescents 
and young adults and (2) a paper-and-pencil survey among youths in the third cycle of secondary 
education in Antwerp and Liège. The present study is limited to the analysis of Flemish youths who 
live in Flanders, have the Belgian nationality and have parents with the Belgian nationality. The web 
survey consists of a self-administered questionnaire that was conducted online. Access was gained 
through a link to the survey’s web page on Facebook. This survey mode requires almost no 
organisation, does not cause disruption to work time and leaves the decision to participate entirely 
to the students. Posters were placed visibly at different strategic places that attract a huge number 
of the target population.  Additionally flyers were distributed in buildings of virtually all faculties of 
universities and university colleges and pamphlets were distributed among the students. To increase 
the response to the web survey, an e-mail invitation was sent to the central faculties and 
administration services for students with a request to circulate the web link to the questionnaire 
Facebook page. This method proved to be very effective. An important drawback is that the 
researcher cannot completely monitor the processes of response selection, i.e. s/he cannot verify the 
conditions under which the questionnaire is completed (the presence of others, anonymity,...). The 
motivation to participate in the survey is left entirely to the respondent. The fact that the 
questionnaire web page was visible on Facebook meant that a high number of respondents could be 
reached in a very short time. The web survey was online between September 2012 and December 
2012 and the response was huge, with more than 3,200 respondents in Flanders. An additional 
paper-and-pencil survey was conducted in Antwerp in order to reach youths in compulsory 
secondary education. A total of 34 schools in Antwerp were contacted. In six out of these 34 schools 
a paper-and-pencil survey was conducted; the other schools allowed us to distribute flyers for the 
online survey. Important draw-backs for this method are the impossibility to monitor response 
selection, self-selection, and under-coverage (internet availability). It should however be mentioned 
that these issues (preparedness to answer survey questions, willingness to report) are central to the 
more traditional survey modes as well. This contribution focusses on the relation between moral 
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support and political violence. It is therefore fair to state that this web survey is contributing more to 
the explanation of the causes than to epidemiological or prevalence studies that try to gain insight 
into the prevalence of attitudes and behaviour. We do need to bear in mind that this approach only 
works if enough participants are willing to report aberrant moral support for right-wing extremism 
and admit violent behaviour. Of the 2879 participants, 74.6 % indicated to have low to medium levels 
of moral support for right-wing extremism. This means that 544 (25.4 percent) respondents showed 
high levels of moral support for right-wing extremism. Regarding violent activity, 123 individuals (5.3 
percent) reported political violence. These might not be seen as representative for the Flemish 
population because of the formerly mentioned bias of the population. They do, however, allow us to 
make to make reliable statistical claims about this group. Still we have to consider the influence of 
our method on our population. Web surveys seem to be most popular among students and less 
among working youth. This is also noticeable among our populations, by which 95.2% have indicated 
to be students.    
 
5. Measurement of constructs 
In the present study numerous scale constructs were used to assess the relationship between the 
exogenous variables, mediators and self-reported political violence. Because of the extensive nature 
of the concepts that were used in the present empirical study, we chose to present a general 
overview of the scale constructs in the present paragraph and refer readers to the appendix 4 for a 
more detailed overview of the scales. We included question wording and additional factor loadings 
per item for each scale (see Appendix 4).  
 
5.1. Dependent variables 
Moral support for right-wing extremist violence refers to one’s tolerance of the use of violence by 
right-wing extremist groups. This concept can be compared to Sutherland’s definitions favourable to 
the violations of law and is thus a personal attitude that is favourable to the use of violence. A 
number of studies have found that the concept of antisocial values is significantly related to the 
committing of acts of crime (Bottoms, 2002; Chapple, McQuillan & Berdahl, 2005; Hirschi, 1969; 
Stams et al., 2006; Wikström & Svensson, 2010; Antonaccio & Tittle, 2008). Support for right-wing 
extremism was measured using items from a scale that measures attitudes towards the use of 
violence by right-wing extremists in order to reach political goals. Cronbach’s alpha for this variable is 
0.89. The items were taken from a larger scale used in a study by Van den Bos, Loseman, and Doosje 
(2010). 
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We measured Political violence by asking if respondents had ever “written a political message or 
political graffiti on a wall,” “participated in a banned political action,” “thrown stones at the police 
during a demonstration,” “vandalised anything in the street or at the public transport stations” 
“damaged someone’s property,” or “set something on fire” because of their political or religious 
beliefs. The scale turned out to be internal consistent with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.87. The scale is 
translated from Swedish and was originally used in a youth survey conducted by the Swedish Council 
for Crime Prevention (see Brottsförebyggande rådet och Säkerhetspolisen, 2009). 
 
5.2. Independent variables 
Independent variables were drawn from a number of theories that are well-known in the field of 
criminology. Control theory (CT) argues that social integration in a number of domains (attachment 
and commitment to school, attachment to parents, parental supervision, family structure, and 
academic success versus failure) restrains an individual from committing acts of crime. An overall 
social integration scale was constructed based on subscales that refer to school performance (never 
repeated a class/at least once repeated a class), parental disadvantage (no unemployment in family/ 
at least one parent unemployed), family situation (living with both parents/ other family situation), 
social bonds with parents (alpha: 0.84), social control by parents (alpha: 0.82), school social bonds 
(alpha: 0.59), and school integration (alpha: 0.80). The original scales were used to create risk scores 
and these risk scores (1= upper risk quartile) were then collapsed into a general scale that measures 
the number of risk factors. To study the impact of variables derived from procedural justice theory, 
the survey included items that measure trust in police procedural justice (alpha: 0.84), moral 
alignment (alpha: 0.77) and obedience to the police (alpha: 0.77) Police legitimacy comprises the 
right to govern and the recognition of that right by citizens. Both moral alignment (shared values 
between the public and the police) and obedience to the police are key dimensions of the concept of 
the legitimacy of the police and these scales were collapsed into one general legitimacy scale. These 
scales have previously been used in the European Social Survey (Hough, Jackson & Bradford, 2013) 
and have been additionally tested in a large-scale student survey in Belgium (Van Damme & Pauwels, 
2013). The difference between police procedural justice and legitimacy is that the justice variable 
corresponds to the overall picture that people have about how citizens are treated by the police. The 
variable legitimacy, on the other hand, concentrates on the extent to which people perceive the 
police as legitimate.  
 
Agnew’s general strain theory (GST) argues that negative feelings may cause strain which can 
pressure adolescents into crime (by stimulating negative emotions and violent beliefs). Perceived 
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personal discrimination refers to the feelings that one is discriminated by other groups in society. 
Alpha is 0.89. Perceived group discrimination refers to discrimination of the group to which the 
respondent belongs. Cronbach’s alpha is 0.95. The items were originally used in a Dutch survey of 
attitudes towards extremism conducted by Van den Bos et al., 2009) 
  
In the present study a number of attitudes/ beliefs that intervene in the relationship between 
perceived injustice, perceived procedural justice and social integration are studied. These intervening 
mechanisms are religious authoritarianism, self-control, perceived political powerlessness and moral 
support for right-wing extremism. Religious authoritarianism was measured by using following seven 
items on a Cronbach’s alpha is 0.89. Religious authoritarianism refers to extreme dogmatic views 
with regard to religion. This scale is based on Altemeyer’s authoritarianism scale. Two dimensions of 
Hirschi and Gottfredson's (1990) conceptualisation of self-control were used in the present study: 
impulsiveness (the tendency to seek immediate gratification) and thrill-seeking behaviour (the 
tendency to seek adventure and kicks). The items for the two scales were taken from the attitudinal 
self-control scale used by Bursik and Grasmick (1993). Anomia (perceived political powerlessness) is 
derived from Srole’s (1956) study of personal alienation. Cronbach’s alpha is 0.85. This scale has been 
frequently used in the European Social Survey.  Sutherland’s differential association theory (DAT) and 
Akers’s social learning theory (SL) can easily be applied to the study of political violence: from both 
perspectives it is argued that political violence is learned through differential associations with 
attitudes favourable to violence and racism. Peer racism measures racist behaviour of peers. This 
scale is adapted from Van den Bos et al. (2010). Cronbach’s alpha is 0.68. Peer delinquency refers to 
respondents' perception of law-breaking behaviour by their best friends. This scale originates from 
the PADS+ study (Ceccato & Wikström, 2012). Cronbach’s alpha is 0.70. All scale constructs were 
standardized before analysis, in order to make their effects comparable. 
 
5.3. Demographic background variables and additional control variables 
Finally some additional statistical controls were used in the multivariate analyses. Age (16-25yrs.) 
was a metric variable that expressed the respondent’s age in years at the time of the survey. The 
survey was conducted in 2012 and respondents were recoded into three age categories for the 
analyses. The first were youngsters under the age of 18 (25.1%). The middle category was aged 
between 19 and 21 (63.4%) and the last category was above 22 (11.5%). Gender was coded one for 
females (64.1%) and one for males (35.9%). Religious attendance was measured on a five-point scale, 
i.e. attending a religious service once a weak (1.3%), once a month (3.3%), once a half year (22.1 %), 
once a year (35.8%) and never (37.6%). Importance of religion was measured by asking the 
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respondent how important religion was on a seven-point scale. We recoded the scale to very 
important (3.1%), average importance (28.2%) and not important (68.7%). 
 
6. Analysis plan 
Given the extreme skewness of the dependent variables, the original scale of moral support for right-
wing extremism was divided into three equal parts, i.e. low, medium and high support for right-wing 
violence. Therefore logistic regression analysis was used to gain insight into the independent effects 
of the available set of independent variables (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000). Given the fact that the 
dependent variable was a trichotomy, we originally used the ordinal regression equation technique. 
The test of parallel lines however turned out to be significant which means that the assumption that 
the effect parameters were identical for every subgroup of the dependent variables was incorrect 
(Pauwels, 2012). To this end, we opted to use the technique of the multinomial regression equation. 
The latter can be seen as a generalisation of the binary logit model (Retherford & Choe, 1993). As the 
dependent variables were separated into low, medium and high levels of moral support for right-
wing extremism, we chose to compare the medium and high levels with the reference category (i.e. 
low moral support). The results will however only highlight the high extremist scores. The second 
depend variable (i.e. political violence) is highly skewed because a majority of the respondents 
answered negative on the question of self-reported political violence. We therefore opted to 
perform a binary logistic regression to estimate the effect of a series of independent variables on the 
odds of having committed political violence versus not having committed political violence.  
 
7. Results 
7.1. Moral support for right-wing extremism 
The results of the blockwise multinomial logistic regression analyses of moral support for right-wing 
extremism are presented in Table 2. We assessed to what extent different theoretical frameworks 
are related to moral support. Within this regression model we present the net effects of indicators of 
a series of demographic background variables (model 1), independent of variables derived from 
procedural justice theory (model 2), perceived discrimination variables (model 3) and personal 
beliefs / attitudes (model 4). Finally, measures of peer deviance were added to model 5. This 
procedure was chosen to gain insight into the relationship between these independent socio-
psychological measures and moral support for right-wing extremism, more specifically support for 
right-wing violence. Further, we also tried to identify potential mediators of the relationship between 
the independent variables and political violence. 
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In model 1 we tested the relationship between the control variables and moral support. As 
mentioned earlier, it was the intention of this research to analyse the relation between this 
theoretical frameworks and moral support. In order to facilitate reliable statements about this 
relationship, however, the independent variables need to be controlled by certain demographical 
background variables. In this research, we took five control variables into account, namely gender, 
age, attendance at religious services, the importance of religion and the social integration of people. 
If we look at the group with the highest levels of moral support, a positive relation can be found 
between gender (OR: 1.877), age and importance of religion. Regarding the age of the respondents, 
it is noticeable that with reference to the older category (>22), the younger the respondents are, the 
stronger their relation with moral support. A slightly positive significant relation can be seen (OR: 
1.861) for those who attach great importance to religion. In contrast, a strong negative direct effect 
was found for social integration (OR: 1.197) on moral support for right-wing extremism. Nagelkerke R 
square is 5.80%. In model 2 procedural justice variables (i.e. procedural justice by police and 
perceived legitimacy) were added as explanatory variables. Legitimacy, in contrast to police 
procedural justice, has a significant negative effect (OR: 0.857) on moral support. Model 3 reveals 
that perceived personal discrimination, in contrast to group discrimination, has a strong positive 
direct effect (OR: 1.676) on moral support. It seems that the moral inclination to breach moral rules 
and use political violence is mostly related to the personal perceived injustice. Model 4 presents the 
personal attitudes related to moral support. It is noticeable that all personal attitudes/beliefs, i.e. 
religious authoritarianism (OR: 1.986), impulsiveness (OR: 1.412), thrill-seeking behaviour (OR: 1.18) 
and anomia (OR: 1.641) have a positive effect.  
 
In model 5 peer influences were studied by entering peer racism and peer delinquency in the 
analysis. This model shows that there is a positive significant relationship between having racist 
peers and moral support for right-wing extremism (OR: 1.767). Overall we see a positive direct effect 
of gender (OR: 1.661), age (1.818), perceived personal discrimination (OR: 1.32), religious 
authoritarianism (OR: 1.939), impulsiveness (OR: 1.289) thrill-seeking behaviour (OR: 1.144), anomia 
(OR: 1.569) and racist peers (OR: 1.767).  
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Dependent variable: 
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 High moral support for right-wing 
extremism 
Control             
gender (ref. female)   1.877*** 1.842*** 1.719*** 1.977*** 1.661*** 
              
Age (ref. >22) <18 2.428*** 3.381*** 3.194*** 1.943*** 1.818** 
  19-22 1.182** 1.591** 1.541** 1.274 1.236 
              
Attending rel. serv. ≥ 1 a weak 0.299 0.645 0.666 0.337* 0.349* 
(ref.cat. 'never') once a month 0.362 0.644 0.64 0.55 0.557 
  twice a year 0.747 1.028 1.021 1.1 1.066 
  once a year 0.985 1.249* 1.254* 1.198 1.199 
              
Importance of religion average 0.93 1.18 1.174 0.887 0.875 
(ref.cat. 'not important') high 1.077* 1.885* 1.513 0.78 0.876 
              
Social integration   0.835*** 0.873** 0.936 1.037 1.067 
Procedural Justice             
Police Procedural justice   0.94 0.99 1.079 1.084 
Perceived legitimacy     0.857** 0.928 0.966 0.95 
Discrimination             
Perceived personal discrimination     1.676*** 1.4*** 1.32** 
Perceived group discrimination     0.991 1 1.022 
Personal attitudes             
Religious authoritarianism       1.986*** 1.939*** 
Impulsiveness          1.412*** 1.289*** 
Thrill seeking behaviour       1.18** 1.144* 
Anomia         1.641*** 1.569*** 
Peer influences             
Positive attitudes towards racism         1.767*** 
Peer delinquency           1.036 
Model evaluation             
Pseudo R²  (Nagelkerke) 5.80% 6.60% 10.60% 23.50% 27.30% 
Predicted   62.10% 62.80% 62.70% 66.10% 66.90% 
Table 2: Multinomial logistic regression analysis of moral support for right-wing extremism on independent variables. 
*p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
 
7.2. Impact of moral support for right-wing extremism on the use of violence 
The previous analyses have shown that there is support for our conceptual model. However, we still 
need to find some confirmation for our hypothesis regarding the fact that a right-wing morality or 
the moral support for right-wing extremism has a significant effect on the use of violence.  
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Dependent variable: 
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Block 5 
Political violence   
Control             
gender (ref. female)   3.820*** 3.311*** 3.190*** 3.110*** 2.759*** 
              
Age (ref. >22) <18 3.369** 3.219** 2.701* 1.549 1.45 
  19-22 1.484 1.427 1.265 1.09 1.063 
              
Attending rel. serv. ≥ 1 a weak 2.669 2.089 1.904 1.645 1.539 
(ref.cat. 'never') 1 a month 0.974 1.019 1.004 0.961 1.083 
  2 a year 0.647 0.719 0.69 0.77 0.83 
  1 a year 1.007 1.064 1.095 0.985 1.022 
              
Importance of religion  average 1.531 1.481 1.437 1.257 1.26 
(ref.cat. 'not important') high 3.892** 3.327* 2.863 2.201 2.582 
              
Social integration   0.572*** 0.638*** 0.683*** 0.707** 0.737** 
Procedural Justice             
Police Procedural justice   0.926 0.955 1.015 1.009 
Perceived legitimacy   0.642*** 0.705* 0.764* 0.782* 
Discrimination             
Perceived personal discrimination     1.028 0.861 0.84 
Perceived group discrimination     1.445* 1.426* 1.453* 
Personal attitudes           
Religious authoritarianism       1.344** 1.285* 
Impulsiveness         1.722*** 1.699*** 
Thrill seeking behaviour       1 0.916 
Anomia         1.016 1.023 
Moral support for right wing extremism       1.367** 1.308** 
Peer influences             
Positive attitudes tow. racism         1.136 
Peer delinquency           1.246** 
Model evaluatie             
Pseudo R²  (Nagelkerke) 18.5% 21.9% 24.4% 31.6% 32.8% 
-2 LL   769.71 742.49 724.16 663.80 654.20 
Table 3: Binary logistic regression analysis of political violence 
 
Table 3 shows the results of the blockwise binomial logistic regression analyses of self-reported 
political violence. The only difference in the blockwise addition of the variables is that model 4 
(personal beliefs) will also add moral support as an independent variable, to test the effect of moral 
support on self-reported delinquency.  
 
Model 1 indicates that young boys under the age of 18 and persons with a high importance for 
religion have a bigger chance on committing political violence. As stated by Wikström (2010) these 
Chapter 2: Explorative study on the mechanisms of moral support for RWE and political violence     
101     
 
 
 
background variables are no real causes for the explanation of crime. Background variables such as 
age, gender and religious importance can rather be seen a markers or symptoms of perpetrators of 
political violence. Looking at causes we see that the effect of social integration (OR: 0.572) confirms 
our hypothesis due to the fact that the latter variable has a negative significant effect on political 
violence. The procedural justice variables added in model 2 provide little change to the model 
evaluation. The abovementioned effects of the control variables and social integration remain and 
police procedural justice do not significantly influence the dependent variable. Perceived legitimacy 
towards police, on the other hand, has a negative significant effect (OR: 0.642) on political violence. 
The addition of discrimination variables in model 3 seems to have a decreasing effect on legitimacy 
and social integration, although both variables remain significantly negative. No effect is measured 
by discrimination on an individual level. The group dimension (OR: 1.445), on the other hand, has a 
positive significant effect on the use of violence. A large increase in explanatory power is gained in 
model 4 by the inclusion of personal attitudes. In contrast to the effects on moral support, no effect 
is measured of both anomia and thrill seeking behaviour. Religious authoritarianism (OR: 1.344), 
impulsiveness (OR: 1.722) and moral support for right-wing extremism have positive significant effect 
on political violence. The last model is extended by the influences of peers. While there is a positive 
significant effect by peer delinquency (OR: 1.246), racist attitudes by peers do not indicate any 
significant effect.  
 
8. Conclusion and discussion 
The present study was built on an integrated model that captured complementary elements of Social 
Bond Theory, Procedural Justice Theory and General Strain Theory to the variation of political 
violence. The key message of our analyses is that both control and motivational factors are related to 
the explanation of moral support for right-wing extremism and the actual use of political violent acts. 
Social integration is negatively related to moral support for right-wing violence which is consistent 
with social bond theory. It supports our assumption that social bonds with family and school are 
important condition for law-abiding/breaking attitudes. These results support the study of Hagan, 
Merkens and Boehnke (1998) who pointed to the importance of family and school, both as a context 
for social control and for social bonding. The same negative effect is measured by perceived police 
legitimacy. This may not come as a surprise, given that people with an extreme-right worldview tend 
to challenge all democratic institutions. Also in accordance with the theoretical framework, the 
results show a positive relation to perceived discrimination, though it appears that it is mostly the 
individual negative treatment by others that influences the moral support for right-wing extremism.  
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Legitimacy, social integration and perceived discrimination, thus, have strong effects on both 
dependent variables, independently of each other. The fact that these three different exogenous 
sources of individual variation in commitment to political violence have independent effects on 
moral support for right-wing extremism supports the idea of the complexity of the latter 
phenomenon: one theoretical framework is insufficient to provide adequate insight into the 
individual differences in moral support. These three related variables could be seen as the ‘causes of 
the causes’ of political violence. Discriminating feelings and social (des)integration provide a certain 
breeding ground for anger, frustration and a negative worldview. Therefore it is presumed that 
effects of these three exogenous variables could be partially mediated by personal beliefs/attitudes 
and peer influence. Further research is, however, needed to test the causal relations between these 
more remote causes of political violence and moral support. 
 
On the level of the personal beliefs/ attitudes we found some very interesting results. First, it 
appears that religious authoritarianism is strongly related to moral support. Our findings suggest that 
there might even be a (hidden or neglected) layer of Christian fundamentalism in Flanders which is 
related to violent extremism. This finding is important as the debate on extremism seems to stress 
fundamentalism as a problem exclusively related to Islamic extremism. Second, our assumption that 
some effects are mediated by moral support seems to be strengthened by the measured effects of 
anomia. The results show that political powerlessness influences the support for violent activities 
related to right-wing extremism, but do not tend to have a significant direct impact on political 
violence. Third, moral support is related to lower levels of self-control. We studied the effect of thrill-
seeking behaviour and impulsiveness separately, and found that both dimensions of self-control are 
related to moral support. Impulsiveness is, however, somewhat more strongly related to both moral 
support and the effective use of violence. This finding suggests that there is a difference between the 
two dimensions of low self-control. Violent activities are not so much determined by people in search 
for thrills. It is rather the impulsiveness of individuals that tend to engage in violence towards 
persons.  
 
Fourth, we see that this study has indicated a positive direct effect of moral support for right-wing 
extremism on political violence. However, moral support does not lead solely to the use of political 
violence. The latter outcome rather depends on a multitude of factors, where one’s tendency to 
commit violent acts also depends on the exposure to action relevant features (Bouhana and 
Wikström, 2010). 
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This brings us, finally, to another remarkable distinction, namely that between peer influences. We 
found that racist peers have a positive effect on moral support, whereas delinquent peers do not. It 
seems that persons who are exposed to pro-racist attitudes of peers tend to have a stronger moral 
support for right-wing extremist acts. When looking for own violent behaviour the roles are 
changing. It appears that not the racist attitudes, but rather the illegal behaviour of peers 
surrounding the individual prevails in the choice to commit violent acts. One must be very careful in 
interpreting the effect of peer delinquency, as recent research suggests that traditional measures of 
peer delinquency may be partially caused by the projection of one’s own behaviour on the behaviour 
of peers (Young, Rebellon, Barnes & Weerman, 2013). It is unclear to what extent respondents who 
have committed some political crimes have overestimated the criminal behaviour of their peers.   
  
The present study has several limitations which must be taken into account. First of all, this 
theoretical framework can account for only part of the variation in youth participation in violence 
and is thus incomplete. We have identified direct effects of social bonds, perceived police legitimacy, 
and perceived discrimination on violence that cannot be accounted for by exposure to peer 
delinquency, religious authoritarianism, or moral support for extremist violence. Future research 
should focus on additional mechanisms that translate social bonds, perceived legitimacy, and 
perceived discrimination into violence. This could be done using a social psychology approach. The 
model can easily be extended, however, by explicitly linking macro-structural properties to social 
bonds, procedural justice, and perceived discrimination. Second, we need to bear in mind that not all 
relevant variables were taken into account in the questionnaire. Although social learning theory was 
included in this research, we only included social learning processes of peers. Parental attitudes 
towards conservatism or extremism, for instance, were not included. Future research on this topic 
could examine the impact of the latter social learning process. A next logical step would be to test 
this model further as a full structural equation model, allowing us to establish relationships between 
the independent variables. Third, our theoretical model has been applied to explain individual 
differences in violence committed by adolescents and young adults. Future research should 
investigate to what extent the model also applies to adults. It is unclear to what extent the 
integrated framework is able to explain all types of violence in all age groups and across all settings. 
Looking at our sample we see that 95 percent of our respondents are students. The question remains 
whether this theoretical model is also applicable to young people who quit school. Fourth, the study 
is cross-sectional and therefore it is possible to determine the direction of the relationships because 
causes and effects are measured simultaneously. Fifth, blockwise regression does not allow to 
uncover the relationships between the independent variables. Structural equation modelling is 
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needed to determine the causal structure between all variables. Finally, we need to take into account 
that our results are based on a large-scale web survey and it is unclear to what extent they are biased 
(through undercoverage and self-selection) by this method of data collection.  
 
Our findings are, however, consistent with a small but growing number of studies that empirically 
document the importance of procedural justice and discrimination as sources of political violence. 
Research into the domain of violence is important not only from an aetiological point of view, but 
also within the framework of prevention of violence, or, as Bouhana and Wikström (2010) have 
argued, if we cannot properly explain why and how people come to commit acts of violent 
extremism, we have no base from which to develop effective preventative strategies. 
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Our enemies are ruthlessly trying to destroy us, our Aryan spirit and our Aryan race itself in order that 
the tyranny they have created will endure. We must now fight a holy war in order to win-in order to 
pass on to others our message of freedom and our desire to live among our own kind in accordance 
with our natural and healthy Aryan customs 
 
-Anonymous writer in name of Blood and Honour magazine number ‘Whatever it takes’- 
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110     Angry white rebel? Study on the mechanisms and processes of participation in ER groups      
 
1. Introduction 
There has been a long-standing tradition for gang research in criminological inquiries (Decker and 
Weerman 2005; Klein and Maxson 2006; Esbensen and Maxson 2012). While studies of troublesome 
youth groups in Belgium are still limited in comparison to other countries in Europe such as The 
Netherlands (Esbensen and Weerman 2005), there has been a mounting interest in the topic in 
Belgium (Pauwels, et al., 2011; Pauwels & Svensson, 2013; Van Hellemont, 2013; Vettenburg et al., 
2013). Research on participation in right-wing extremist groups, however, has attracted relatively 
little attention in Belgium. Therefore, the present study aims to fill this gap by presenting and testing 
an integrative model that is capable of explaining why extreme-right young people participate in 
disruptive groups (henceforth, RWD group participation).  
 
Qualitative studies on neo-Nazi gangs and racist groups have supplied us with detailed information 
concerning motives for entry (Bjørgo, 2002; Sela-Shayovitz, 2012). This current contribution adopts a 
different perspective and analyses the role of a series of social-psychological mechanisms in 
prompting participation in right-wing extremist groups. Previously, Bouhana and Wikström (2010) 
argued that studies of terrorism and violent extremism suffer from a poor understanding of causal 
mechanisms and lack integration of explanatory levels. Bouhana and Wikström were not alone with 
this criticism, as a comparable statement was made earlier by Mudde (2002: 10) on the state of 
studies on right-wing extremism:48 this lack of knowledge “[…] has been partly caused by the fact that 
the term is not only used for scientific purposes but also for political purposes.” The social 
construction of this politically-sensitive concept is shaped by multiple actors, including politicians, 
academics and the media. Although this elusive concept has been a subject of interesting debate and 
calls for clarification from a criminological viewpoint, the present study is not aimed at extending the 
debate on how right-wing extremism can and should be best defined: our focus is on presenting and 
validating an integrated model which combines elements from social psychological and sociological 
traditions that have previously been applied to the study of violent youth groups. Previously, Decker 
and Pyrooz (2015) argued that much can be learned from 100 years of gang research when we test 
theories of violent extremism. This study can thus be seen as a modest attempt in this regard. By 
integrating fragmented insight, we hope to stimulate theoretical elaborations and the development 
of more comprehensive perspectives that can throw new light on preventing or tackling the problem 
of right-wing extremist violence.  
 
                                                          
48
 For more detail on the definition of right-wing extremism, see e.g., De Waele, M. (2013) 
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In this paper, we first describe the integrated framework that has been used. Then, we introduce the 
sample, outline the methods and explain the data. Next, we present the results of path analyses and 
finally, discuss the findings.  
 
2. An integrative mechanism-based approach 
In criminology the idea that a single theoretical framework does not provide a salient explanation for 
offending and for participation in troublesome youth groups has long been acknowledged (Bernard & 
Snipes, 1996). Elliott, Ageton, and Canter (1979) indicated as early as in the late 70’s that theoretical 
reliance on variables from one theory (cf. strain, self-control, etc.) for the explanation of offending 
has limited results in view of the moderate level of explanatory power for crime or criminal behavior. 
Furthermore, competitive testing of theories on criminal behavior did not yield conclusive results 
(Bernard & Snipes, 1996; Liska, Krohn & Messner, 1989). Nevertheless, theoretical integration does 
not come without restrictions. Some scholars have warned about creating theoretical mush by which 
the fundamental purpose of theory constructions is neglected (Thornberry, 1989). Besides, an 
integrative approach requires discovering communalities in seemingly competing theories rather 
than focusing on differences. Therefore, integration should build on an internal causal logic to 
explain phenomena, by which theoretical causation, human agency, and the person-environment 
interaction should be duly considered to advance knowledge, detect causes and take preventive 
actions. This implies that it is important to gain insights into both the proximate and the remote 
causes of RWD group participation (Wikström, 2010).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Conceptual model for the explanation of right-wing disruptive participation 
Perceived 
Injustice 
Group 
Threat 
Low self-
control 
Pos. attitudes 
tow. racism 
Moral support 
for RW 
Extremism 
Partici-
pation in 
RWD 
group  
Authori- 
tarianism 
Anomia 
Anomia Flemish 
identity 
Neg. attitudes  
out group 
Superiority 
112     Angry white rebel? Study on the mechanisms and processes of participation in ER groups      
 
Integrated theories have also been used in gang research (e.g. Thornberry, et al. 2003; Esbensen et 
al., 2010; Alleyne and Wood 2011). The conceptual framework presented in figure 5 elaborates on 
the existing models and integrates concepts from three different traditions: (1) perceived injustice / 
relative deprivation literature, (2) self-control, and (3) moral beliefs favourable to right-wing 
extremism and racist peer exposure.  
 
We assert that perceived injustice, anomia and authoritarianism (the strain initiated model) on the 
one hand, and thrill-seeking behavior (low self-control) on the other, have consequences for RWD 
group participation through different routes. Social psychological mechanisms that represent 
discontent affect RWD group participation through a series of psychological mechanisms that have 
been identified in social identity theory, while thrill-seeking behavior affects the membership 
through the development of attitudes favourable to right-wing extremism and through the selection 
of racist peers. Both racist peers and moral support for RW extremism are considered proximate 
causes of RWD group participation.  
 
2.1. Strain initiated model 
Since the 1960s, studies of violent left-wing extremism have pointed to the effect of root causes 
which criminologists would label as strains. Within the field of criminology, it has especially been 
considered the merit of Agnew’s general strain theory to stress the importance of perceived 
injustice. Agnew’s General Strain Theory (GST) argues that negative feelings may cause strain, which 
can pressure adolescents into crime (by stimulating negative emotions and violent beliefs) (Agnew 
2006; 2011). In this respect, crime is a coping strategy. Subjective strains, such as perceived injustice 
and feelings of political powerlessness (anomia49) may act as stressors that may trigger one’s 
involvement in disruptive groups. The latter feelings of strain, together with authoritarianism, can 
pave the way for developing moral support for the use of violence by right-wing extremist groups 
(henceforth, moral support for right-wing extremism). In the next paragraphs we explain how we 
conceive each of these strain-related concepts.  
 
Perceived injustice and anomia as strain 
Perceived injustice corresponds to the feeling of being treated unfairly as a result of the perception 
that the person itself or the group to which one belongs (‘reference group’, see Merton, 1957) are 
unjustly disadvantaged compared with other individuals or groups in society. This term thus 
                                                          
49
 ‘Anomie’ was originally defined by Durkheim and Merton as a state of society (macro) and “the breakdown of moral 
norms that limit desires and aspirations” (Deflem, 1989: 629). It was later modified by Srole (1956), who described ‘anomia’ 
as a state of mind expressed by individuals with “a subjective feeling responding to societal dysfunctions” (Van de Velde and 
Pauwels, 2010: 112).  
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highlights the subjective perception and experience of it (Van den Bos et al. 2009). Runciman (1966) 
first introduced the term of relative deprivation in his study on attitudes of social inequality and his 
work inspired Gurr (1970) to operationalize the concept as a state of deprivation by which persons 
compare their own situation with that of others. Gurr particularly deserves the credit for translating 
this idea into the realm of studies of political violence. From the social psychological standpoint, Van 
den Bos et al. (2009) indicated in their study of Dutch native and immigrant youths that (the 
perception of) negative treatment indirectly leads to negative emotions towards out groups, and that 
societal disconnectedness or anomia was a very important mediator.  
 
As regards social disconnection, Srole (1956) suggested that people with high scores on the anomia 
scale tend to feel helpless, alone, powerless and alienated from society. Previous studies have found 
that especially the dimension of political powerlessness50 strongly correlates with support for right-
wing ideology, and, indirectly, influences right-wing extremist violence and vandalism (Hagedoorn 
and Janssen, 1983; Boehnke Hagan and Merkens, 1998; De Groof Debusscher Derks Elchardus 1999; 
De Witte 2001; De Waele 2014). In addition, based on a large-scale Belgian survey conducted in 
Flanders and Wallonia, Pauwels et al. (2014) demonstrated that perceived injustice and alienation 
were strong predictors for moral support for left-wing extremisms, religious extremism, right-wing 
extremism, and political violence. A more detailed analysis of the Flemish data revealed that the 
direct effect of perceived injustice declined when the researcher controlled for other direct effects 
(De Waele 2014). However, the above mentioned studies were not designed to study the effects of 
social identity related concepts (e.g. group threat, Flemish identity, negative attitudes towards out-
groups and superiority feelings). The present study therefore extends previous research and aims to 
advance the understanding of the negative consequences of perceived injustice. We hypothesize that 
the effect of perceived injustice and anomia on RWD group participation is indirect, mediated by the 
effect of group threat.  
 
Authoritarianism as an exogenous variable 
Besides perceived injustice, the strain-initiated model also incorporates authoritarianism as one of 
the first explanations for right-wing participation. Developed by Adorno and associates (1950) in 
their seminal work on ‘The Authoritarian Personality’, the concept of authoritarianism was a 
relatively stable intrapersonal trait which results from enduring intrapersonal conflicts rooted in 
                                                          
50
 Srole indicated that the concept of anomia contains five strongly interrelated sub-dimensions. In this paper the concept is 
limited to the dimension of political powerlessness, given the political-related nature of the dependent variable. 
Furthermore, previous research in this field has indicated that right-wing extremist ideology mainly seems to correlate with 
this dimension (Scheepers Felling and Peters 1989; Vande Velde and Pauwels 2010; De Witte 1999). For more information 
on this topic see De Waele (2013: 28). 
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childhood experiences of harsh education. Adorno et al. argued that authoritarians consider others - 
out of dissatisfaction with their own position - as weak or immoral (Adorno et al., 1950; Whitley & 
Ægisdóttir, 2000). In contrast, Altemeyer (1998) disagreed with that view and instead rejected the 
idea of authoritarianism as a personality characteristic. He rather believed that authoritarianism 
consists of a set of coherent attitudes learned from peer groups and similar socialising agents 
(Altemeyer, 1981, 1988). Altemeyer thus reconceptualised authoritarianism as a value syndrome that 
comprises three distinct elements: (1) conventionalism, which is a high level of compliance with 
social norms; (2) an emphasis on hierarchy and submission to authority; and (3) a ‘law and order’ 
mentality which legitimizes anger and aggression against those who deviate from social norms. 
Authoritarians are often supporters of nationalism and share ethnocentric attitudes. Research even 
indicated that people with high scores for authoritarianism are showing displays of biological racism 
and fear things that differ from the traditional role relationship, such as homosexuality (De Witte, 
1999). Therefore, it is plausible to assume that people having high levels of authoritarianism are 
more likely to exhibit higher levels of group threat.     
 
Perceived group threat as mediator of perceived strains 
Researchers often indicate the strong effects of group threat on forming prejudice against out-
groups. Manifestations of prejudice are explained as a coping mechanism to establish group privilege 
(Blumer, 1958). This point is especially stressed in the Integrated Threat Theory (Stephan et al. 2000). 
The theory was modelled after Pettigrew’s theory of intergroup contact (Pettigrew 1988) and focuses 
on the conditions that lead to perceptions of threat, which in turn have an impact on attitudes and 
behavior (Wagner, 2008). In their experiment on threatening information about ethnic out-groups, 
Cohrs and Ibler (2009) demonstrated that high levels of right-wing authoritarian (RWA) feelings 
increased the likelihood of prejudicial attitudes (Heylen and Pauwels 2015). Perceptions of threat 
may endorse people to engage in violent activities to reduce feelings of anxiety and threat. Three 
dimensions of perceived threat have been identified in the literature, i.e. symbolic threat, realistic 
threat and intergroup anxiety (Stephan et al., 2002, Doosje et al., 2013). The first refers to the threat 
to the respondent’s culture, which in our study is a threat to the Flemish/Belgian culture. Realistic 
threat, on the other hand, indicates the economic conditions and the influence of immigrant groups. 
Quillian (1995) maintained in his study that while threat is perceived by individuals, but the effect of 
prejudice is largely experienced in the context of intergroup relations between dominant and 
subordinate social groups. On the basis of these opinions, we hypothesize that perceived group 
threat has an indirect effect on participation in right-wing extremist groups through its effect on 
ethnocentrism and feelings of superiority. 
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Ethnocentrism and Superiority as consequences of perceived group threat 
Integrated threat theory provides the reason for which perceived threat results in bias-motivated 
behavior: it may foster ethnocentrism and feelings of superiority.  In their research, Pennings and 
Brants (1985) stated that right-wing extremism is characterized by strong contra-identification with 
leftist opinion, multiculturalism and internationalism. In contrast, as indicated by the historical roots 
of Flemish nationalism, right-wing militancy is mostly connected with strong Flemish identity. 
Nevertheless, this relationship can by no means be seen as a causal relationship51. Tajfel and Turner 
(1974) worked on the influence of social identity and contended that shared experiences, values and 
norms of the group are crucial for the development of social identity and status of the group in 
relation to enemies. They referred to the social-psychological process of in-group socialization when 
individuals enter a certain group. On the other hand, not only a positive identification, but also a 
negative identification with the ‘out-group’ (contra-identification) needs to be mentioned (Scheepers 
and Eisinga 1989; Hogg and Terry 2000; Hooghe and Reeskens 2006). This “in-/out-group” relation 
allows people to break down the barriers of illegality (Heitmeyer, 2003; Van der Valk and Wagenaar, 
2010). Applied to the current study, in-group identification was measured as a strong identification 
with the Flemish people. In contrast, the contra-identification was derived from the negative 
attitudes towards the out-group (immigrants in general, Muslims and Jews). It is hypothesized in our 
study that both aspects of ethnocentrism have an impact on moral support for right-wing extremism 
and the exposure to racist comments by peers (henceforth, peer racism). 
 
Connected to the sense of strong Flemish in-group identification is the feeling of superiority among 
the Flemish people or the so-called superior race. Results from Scandinavian research on former 
members of extreme right-wing groups have indicated that various extremists were convinced that 
they belonged to a superior group (Kimmel, 2007). These feelings of superiority can have an effect on 
positive attitudes towards the use of violence against Muslims (Van den Bos et al 2009). Therefore, 
we hypothesize that superiority has a positive significant effect on moral support. Likewise, we 
assume that people with higher feelings of superiority run a bigger risk of being exposed to racist 
comments by peers. This assumption is supported by the social selection effect worded as ‘birds of a 
feather flock together’ of Glueck (1950), who said that people join groups in which they can 
recognize themselves. Van der Valk and Wagenaar (2010) illustrated this as the mirror effect with 
which individuals connect with people who have similarities.   
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 Although there is considerable overlap between Flemish nationalism and support for a right-wing ideology, it is clear that 
the one does not imply the other. For instance, currently Flanders deals with some right-wing national solidarist groups, 
who tend to focus less on the subnational context but more on geopolitical nationalist issues. Vice versa, there are also 
Flemish nationalist movements, without political orientation, aiming to gather a broad Flemish public regarding linguistic 
and cultural matters.  
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2.2. Low self-control initiated model 
While the perceived injustice model has caught considerable interest, the role of self-control is by no 
means less important. Despite the fact that self-control theory was not originally developed to 
explain individual differences in right-wing extremist groups, Hirschi and Gottfredson (1990) claimed 
their theory was a general theory of crime. The central assumption in Gottfredson and Hirschi’s 
General Theory of Crime is that low self-control increases the risk of offending, as well as other 
deviant and imprudent behaviours. A large number of studies have tested this proposition and 
empirical research has shown that low self-control is associated with offending among different 
samples (e.g. youth, college students, adults, males vs. females, criminals) and in different designs 
(Burton et al. 1998; Pratt & Cullen, 2000). More recently, attention has been paid to the concept of 
self-control in the explanation of troublesome youth group involvement (Kissner & Pyrooz, 2009; 
Esbensen & Weerman, 2005; Hope & Damphousse, 2002). Therefore, it is important to test 
empirically whether thrill-seeking behavior is an additional mechanism that exerts an independent 
effect on RWD group participation. Ethnographic studies have revealed that new members are often 
motivated by their own opportunistic or thrill-seeking motives (Bjørgo, 2002; Watts, 2001). Although 
ideological motivations are important in understanding acts of politically motivated violence, 
ideology is not always crucial for entering extremist groups. The search for adventure, i.e. thrill-
seeking behavior, is one of the reasons frequently mentioned by (former) members of extremist 
groups. A pure self-control-based explanation would consider the lack of self-control to be the 
ultimate cause of right-wing extremist group involvement. Moral support for right-wing extremism, 
exposure to racist peers and participation in a right-wing extremist group would therefore all be 
common consequences of low self-control.  
 
2.3. Proximate causes  
Moral support for right-wing extremism  
The concept of moral support for right-wing extremism refers to the individual’s favourable attitude 
towards the use of violence by right-wing extremist groups. Radicalization is often defined as the 
process whereby individuals acquire a moral support for violence used in a means-to-an-ends 
fashion. Moral support for right-wing extremist violence constitutes a personal moral belief that 
favours the use of violence by right-wing extremist groups. In the perceived injustice induced model, 
moral support for violence is seen as the key mechanism by which perceived injustice, group threat, 
authoritarianism, and anomia, feelings of superiority, Flemish identity and ethnocentrism are 
translated into RWD group participation. A multitude of studies have found that measures of 
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antisocial moral beliefs are positively related to offending and gang membership, while those of 
prosocial moral beliefs are negatively related to offending and troublesome youth groups 
involvement (Esbensen et al. 2010; Hill et al 1999; Svensson, Pauwels, and Weerman 2010; Weerman 
and Esbensen 2005) and political violence and vandalism (Hagan, Merkens and Boehnke, 1995; 
Pauwels and De Waele, 2014). 
 
Exposure to racist peers 
The role of peers is especially prominent in social learning theories (Akers, 1998; Bruinsma, 1992; 
Warr, 2002) but highly contested in control theories (Hirschi & Gottfredson, 1990; Kornhauser, 1978; 
Hirschi, 1969). Peer delinquency is one of the strongest predictors of self-reported delinquency, and 
therefore, it is expected to help explain right-wing extremist group participation. Differential 
association with racist groups provides two specific contexts of exposure to settings in which the use 
of violence is supported or considered as a means of justifying the ideological goals of the group. 
Differential associations are important not only in social learning theory, but also in routine-
activities/lifestyle theory (Laub & Sampson, 2003; Wikström and Butterworth, 2006; Pauwels & 
Svensson, 2013). Reasoned from a routine activities/lifestyle perspective, racist peers are important 
as they may be responsible for the situational instigation to commit an act of (politically motivated) 
violence or become involved in a right-wing extremist group. In the present study we take into 
account exposure to peer racism as an important indicator of exposure to criminogenic moral 
settings, which shapes the individual’s routines and risky lifestyle. In short, we summarize the 
hypotheses that are derived from the integrated approach as outlined in figure 5: the conceptual 
model 
 
H1: Group threat is determined by authoritarianism, anomia and perceived injustice; 
H2: Flemish identity, ethnocentrism and superiority are determined by group threat; 
H3: Moral support for right-wing extremism is determined by superiority, Flemish identity, 
ethnocentrism and thrill-seeking behavior; 
H4: Exposure to racist peers is directly related to thrill-seeking behavior, ethnocentrism and moral 
support for right-wing extremism; 
H5: RWD group participation is directly related to moral support for right-wing extremism, exposure 
to racist peers and thrill-seeking behavior. 
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3. Data and method 
3.1. Method and sample 
Between December 2012 and April 2013 a self-administered questionnaire was made available 
online. In this study, we used a convenience sample of students. The basic idea was that as students 
differ on political attitudes and behavior, we would need to find a way that guaranteed maximum 
variation in terms of right-wing extremism. Therefore, a link to the online questionnaire was placed 
on different web pages for targeting extreme-right youngsters on chat rooms of Neo-Nazi groups and 
extreme-right Flemish nationalist student organizations. In addition, the survey was spread through 
social media and online forums of universities and university college students. It is therefore not 
surprising that our survey contains an overrepresentation of students in the population (94.7%), 
which implies that our sample is not representative, even for the population among adolescents and 
young adults between the ages of 18 and 25. However, we do not claim to make any generalization 
about the prevalence of RWD group participation. On the contrary, our aim is to analyse the 
proximate and remote causes of RW extremist group participation. This sampling approach allowed 
us to have a good grasp of the extreme-right population in Flanders. We were aware of other ways to 
possibly gain an insight into the political preferences of the Belgian population, as some 
representative surveys on socio-cultural attitudes are drawn every second year in Flanders. However, 
those surveys were not targeted at discovering RWD group participation. Overall, we were able to 
receive filled-out online questionnaires from 723 respondents. The majority of them was female 
(64.3%), student (94.7%) and was either Catholic (45.6%) or atheist (47.3%). In terms of the place of 
origin, the majority was from the eastern part of Flanders (64 %), with 34.7 and 29.3% of the 
respondents coming from the provinces of Limburg and Antwerp, respectively. The remaining 
respondents lived in Flemish Brabant and the Brussels Capital (10.1%), East Flanders (16.7%) and 
West Flanders (9.3%).  
 
While the survey may not be seen as a nationally representative survey, its goal was to test a general 
theory, and therefore the sample can be seen as a test of the theory, particularly based on Popper’s 
idea of developing potential falsifications for theories (Popper, 1963; Opp, 2009). This idea holds that 
if a theory is to be seen as a general theory, it should be applicable in different sub samples. 
However, we are trying to falsify the hypotheses stated above (Henrich et al 2010). Although an 
online survey has some advantages, it cannot ensure that researchers completely monitor the 
processes of response selection and that the condition of the questionnaire are verified completely 
(e.g. presence of others and anonymity). As a result, the motivation to participate is left entirely to 
the respondent, and therefore, data could have a selection bias. In this regard, it is important to 
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recognize the impossibility of monitoring response selection, self-selection, and under-coverage 
(internet availability). However, it should be mentioned that these drawbacks, including 
preparedness to answer survey questions, the willingness to report and too limited information on 
the participants, are also discernible in the more traditional survey modes (Dillman, 1978). Yet, we 
remain confident about the advantages of the online survey method: it is low in cost and is also 
easily analysed with the aid of software programs, such as SPSS and Mplus. Furthermore, web 
surveys are especially useful for explanatory research in studying the causes and correlates rather 
than the prevalence of the phenomenon for lack of randomization. Despite this restriction the 
percentage (4.1 %) is very similar to the percentages found in studies on political preferences 
(Maxson and Klein, 1995)  
 
3.2. Measurement of constructs 
In the present study numerous scale constructs were used to assess the relation between exogenous 
variables, mediators and dependent variables. In view of the extensive nature of concepts employed, 
a brief overview of the scale constructs is presented below. A more detailed overview of the scales 
can be found in Appendix 5, in which question wording, descriptives and the measure of scale 
reliability, i.e. Chronbach’s alpha is included. All exogenous and independent constructs achieve an 
acceptable reliability coefficient of .62 to .92. 
 
Dependent variable 
Since there are no existing scales available on RWD group participation, we attempted to develop a 
measure of RWD group participation on the basis of the idea of funneling, which is paramount to the 
Eurogang definition of street gang membership. The Eurogang group provides a consensus definition 
which constitutes a gang as any durable, street-oriented youth group whose involvement in illegal 
activity is part of its group identity (Weerman et al 2009; Esbensen and Maxson 2012). Therefore, 
this contribution adopts aspects of the latter definition, and applies it to the context of right-wing 
extremism.  
 
Our aim was to follow the Eurogang definition as closely as possible. We made a distinction between 
the essential elements of a gang definition (gang definers) and specific characteristics of the gang 
(gang descriptors) (Esbensen and Maxson 2012, 6). With regard to the disruptive group, we chose to 
work with parts of the Eurogang definition. The duration and size of the non-informal group were 
determined, and in accordance with the Eurogang definition, the group was restrained to 
respondents who were members of a group containing 3 or more persons for longer than three 
months (Weerman and Decker 2005). This approach made it feasible to identify ‘active individuals’ 
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with an acceptable minimum time period. However, different from the Eurogang definition, we did 
not focus on street-orientation. Although some overlap may exist between street gangs and right-
wing extremist groups, the focus of the present study is on detecting young adults who can be placed 
on the far-right, and who are affiliated to right-wing social movements or subcultural networks which 
combine the political ideology with illegal acts. Despite the fact that many right-wing groups often 
partake in (illegal) political protest and occasionally “hang around” on the street, they cannot be 
seen as RWD group participants.  
 
As mentioned earlier, RWD group participation was measured with the funneling technique. This 
means that we combined answers to one filter question and four follow-up questions to measure 
self-reported group participation, further narrowing the answers down with an additional question 
about right wing orientation and other group characteristics. The leading question was “do you 
consider yourself to be a member of a group of friends (not an organization or association) that 
frequently meets and considers itself as a group?” (1 = yes, 0 = no). The four follow-up questions 
were: (1) How long have you been a member of the group? (2) How big is your group? (3) Do 
members of this group get involved in fights with other cliques? (4) Are members of this group 
involved in law breaking? The last two questions were dichotomies (1 = yes, 0 = no). Respondents 
were categorized as involved in a ‘disruptive group’ if they answered affirmatively to the leading 
question, (1) where members for more than three months and (2) the group existed out of more 
than 3 persons. Regarding question 3 and 4, it was sufficient to score positive on one of the two 
follow-up questions. To the introductory question (n = 295), 40.8 % of the total sample answered 
positively, while (n= 70), 9.7% answered positively to the follow-up questions. In addition, the 
members were asked to position themselves on a left (0) to right (7) scale. From the latter group 30 
respondents (4.1 %) positioned themselves at the extreme right spectrum (6-7). This latter group of 
30 respondents is consequently regarded as disruptive group members with an extreme-right 
attitude, henceforth referred to as RWD group participation. Although we are aware of the fact that 
the operationalization does not necessarily make these groups extremist, we assume the group’s 
acceptance of extreme-right members is an indication of tolerance towards the extreme-right 
ideology.   
 
Exogenous and independent variables  
Perceived injustice refers to the extent to which respondents feel they have been treated unjustly by 
others. In this survey, the others are not linked to specific persons (see Appendix 5). The questions 
are intended to measure the overall perception of both personal and group discrimination, and 
personal negative treatment. The combined scale measures items on personal discrimination, group 
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discrimination and personal treatment and has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.62. Perceived personal 
discrimination indicates one’s feelings of being discriminated against in relation to other people in 
society. An example of the latter scale is “It makes me angry when I think of how I am treated in 
comparison to others”. Perceived group discrimination refers to discrimination against the group to 
which the respondent belongs. Group discrimination is measured through questions, such as: “if I 
compare the group to which I belong with other groups in Belgium, I think we are treated unfairly”. 
The last dimension of the perceived injustice scale is Personal treatment which raises questions 
about every day treatment of people by others, such as: “I think that if I have complaints about 
anything, that, normally, people listen to my opinion.” The items were originally used in a Dutch 
survey of attitudes towards extremism conducted by Van den Bos et al. (2009) and validated in a 
study of Pauwels and Schils (2014).  
 
In the present study, a number of attitudes/beliefs that intervene in the relationship with perceived 
injustice are studied. These intervening mechanisms are authoritarianism, anomia, ethnocentrism, 
Flemish identity, superiority and thrill seeking behavior. Authoritarianism was measured by using 11 
items based on the three elements of Altemeyer’s authoritarianism scale (conventionalism, hierarchy 
and submission, and law and order mentality). One example question to measure the construct is:  
“can people be divided into two distinct classes: the weak and the strong?” 
As indicated in the theoretical section, Ethnocentrism was measured on the basis of both in-group, 
i.e. Flemish identity, and out-group orientation, i.e. negative attitude towards the out-group - in this 
case, migrants. The scale was derived from the research of Van den Bos et al. (2009) and the Social 
Cohesion in Flanders (SCIF) questionnaire (for more information see Appendix 5). Since Flemish 
identity is operationalized as a strong form of Flemish preference, we asked questions assessing how 
important it was for them to be Flemish or how proud they were to be Flemish. In contrast to the in-
group questions, more negative attitudes were measured regarding the out-group, operationalized 
here as immigrants. For instance, one negative statement was: “Immigrants come here to exploit our 
social security”. A few positive statements were also included in this category, for example, “we 
should welcome the immigrants who want to live in Belgium”(R52).  
 
Derived from Srole’s (1956) study of personal alienation, anomia was operationalized on the 
dimension of perceived political powerlessness. Questions were phrased as to the extent to which 
respondent (dis)believed that, for instance, there is no sense in voting, because the parties do what 
they want to do anyway.  
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 The R indicates that the scores for this item were reversed 
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In the present study we also incorporated Hirschi and Gottfredson's (1990) conceptualization of self-
control through the notion of thrill-seeking behavior (the tendency to seek adventure and kicks). The 
items were taken from the attitudinal self-control scale used by Bursik and Grasmick (1993). This 
scale has been frequently used in many delinquency studies (Pratt and Cullen 2000). The tendency to 
seek adventure was operationalized by statements, such as: “I sometimes find it exciting to do things 
that could be dangerous”. 
 
Personal superiority was operationalized as the fact that someone perceives him/herself as better 
than others. For instance, respondents were asked how strongly they (dis)agreed with the statement: 
“when people think differently, they are less valuable to me”. Perceived group threat was derived 
also from the study of Van den Bos et al. (2009) and adapted to the Flemish context. It was measured 
regarding three out-groups, i.e. the immigrant in general, Muslims and Jews. However, the three 
categories of out-groups strongly correlated. The construct was operationalized in items probing to 
what extent respondents agreed that “Belgians do not get the respect that they deserve from Jews” 
or the reversed question “In Belgium, people from other countries have the right to be more 
important than Belgians”. 
 
Moral support for right-wing extremism was measured through items from a scale that measures 
attitudes towards the use of violence by right-wing extremists in order to reach political goals.  The 
items were taken from a larger scale used in a study by Van den Bos et al. (2009). Three questions 
were asked, and one of them stated: “to what extent do you understand that some right-wing 
extremists use violence against the people who have the power in Belgium?” Positive attitudes 
towards racism was measured via the scale from Van den Bos et al. (2009). The exposure was 
operationalized as the near environment of the respondents. Therefore, questions were asked 
relating to the extent to which ‘do you think your friends would think it is OK if …’ One of these 
questions was related to violence, i.e. “do you think your friends would think it is OK if you would 
fight with an immigrant without any reason?” More information can be found in Appendix 5. 
 
3.3. Analysis plan 
To test the integrated theoretical model, a series of structural equation models were run in order to 
identify the direct and indirect effects. As the dependent variables are dichotomous, a logistic path 
model was tested using Mplus (Muthén and Muthén 2012). The results are shown in figure 6 in 
which only the direct effects of the beset fitting model are presented. These direct effects between 
the scale variables are standardized regression coefficients (β). All independent variables were 
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standardized before entering the equation. The direct relationships between independent variables 
(i.e. Moral support for RWE and positive attitudes towards racism) and the dependent variable (i.e. 
RWD group participation) are log-odds and should be interpreted as the one standard deviation 
change in the log-odds of the dependent variable, as the independent variables change with one 
standard deviation.  
 
4. Results 
The results are shown in two ways. At first, a detailed overview of the specific direct effects on the 
independent variables and the dependent variable is given in table 4. In addition, figure 6 displays 
the best fitting model to explain RWD group participation. Starting with the effects of the exogenous 
variables, it is noted that perceived injustice (β = 0.129), anomia (β = 0.241), and authoritarianism (β 
= 0.515) have strong effect on group threat. In total, the model indicates R² of 0.433, indicating that 
43.3 % of the total variation of group threat is explained by the model. Although it was proposed in 
the conceptual model that anomia and authoritarianism were seen as exogenous variables, results 
also indicated positive direct effects towards the other exogenous variables. However, the coefficient 
of determination R² is much lower for both perceived injustice (R²=0.048), anomia (R²=0.095) and 
authoritarianism (R²=0.071). A similar R² is measured for the fourth exogenous variable, i.e. thrill 
seeking behavior. In line with our conceptual model, the results confirm that our exogenous variables 
are to a large extent explained by factors that are not included in this model.  
 
Another confirmation of our proposed conceptual model is found in regard to the outcome variables 
of group threat (i.e. Flemish identity, negative attitudes towards out group and superiority). Results 
confirm that group threat can be seen as a common cause of the three variables. Regarding the 
interrelationship of the three outcome variables, a strong relationship is found between the 
measures of ethnocentrism, i.e. Flemish identity (identification) and negative attitudes towards out-
group (contra-identification). Furthermore, both measures indicate a reasonable to good fit of the 
coefficient of determination R², respectively 0.317 and 0.618. No positive significant relationship was 
found between superiority and ethnocentrism. Negative significant effects were measured from both 
anomia (β= -0.189) and superiority (β = 0.086) towards Flemish identity.  
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Independent 
variables(x) 
Perceived 
injustice 
Anomia Authorit-
arianism 
Group 
threat 
Flemish 
identity 
Negative 
attitudes 
tow. out 
group 
Superiority Thrill 
seeking 
behavior 
Positive 
attitudes 
towards 
racism 
Moral 
support 
for RWE 
Participation 
in RWD 
group 
  β β β Β β β β β Β β Log Odds 
Perc. Injust. --- 0.174*** 0.082** 0.129*** -0.058 0.028 0.088* 0.114** 0.095** 0.034 0.001 
Anomia 0.183*** --- 0.238*** 0.241*** 
 
-0.189*** 0.101*** 0.005 0.052 -0.022 0.010 -0.137 
Authorit-
arianism 
0.084* 0.232*** --- 0.515*** 0.346*** 0.209*** 0.195*** 0.053 0.077 -0.035 0.043 
Group threat --- --- --- --- 0.102* 0.488*** 0.160** 0.129* 0.089 0.060 0.103 
Flemish ident. --- --- --- --- --- 0.189*** -0.111** 0.055 -0.022 0.005 0.119 
Negative att. 
tow. out-group 
--- --- --- --- 0.339*** --- 0.032 -0.185** 0.272*** 0.227*** 0.127 
Superiority --- --- --- --- -0.086** 0.014 --- 0.054 0.002 0.140*** 0.032 
TSB --- --- --- --- 0.039 -0.074** 0.050 --- 0.114** 0.171*** 0.150 
Pos. att. tow. 
racism 
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.108** 0.239** 
Moral support 
for RWE 
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.103** --- 0.049 
R-square 0.048 0.095 0.071 0.433 0.317 0.618 0.119 0.042 0.234 0.197 0.270 
   
Table 4: Specific direct effects of the independent variables. All effects are standardized beta coefficients, except for the direct effect on RWD membership 
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The proximate causes (moral support for RWE and positive attitudes to racism by peers) were 
strongly influenced by the negative attitudes towards out-group. The effect of the latter variable on 
positive attitudes towards racism (β =0.272) and moral support for RWE (β = 0.227) was positive. In 
contrast, no positive effect was found from this form of contra-identification towards the dependent 
variable of RWD group participation. A similar common cause of the proximate causes was found in 
the exogenous variable of thrill seeking behavior. Regarding the effects on the dependent variable, 
only one significant effect was measured, namely that of positive attitudes towards racism (β 
=0.239).  
 
Figure 6 presents the best fitting model of the SEM path analysis (RMSEA=0.062). As hypothesized, 
anomia (β= 0.214), perceived injustice (β= 0.191) and authoritarianism (β= 0.667) are directly related 
to perceived group threat. Perceived injustice and anomia have both direct and indirect significant 
effects on group threat (see Appendix 6). The best fitting model indicates that perceived injustice has 
a positive effect on anomia (β= 0.214) and anomia has a positive effect on authoritarianism (β= 
0.257) 
  
Furthermore, there is a direct path from perceived group threat to Flemish identity (β= 0.411), 
negative attitudes towards out-group (0.767) and feelings of superiority (β = 0.296). The pathway of 
group threat on the dependent variable may run through the concept of ethnocentrism, involving 
both the in-group identification (Flemish identity) and the contra-identification with the out-group 
(negative attitudes towards out-groups). In line with the results of the direct effects in table 4, the 
results indicate a direct effect of contra-identification (β= 0.329), and no significant effect of in-group 
identification, on moral support for RWE. The effect of Flemish identity might be mediated by contra-
identification which has an independent effect on negative attitudes towards out-group (β= 0.173). A 
positive significant effect is evident from contra-identification on positive attitudes towards racism 
by peers (β= 0.473). Likewise, no direct effects is found from Flemish identity on positive attitudes 
towards racism. 
 
In line with the previous results, group threat operates as a common cause of both ethnocentrism 
and superiority. However, in contrast to the previous results, the best fitting model indicates a small, 
but significant effect of thrill seeking behavior (β= 0.071). Both contra-identification (β= 0.133) and 
superiority (β= 0.140) indicated a positive significant effect on moral support. Nevertheless, no effect 
occurred from superiority on positive attitudes of peers in regard of racism. The effect on the latter 
variable might be suppressed by the strong effect of negative attitudes towards the out-group.
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Fig. 6 Merged model for the explanation of participation in right-wing disruptive groups, RMSEA= 0.062. All parameters are statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level or better.  
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Thrill-seeking behavior exhibits a direct effect on exposure to racist peers (β= 0.154), but not on RWD 
group participation. Interestingly, in the best fitting model, there is no direct relationship between 
moral support for right-wing extremism and positive attitudes to racism by peers. In line with a key 
assumption of self-control theory, thrill-seeking behavior is a common cause of both moral support 
(β= 0.194) and positive attitudes towards racism. 
 
There are only two direct effects on RWD group participation: moral support for right-wing 
extremism (log-odds53: 0.210) and exposure to racist peers (log-odds: 0.482). For interpretation, we 
calculate the odds ratio by taking the inverse log function. Results indicate that a one-standard 
deviation increase on moral support for RWE increases the likelihood of RWE participation with a 
factor of 1.23 (odds-ratio). Moreover, one-standard deviation increase in exposure to racist peers 
increases the probability of RWD group participation with a factor of 1.62 (odds-ratio) (Menard 
2011).  
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
The results have shown that RWD group participation partially stems from perceived injustice, group 
threat, authoritarianism and anomia. This is consistent with previous research that recognizes the 
triggering of feelings of both perceived and procedural justice by the lack of social integration with 
school and/or family (De Waele 2014; Pauwels and Schils 2014). Past studies have also confirmed 
that perceived injustice impacts on respondents’ feelings of legitimacy about democratic institutions, 
such as the police. Such feelings of distrust might lower the threshold for illegal behavior and, 
likewise, support the motivation to RWD group participation.   
 
Nevertheless, feelings of injustice do not directly trigger RWD group participation (see table 4). The 
results supported our hypothesis that group threat may trigger feelings of superiority and 
ethnocentrism (identification and contra-identification). Contra-identification, in particular, plays a 
major role in further translating the aforementioned strains into RWD group participation. These 
mechanisms derived from the social identity theory and the intergroup threat theory are directly 
related to moral support for right-wing extremism.  Regarding our result that no direct effect was 
observed from in-group identification on moral support, Billiet et al. (2003) obtained similar results, 
and they attributed this result to the fact that strong identification with national identity does not 
necessarily require a strong contra-identification with foreigners. In addition, our research only 
                                                          
53
 Log odds reflect the increase in the change in the dependent variable (participation in RWD group vs no participation in 
RWD group) with respect to the value of the independent variable. The higher the value of the log odds is, the greater effect 
there is. A positive value indicates a positive effect, while a negative value denotes a negative effect. 
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measured the contra-identification with immigrants and not with other related out-groups, including 
leftist or the political establishment. Therefore, it can be inferred from respondents who feel aligned 
with the Flemish people and the nation that there exists a different in/out group connotation. Billiet 
et al. (2003) argued that national identity and attitudes toward immigrants are determined by the 
social representation of “nation”. In-group is, thereby, built through shared images and beliefs about 
national in-group and its relationship to other groups or foreigners. In addition, the results also 
indicated a negative effect of anomia, as measured by political powerlessness, on Flemish identity. 
This indicates that persons who strongly identify with Flanders do not necessarily identify as a result 
of disillusionment with the political system. In contrast, it can be argued that political awareness and 
interest in politics could trigger Flemish identification.   
 
On the other hand, thrill-seeking behavior is an additional important exogenous mechanism: it 
affects both moral support for right-wing authoritarianism and exposure to racist peers. We find 
both the perceived injustice model and the self-control initiated model highly compatible with each 
other: our study reveals that both models share common intervening mechanisms leading to RWD 
group participation. While this revelation is found to be the case for right-wing extremism, it remains 
to be seen if it would be applicable to the study of religious Islamic extremism and left-wing 
extremism. Future studies should attempt to gain an insight into the general character of these 
mechanisms. 
 
Based on previous empirical tests of general models (see e.g. Van den Bos et al. 2009), the present 
study integrated a social-psychological model with a self-control initiated model, leading to different 
paths that explain RWD group participation. These findings are in line with those from past research 
(Pauwels and De Waele, 2014) but more importantly, they have extended our knowledge by stressing 
the importance of additional routes from social identity theory and intergroup threat theory. By 
discovering the different routes, we have contributed to a more thorough understanding of 
individual differences in RWD group participation. Future research, in consonance with the gang 
research, could explore the amplifying effect of RWD group participation on the development and 
persistence of violent behavior.  
 
However, some limitations of the present study should be acknowledged.  First of all, our theoretical 
model has been applied to explain individual differences in RWD group participation among students. 
Future research should investigate to what extent the model also applies to the explication of RWD 
group participation in adults and in non-student populations. Second, the measure of RWD group 
participation is a constructed combination of personal ideological positioning and gang identifiers. In 
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this research we assumed that tolerating right-wing extremist participants was a measure of RWD 
group participation. However, to capture the total concept of RWD groups, future research might 
also include additional measures of ideological group positioning. Third, the study is cross-sectional 
and therefore not optimal for studying causal inferences, as causes and effects are measured 
simultaneously. Finally, our results are based on a large-scale web survey, and it is unclear to what 
extent our results are biased by this method of data collection. 
 
Research into the domain of RWD group participation and political violence is important not only for 
the development and evaluation of criminological theories, but also within the framework of 
prevention of political violence. It is in this regard that studies of violent extremism and gang 
research can benefit from a vigorous definition that can enlighten us about aspects of political 
extremist groups, which live on the edge of mainstream society. In their recent work, Decker and 
Pyrooz (2011, 2015) point out how the study of terrorism, extremism and radicalization and gang 
research could mutually benefit from each other by comparing the similarities and contrasting the 
differences. First, they argue that in gang research, political belief and ideology are barely touched 
upon. Therefore, it may be worthwhile to consider combining the research concerns of Eurogang 
with the interest in left/right identification. When we apply the gang definition to RWD group 
participation, inquiries into the political beliefs of the group could then be undertaken and 
illuminated. Second, Decker and Pyrooz specify that the motivation of violence could differ between 
the two groups. We agree with this statement, but concurrently recognize that although the 
motivation could be different, the causal mechanisms of political violence might not. The strong 
effect of thrill seeking behavior, identified in the current research and past studies regarding political 
violence, underlines the prominence of Bjørgo’s statement (1997) that ideology is far from the 
determining factor in joining right-wing groups (De Waele, 2014; Pauwels and De Waele, 2014). 
Finally, some scholars also indicate that there is a difference between the international aspect of 
terrorism and local gang activity. This brings us to the already cited view that the street oriented level 
of the definition of gangs cannot be applied to the research of RWD group participation. Although 
this aspect of street orientation could be a descriptor of some disruptive groups, it cannot be seen as 
a general definer (Esbensen and Maxson, 2012). Therefore, future research should consider the 
Eurogang definition in combination with inquiries into the political preferences by which the 
ideological connotation constitutes a part of the subcultural context. The continuation of work on a 
more comprehensive definition in the field of radicalization could also draw inspiration from the 
traditional research on gang, together with other traditional fields of political violence and political 
protest (e.g. Opp, 2009) so as to produce more profound research.  
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Qualitative research is a form of social inquiry that focuses on the way people interpret and make 
sense of their experiences and the world in which they live. A number of different approaches exist 
within the wider framework of this type of research, but most of these have the same aim: to 
understand the social reality of individuals, groups and cultures.  
(Holloway and Wheeler, 2013, p.3) 
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1. Introduction 
Studies have indicated that the events of 9/11 have significantly increased anti-Islamic sentiments 
and manifestations of violent attacks against Muslims in Western European countries (Glaser, 2006). 
Regarding the Islamic State terrorist acts, society must not turn a blind eye to potential forms of 
home-grown anti-immigrant sentiments, as democratic institutions are regularly exposed to the 
continuing problems of racism, xenophobia and homophobia. In 2014, for instance, the Belgian 
police services received 496 reports on discrimination (Federal Police, 2015). In this context, it is not 
implied that extreme-right groups must be seen as the cause of these discriminating acts. 
Nonetheless, scholars must not ignore the contributing indirect (e.g. hate speech towards 
immigrants) and direct influences of discriminating acts on the mindset of extreme-right groups. In 
fact, recently a member of the extreme-right movement Voorpost was convicted for attaching 
stickers and graffiti on two mosques with slogans of ‘stop Islam terror’ and ‘stop child rape'. The 
judge ruled that the slogans created a hostile atmosphere, demonstrating a profound intolerance 
and provoking a message against the freedom of religion (Het Nieuwsblad, 2015). Yet, this incident 
indicates that cultural and ethnic conflicts are still highly polarized and certain niches on the fringe of 
mainstream society are willing to go far in support of their beliefs.  
 
Traditional research (cf. Adorno, 1950, Billig, 1978) on these forms of extremism primarily focussed 
on the ‘irrational’ behaviour in an attempt to explain the pathology of these aberrant world views 
(Mudde, 2007).  As a response to this approach, social movement scholars, in contrast, emphasised 
‘rational’ explanations for engagement in extreme-right groups (Linden, 2009). Against the contrast 
and tension between these two opposing approaches, Snow and colleagues (1986) criticised the 
approach of social psychology, stating that scholars neglect interpreting grievances in their 
explanation. Snow et al.’s criticism does not contradict the social-psychological explanation, but 
rather build on the social-psychological mechanisms to further explore the ‘thoroughgoing 
understanding which requires both social psychological and structural/organizational factors’ (Snow 
et al., 1986, 464). Opp (2009) alludes to this work, indicating similarly that although becoming a 
member refers to a real phenomenon, membership becomes effective as they become part of a 
mental model that frames values and beliefs.  
 
Previously conducted quantitative research stressed the importance of social-psychological 
mechanisms (i.e. perceived injustice, authoritarianism, anomia and ethnocentrism) for explaining 
extreme-right participation in Flanders (De Waele, 2014). However, this strand of quantitative 
research has yielded limited insights when it comes to understanding the construction of these 
mechanisms in the process of engaging in extreme-right groups. Therefore, in this study in-depth 
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interviews were conducted with (former) members in order to highlight the process of engagement 
in Flemish extreme-right groups. The following questions are addressed:  
 
1) What factors contribute to the development of an initial interest in extreme-right groups?  
2) How do the identified catalysts impact on the process of joining extreme-right groups?   
3) How do members attract individuals to engage in Flemish extreme-right group? 
4) How do individuals internalise ideological frames and become socially integrated?  
 
This article begins with the theoretical approach adopted for analysing the motivation for joining 
extreme and/or stigmatised groups. It then describes the research conducted from June 2014 to April 
2015 regarding the interview method and the recruitment of participants. Next, the findings are 
discussed under several sub-themes, including the context and background characteristics, personal 
motives for engagement, the effect of catalysts in the process of engagement, the attraction of the 
movement, the framing perspective and the process of socialisation. Finally, the article concludes 
with a discussion of the main findings.  
 
2. Theoretical framework 
The starting point for this theoretical frame is the contribution of Quintan Wictorowicz (2004) who 
conducted research on joining radical Islamic groups, such as Al-Muhajiroun, in the UK. His work not 
only inspires attempts to bridge the divide between explanations of various manifestations of 
radicalisation, it also offers an eclectic explanation of both social psychological and social movement 
theories. In line with Wiktorowicz’s research on engaging in radical Islam groups, this article 
elaborates on three stages54 in the process of extreme-right group engagement (i.e. cognitive 
opening, framing and socialization). Important aspect is that we do not perceive these processes as 
linear or determining process of joining. In contrast, the current theoretical approach highlights the 
dynamic process in which the different steps (cognitive opening, framing, and socialisation) can 
overlap or can occur at different moments in time. Diverse scholars have attempted to tackle the 
problem of causal events in time, giving rise to discussion on the chronological order of engagement 
(physical process) and radicalisation (mental process) of joining extreme-right groups (Bjørgo, 2011; 
Bjørgo and Horgan, 2009). Bjørgo commented that there is no ‘one size fit all’ convincing explanation 
to determine the exact chronological order. Hence, this study investigates how these three phases 
impact on the engagement process of Flemish extreme-right groups.  
 
                                                          
54 
In this contribution we only focus on three out of the four stages mentioned by Wiktorowicz (2007). The stage of religious 
seeking has been left out of the persuasion model due to the fact that we focus on the engagement of political extremism. 
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2.1. Factors leading to a cognitive opening for an extreme-right ideology55 
To become susceptible to new ideas and worldviews, people might externalize personal and absorb 
contextual influences, especially when previous belief systems are perceived as inadequate 
(Wictorowicz, 2004; Choudhury, 2007). In his model (see Figure 7), Mellis makes a distinction 
between the influences of the two involved actors, namely the demand and the supply side. On the 
demand side, Mellis places possible contenders for engagement in extreme-right groups. These 
contenders are experiencing a pushing effect towards the edge of mainstream society. In contrast, 
the supply side gathers the extreme-right groups responsible for pulling individuals towards the 
fringes of society. These groups try to create an attractive environment through diverse channels of 
recruitment56 (social media, newspapers, magazines, demonstrations, etc.) in order to convince 
individuals that this group is an alternative option for engagement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Cognitive opening based on the model of Mellis (2007, 27) 
 
In addition, Mellis (2007) points out the risky environment of individuals (i.e. personal frustration 
through discrimination, humiliation, alienation and injustice) as the breeding ground to engage in 
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 In line with Mudde, the term ideology is used to refer to the normative ideas on man and society as propagated by a 
certain group. Therefore, it is stated that ideology is seen as the body of normative(-related) ideas about the nature of man 
and society as well as the organization and purposes of society Cited in Mudde (2002) 
56
 Pauwels et al. (2014) stipulate in this sense from an individual point of view, recruitment can be active (individuals search 
for a group) or passive (not an individual’s deliberate choice), intentional (individual is aware of the engagement) or 
unintentional (individual is not aware of the engagement (individual is not aware of engagement). 
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extremist groups. It is that breeding ground that influences the personal receptiveness for an anti-
establishment ideology. However, Mellis indicates that individuals do not automatically proceed to a 
cognitive opening. Individuals possess a certain ‘wall of resilience’ concerning the push and pull 
factors which may hinder the passage towards a cognitive opening57. Finally, it is noted that certain 
life events may facilitate the process of cognitive opening (Crenshaw, 1981; Melde and Esbensen, 
2011; Veldhuis and Bakker, 2007). Turning or triggering points, in this perspective, might be the 
murder of an extreme-right leader, loss of spouse or negative experiences with immigrants.  
 
In contrast to the work of Mellis, Bjørgo (2011) argues that scholars take for granted that changes in 
behaviour (engagement) result from changes in values and norms (radicalisation). Nevertheless, the 
relation between radicalisation and engagement seems to be far more complex. As such, Bjørgo and 
Horgan (2009) pointed out that while a certain proportion engages because of the cognitive 
alignment with the groups’ ideology, there is a variety of internal driven motives pushing individuals 
to group engagement (e.g. provocation, anger, thrill seeking, etc.). In line with Bjørgo’s remarks, Sax 
(2012, 117-154) marked in her historical study on motives for collaboration during the second World 
War that the Flemish soldiers had various incentives for their engagement (i.e. personal adventure, 
personal economic and financial benefits, material benefits, escaping employment, pressure by 
family, etc.). To this end, we want to examine which factors push and pull individuals towards (a 
cognitive opening for) the extreme-right discourse.  
 
2.2. The mental process of frame alignment 
In search of explaining the process leading people from being open for new ideas to engaging 
cognitively with a group, Snow et al. (1986) discussed the process of frame alignment which relates 
to the idea that groups need to empower people and enable them to identify with the cognitions of 
the extreme-right group. They indicated that the process of frame alignment provides the 
conjunction manifested in four processes between the individual frame and the interpretive 
framework of the social movement organisation (SMO).  
 
The first element of the framing process is frame bridging. Snow et al. (1986) suggested that this is 
the initial link established between two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected 
frames regarding a particular issue or problem. This process is supported through organisational 
outreach and the distribution of information among interpersonal or intergroup networks. McCarthy 
(1997) indicated that in order to resonate frames, movements face the difficulty of addressing local 
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 Relevant to this view, it can be argued that adolescents or people with a low level of ability to control themselves might 
be less resilient to internal and external influences 
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personal experiences. In this perspective, Conway and McInerney (2008) state that the current rapid 
communication of information through internet and social media enable movements to cover a 
widespread audience of possible activists. In contrast, Schils and Pauwels (2014) marked that online 
exposure of extremist messages only partially explains issues of political violence and differential 
association with racist peers. To this end, the scholars mark that an important mediating role is still 
reserved for real-world associations. Considering all these findings, we want to analyse what the 
initial ‘frames’ are for connecting the individual to the group, and how people got into contact with 
these extreme-right frames (in the real world or via social media). 
 
Second, Snow et al. (1986) mentioned frame amplification as the process of clarification and 
invigoration of an interpretative frame. This amplification is specific to certain issues, problems or set 
of events which can be divided into two types: values58 and beliefs59. In order to address the 
individual demand, groups tend to highlight or accentuate these values and beliefs by using 
attractive slogans. Appealing slogans by the Flemish extreme-right groups often refer to the 
immigration theme, with slogans such as ‘Own people first’ and ‘500,000 unemployed people, why 
guest workers?’ (Derks, 2007). Accordingly, it is not merely innovative thinking but, rather, the 
manner in which the issue, event or belief is articulated that provides a particular interpretation 
(Benford and Snow, 2000). Hogg and Terry (2000) indicate that extremist groups respond to this by 
providing clear and sharp answers which appeal individuals in order to compensate their low levels 
of self-certainty.  
 
Third, it is argued by Benford and Snow (2000) that certain values promoted by the SMO are not 
fundamentally rooted in the initial framework of the SMO. To enlarge the pool of adherents, SMOs 
need to broaden their scope and extend the boundaries of the earlier framework, referred to as 
frame extension. In Flanders, this can be demonstrated by the Vlaams Blok, which was originally 
founded as a party primarily focussing on the division of Belgium. This focus remained but towards 
the end of the Cold War, the party added the immigration theme to their discourse (Coffé and 
Dewulf, 2014), culminating in the programme of 70 points aimed at contesting immigration (Erk, 
2005). This frame extension ensured that they increased their support over the years from a small 
single-issue party to the second largest party in Flanders in 2004.  
 
Finally, Snow et al. (1986) held that in some instance frames need to be transformed when they are 
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Values are considered as being end-stated goals which movements seek to promote. 
59
Beliefs are elements which are more philosophical and ideational. They are cognitions that support or impede action in 
pursuit of desired values.  
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no longer appealing or need to be reframed in order to maintain support and participants. In 
particular, a distinction can be made between two forms of transformation. On the one hand, the 
transformation of domain specific frames is seen as the change to the perceived seriousness of the 
condition. Where the condition might have been unfortunate but tolerable, for example, the influx of 
immigrants, transformation of frames might create an awareness and adoption of an injustice frame 
towards the theme of immigration. On the other hand, transformation can also be connected to a 
shift of global interpretive frames as a kind of master frame that dominates the new primary 
framework according to which experiences and events are to be (re)interpreted.  
 
2.3. Socialisation and joining extreme-right groups 
The last aspect we want to address is the phase of socialisation. In contrast to explanations which 
focus on the cognitive evolution of individuals, scholars have worked on the understanding of 
processes of social inclusion of individuals in group engagement. Theories of differential association 
and social learning were among the first to mark the process of socialization among criminal groups 
and networks (Akers, 1998). Scholars noted in this perspective that forms of social interaction 
created an optimal environment in which individuals can adopt the definitions and values of the 
group (Sela-Shayovitz, 2012). As such, it is through forms of education in mundane activities such as 
‘study groups, lectures, interactions, discussions, social events, protest and other activities’ that 
individuals become willing learners of the ‘extra’-ideological60 group values. To this end, new 
‘indoctrinated’ member are trained to reproduce the groups’ ideology and attract new followers 
(Wiktorowicz, 2004) 
 
However, social contact does not solely fulfils the role of distributing group values and norms. Sitzer 
and Heitmeyer (2008) indicate that socialisation serves as a process of appropriation and interaction 
of social-emotional (affection, recognition, etc.) and material (money, symbols, magazines, etc.) 
conditions. Social-identity theorists have stipulated in this context that people who highly identify 
with a certain group undergo a process of depersonalization (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). As such, these 
individuals tend to fall in line of the group and obey orders of their group leaders (Turner, 1987, Hogg 
and Terry, 2000). Swann et al. (2009) have contradicted the latter by stating that it is not merely the 
identification process, but rather the fusing of identities that leads people to extremist behaviour. In 
line with the self-verification theory they point out that people base their identity on the treatment 
they receive from others inside the ‘community’. As soon as the identity is formed, people use this 
frame to make predictions about the world and guide their personal behaviour (Swann et al., 2009).  
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 With ‘extra’ ideological we point on the values and norms applicable in a certain group (f.e. internal regulations for 
members) 
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Besides the identification with a certain group, people likewise undergo a gradual process of contra-
identification (Pennings and Brants, 1985). Bjørgo (2002) pinpointed on this matter that joining the 
extremist community may cut ties with the ‘normal’ community. This form of bridge-burning, along 
with creating a security consciousness (e.g. creating a sense of paranoia), mutual experiences of 
violence and community-building are essential for engagement of extreme-right groups. Moreover, it 
is expected that these feelings of paranoia and community Building may even further be enhanced 
when people experience (actual or symbolic) threat (Sela-Shayovitz, 2012).  
 
3. Method 
3.1. Interview technique & data analysis 
Interviews were conducted on the basis of a semi-structured questionnaire which covered a variety 
of topics. Concepts (see topic list, Appendix 3) were selected on the basis of the literature study. 
Specific attention was paid to the educational context, the role of significant others such as parents, 
peers, relatives, etc.), personal perceptions including multiculturalism, (homo)sexuality, traditional 
gender patterns, national identity, violence, personal role within the group and extreme-right group 
activities. Each interview was transcribed in detail and coded openly according to themes such as the 
important events, opinions and phenomena. Subsequently, axial coding was used to categorise the 
relevant codes, which enabled us to compare and reflect on the differences and similarities. This 
analytical method presented us with a large amount of rich data, although some difficulties were 
encountered during the research. 
 
3.2. Difficulties and limitations 
Research on difficult to reach populations are indisputably faced with different drawbacks and 
limitations in regard of method and response rate. Three drawbacks can be identified, i.e. response 
rate, social desirable answering by the respondents and the relatively limited amount of data 
collection.  
 
First, there have been considerable cases of rejection in recruiting of participants. Of the total of 85 
people contacted through mail, telephone, informal contact and facebook messages, only 23 
responded, which means the response rate was approximately 27% (23/85). Of the participants who 
responded, only 46 % (23/50) decided to participate. Those who refused to participate indicated four 
main reasons for their decision. At first most individuals indicated distrust of the research and/or the 
researcher. The stated reasons for distrust were: (1) the perception that studies about the right-wing 
scene are always taken out of context, (2) the rumour that the interviewer worked for the police 
and/or judicial services, or (3) the fact that the final report would provide police and judicial services 
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with information about their radical political group. The second reason was that some individuals had 
renounced their past and were not eager to discuss their previous life. One former member stated, ‘I 
do not want to be remembered for the biggest waste of time in my life’. The third reason is related to 
prior unfortunate personal experiences with interviews by journalists and/or researchers. Finally, the 
last reason for non-participation was that people were not allowed to discuss group matters to 
strangers. These sort of ‘omerta’ rules have made it difficult to contact persons within certain groups. 
In this perspective, our research is not able to provide a comprehensively representative view of the 
number of respondents per group. However, the in-depth study can throw some light on the 
engagement process for each type of extreme-right groups (see below).  
 
The second limitation of the research is inevitably the risk of the respondents providing socially 
desirable answers, in other words, ‘inauthentic’ answers to issues such as self-conducted violence 
and radical ideology. To anticipate this social desirability, numerous initiatives were undertaken. 
First, the sensitive topics of the study were discussed at the end of the interview when a certain 
amount of trust had been built between the interviewer and interviewee. Subsequently, we 
anticipated socially desirable answers by providing the in-depth investigation with prior information 
about the background of the respondent. On-line documentation, informal information from other 
respondents, open sources, criminal records and archive documents provided us with a great deal of 
background information about the respondent. This ensured that the statements of the respondent 
could be checked and that more profound questions could be explored. Regardless of the efforts we 
put in, future research might check for socially desirable answers or exaggerated stories to make a 
good impression61. 
 
Finally, the research is based on the number of respondents willing to participate in the interview. 
Due to the above stated drawbacks and the difficulty of identifying those members (e.g. there are no 
formal membership list), it is often hard to reach individuals. Moreover, the population covers not 
only a hard-to-reach population, but likewise a movement which is marginally active within the 
Flemish territory. Previous studies on extreme-right have only focused on voting behaviour and 
participation in right-wing nationalist groups (Billiet and De Witte, 2001). In contrast, this study 
focuses on the broad range of extreme-right groups, from Flemish right-wing nationalist to Neo Nazi 
groups (see below).  
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Certain respondents may ‘spice’ up certain stories to make a good impression. See Paulhus, D.L. (2002), Social desirable 
responding: The evolution of a construct. In: Braun, H.I., Jackson, D.N., Wiley, D.E., The role of constructs in psychological 
and educational measurement, Mahway, Erlbaum, 59-69. 
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Furthermore, to explore all possible influences of context, respondents were recruited from every 
province of the Flemish region. After the last series of interviews was conducted, no correlation 
could be established with the origins of the three different group types. Therefore, it was assumed 
that saturation point had been reached.  
 
3.3. Respondents 
From July 2014 to April 2015, twenty-three (former) members of an extreme-right group were 
interviewed (see table 5). A profile overview of the participants is included in appendix 7.  
 
 Right-wing Nationalist 
(n= 9) 
Neo-Nazi  
(n=8)  
National Solidarist 
(n=6) 
Type of group Political Party, social 
movement 
Social-cultural 
network 
Social-cultural  
network 
Relation to 
democracy  
Accept and prefer to 
work within democracy 
Reject democracy Reject democracy 
Reference group Flemish nation  White nation  Flemish or European 
 
Out-
group62 
Internal National traitors  
(leftists, political 
establishment) 
Racial traitors 
(leftist, political 
establishment) 
National and racial 
traitors (leftists, 
political  
Establishment) 
 External Immigrants with a 
foreign culture 
Jewish world 
domination and 
Muslim invasion 
Jewish world 
domination and 
Muslim invasion 
Consequence of 
immigration 
Cultural mixing, loss of 
Flemish identity and 
destruction of the 
nation (cf. economy, 
criminality) 
Racial mixing, blood 
pollution, clash of 
civilizations, Racial 
Holy War (RahoWa)   
Cultural (and racial)  
Mixing, clash of 
civilizations, 
destruction of 
identity and nation 
Table 5: Ideological differences between types of Flemish right-wing groups, based on the work of Bjørgo, 1997, 63-71) 
 
Respondents were recruited through multiple channels. First, observations were made at 
demonstrations, debates, lectures, meetings. Some respondents were approached directly without 
any initial contact in the ‘real world’. Potential respondents were contacted because (1) they had 
been mentioned in online documents, websites, chat boxes or open access criminal files, or (2) 
through snowball selection via previous contacts63. In the interviews it appeared that the 
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 In line with Sprinzak’s (1995) theory on split delegitimization where he argues that right-wing radicals have a primary 
conflict with an ‘inferior’ community (e.g. Muslims, Jews) and a secondary conflict with the government. 
63
 The option of snowball sampling turned out to be unsuccessful. Most respondents were willing to talk anonymously, but 
when asked about other individuals within the movement most were not eager to (1) contact other individuals themselves 
or (2) mention the names of other members 
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interviewees held diverse ideological opinions about economics, society and topics such as Flemish 
independence and migration. We then distinguished three types of respondents: right-wing 
nationalists, neo-Nazi and modern national socialist and national solidarists. The first type64 of 
respondents is the right-wing nationalist, who represent the radical to extreme-right segment of the 
broader Flemish nationalist movement. These respondents were and are active within political 
parties or well-organised social movement surrounding the political field. Most respondents label 
themselves as radical, militant, anti-Belgian, Flamingant, European, democrat and republican. 
Although criticising strongly the political establishment and the current democratic system, they 
prefer to work within the democratic system. As democrats they tackle the issue of immigration from 
the perspective that it undermines Flemish values and culture. Internationally similar type of 
nationalists is found among international movements and political parties such as Lega Nord (Italy), 
Partij Voor de Vrijheid (The Netherlands), Front National, War Raok! and Génération Identitaire 
(France), Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPO, Austria), Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden), Jobbik 
(Hungary) and SOMcatalans (Spain). 
 
The second type of respondents indicated strongly the glorification of the German National Socialistic 
regime. These are referred to as neo-Nazi’s and could be placed, according to Bjørgo’s typology, 
within the scope of racial revolutionaries (Bjørgo, 1997). These respondents unanimously label 
themselves as extreme-right, radical, militant, national socialist, national solidarist, anti-Belgian, 
Flamingant and republican. In their vision, political parties and social movements are considered to 
be weak on crime and immigration. Therefore, they reject to work within the democratic system and 
propose a fundamental change to society out of loosely structured sociocultural groups of networks. 
Within this type, respondents attach great importance to their own race and show support for 
international networks such as Blood and Honour, Combat 18, Autonomous Nationalist, Swedish 
Resistance movement (Sweden) and the Nationalsozialistischer untergrund (NSU, Germany). 
 
The last type of extreme-right respondents identified as the national solidarists demonstrated a 
strong aversion to the Nazi regime and the emphasis on race, at least to the outside world. These 
respondents label themselves as nationalist, socialist, solidarists, anti-Belgian (though not always), 
European, democrat and republican. They promote a modern explanation of the national socialist 
ideology with a focus on structural change in modern society which combines nationalism with 
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 The type of respondents (i.e. RW nationalist, National socialist and National Solidarists) is determined by their 
membership of certain RW nationalist, National Socialist and National Solidarist ideological groups and the manner in which 
they label themselves as one of those three types.  
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economic socialism or solidarism65. However, some refuse to label themselves as national socialist or 
national solidarist due to the contaminated meaning of the word. Therefore, they promote 
themselves as geo-political nationalists and by referring to the importance of the European culture 
and the preservation of traditions. Their ‘enemies’ are often located within national and 
international institutions, such as those who control the financial and economic system (i.e., Jews).  
Within this type most respondents tend to support international movements such as Casa Pound 
(Italy), Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD, Germany), and the Golden Dawn (Greece). 
 
4. Context and background characteristics  
4.1. A hazardous environment  
Examination of the background of the respondents did not yield any indication of connection 
between contemporary geographical location and extreme-right sympathies. However, when we 
analysed the context in which respondents started to engage in extreme-right groups, it is noticeable 
that 15 out of the 23 respondents were connected with the group in an urban environment. There 
are many reasons why urban environments tend to attract extreme individuals and groups. Firstly, in 
contrast to local municipalities, supply is larger in urban cities where a broader range of movements 
and networks are available to attract susceptible individuals. Secondly, certain cities have greater 
exposure to out-groups (i.e., leftist, Walloons or immigrants). Respondents, mainly those who grew 
up in Brussels66, indicated that French and immigrants often look at Flemish people with disdain. 
Diverse stories were mentioned in which respondents (e.g. Achiel and Quinten) were verbally 
insulted as ‘sale Flamand’ (dirty Flemish) or ‘sale Blanc’ (dirty white). Thirdly, Achiel, who grew up in 
the city of Brussels, implied another triggering factor for engagement. 
 
 One cannot imagine […] how strong the social loneliness is of regular Flemish people in 
Brussels […] The regular Flemish people in Brussels, who continue to speak Dutch, they are 
terribly alone. Really, that is and that was certainly the case with me. I won’t say that we 
didn’t talk with French people or so but it is a rather strange situation.  
(Achiel – Right-wing nationalist) 
 
When the individual economic background was compared with group type involvement, it is noticed 
that right-wing nationalist were more broadly distributed on the economic scale in comparison to 
                                                          
65
 Respondents explain the difference between solidarism and socialism out of the fact that national socialism promotes 
collaboration between different classes in society whereas national socialism does not. 
66
 The Brussels capital is, in contrast to the unilingual regions of Flanders (Dutch) and Wallonia (French), a bilingual region. 
Flemish people indicate that the region is dominated by French speaking people. Therefore, they often feel discriminated or 
neglected.  
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sociocultural groups. Various right-wing nationalist respondents are in the possession of a college 
degree which is not surprising, given the fact that there is a broad influx of members coming out of 
the Flemish right-wing nationalist student movement. The majority of members of sociocultural 
groups can be placed in the lower-middle class. Personal economic background is not a decisive 
element within sociocultural groups, but might be a key marker of shared group sentiment. Neo-Nazi 
skinheads Ulbrecht and Victor grew up in a low-middle class family and although they indicated that 
this was not important for their own engagement, both indicated to feel strongly attracted by the 
working-class mentality among the skinheads. Right-wing nationalist Stijn mentioned that he initially 
thought he was left, because of his strong sentiment for working class men. However, after some 
disappointing adventures on the extreme-left scène, Stijn gradually turned to a right-wing nationalist 
discourse with focus on a suppressed Flemish population. These examples indicate that personal 
economic deprivation might form a trigger for possible activation of respondents to contest the 
contemporary democratic system.  
 
4.2. An impressionable age  
In line with the research on extreme-right groups, it was found that respondents tended to join the 
group at an early age (between 14 and 22). Some respondents even turned out to have been 
involved in the Flemish nationalistic movement long before their entrance in the Flemish right-wing 
group. The older respondents indicated that their first steps into the Flemish nationalistic movement 
were made within traditional Flemish youth movements such as Scouts, Chiro and KSA where 
traditional Flemish values are held and members attend Flemish national events such as the ‘Vlaams 
Nationaal Zangfeest’67 and the ‘Ijzerbedevaart’68. Nowadays, this role of the youth movement is 
virtually exclusively reserved for the VNJ, the Flemish nationalist Youth Movement. Two respondents 
indicated that this early engagement in the Flemish movement encouraged them to remain active 
within the field. It has to be pointed out that this early engagement is connected to a broad Flemish 
nationalist discourse which is not necessarily associated with a certain political current. On the 
contrary, respondents indicated that this Flemish nationalist background significantly stimulated 
them to further grow on the right-wing nationalist scène due to the friendship ties established 
earlier. 
 
Nevertheless, engagement within the right-wing movement does not seem to be solely determined 
by ‘indoctrination’ at early age. Respondents implied that at young age, they were more open to new 
                                                          
67
 The Vlaams Nationaal Zangfeest is an event that promotes traditional Flemish music such as classic battle songs and folk 
songs (e.g., the Flemish ‘anthem’ De Vlaamse Leeuw). The organisation of this event is one of the key pillars of the Flemish 
nationalist movement. This year the slogan of the event was ‘Sing Flanders Free’, with a clear separatist message.  
68
 The Ijzerbedevaart is an annual pilgrimage in memory of the fallen Flemish soldiers from the First World War.  
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ideas, attracted by action and more prone to retaliation. Piet, for example, indicated that his 
vulnerable position as a youngster, in combination with negative experiences with immigrants, had 
fostered his sense of willingness to engage with groups of like-minded individuals. 
 
I was then quite alone, shall I say. I didn’t knew many people. I was 16, 17 years old and, 
yeah, totally not resilient and then you are an easy victim, of course. I was frustrated and 
that is how I rolled into these groups by searching for people […] because eventually you get 
such an aversion to these people and, yeah, then you search for equals and that has been the 
first step towards X (neo-Nazi network). (Piet –Right-wing nationalist, former Neo-Nazi) 
 
This example displays the role of being a victim of violence from immigrants as a catalyst. Through 
the experience of violence, Piet’s susceptibility for radical messages increased within a short period 
of time. The background to the situation indicated that Piet had been moved to a school with a 
concentration of Turks and Moroccans before he ran into trouble with the latter. As a youngster he 
felt terribly alone, misunderstood, vulnerable and treated unfairly, which nourished a strong 
breeding ground for him to accept alternative narratives to reclaim deprived rights.  
 
5. Personal motivations for engagement 
Becoming receptive to extreme-right influences is often strongly determined by internal driven 
motives. A pioneer on the process of entry, Bjørgo (2002), drew attention to 10 motives for entering 
the Nazi scène69 in his article on exit neo-Nazism.  Bjørgo said that respondents are often in doubt 
about themselves and in search for an identity, like-minded people or a sense of belonging. Diverse 
respondents expressed a similar quest. Kristof, a right-wing nationalist, for instance, claimed that he 
was very young when he started his ideological quest, together with a similar group of young people, 
in search of potentially interesting experiences. They started this quest because they were interested 
in aspects of Flemish nationalism, but had enough of the traditional Flemish nationalist discourse. 
The quest finally led him to participation in a national anarchistic scene. Hanne, on the other hand, 
felt misunderstood due to her sympathy for Flemish nationalist movements and desired a space 
where she could be herself. She, therefore, started to actively search for like-minded people. 
 
I had some friends in class, but I was more, yes, a loner, well not really a loner but because I 
just couldn’t find myself in the discussion with the other students and in that way I wanted to 
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 His ten indicates motives for entering a neo-Nazi group were (1) Ideology and politics, (2) provocation and anger, (3) 
protection, (4) drifting, (5) thrill seeking, (6) attractiveness to violence, weapons and uniforms, (7) youth rebels go to the 
right, (8) the search for substitute families and father-figures, (9) the search for friends and community and (10) search for 
status and identity.   
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search for an entourage or a group of friends or just acquaintances with whom I, in the first 
place, could tell my thoughts to in an untamed way without being shut off by dreadlocks and 
hippies, as a figure of speech, in the political and social sciences. (Hanne – Right-wing 
nationalist) 
 
Hanne’s narration indicates that people themselves often consciously make the first step to fulfil 
their needs. On the other hand, initial choices are not always based on an ideologically defined quest 
in order to explore their Flemish nationalist feelings. Many respondents indicated that, at an early 
age, they were open for exploring new ideas where engagement in right-wing groups was rather 
seen as an opportunity that had been afforded. Achiel revealed in that perspective that he would not 
have had any moral problems in joining a Francophone youth movement, but none of them came to 
him and he himself was too ashamed and too timid to ask if he could join them. Respondents also 
suggested that they had felt attracted to the discourse of the political counterpart (e.g. Claude, Stijn). 
In contrast to searching for a belonging or responding to feelings of deprivation, some respondents 
implied that they were actively seeking action and drawing attention in order to provoke people (e.g. 
Ignace, Claude, Victor). Victor indicated to have a self-centered vision and a claim for attention in his 
childhood and he still likes to engage in what he calls ‘puncturing bubbles’. 
 
 Puncturing bubbles … I always liked that. I also liked to be the centre of attention, you know 
[…] I was always happy to be in the spotlight and how that happened, good or bad that was 
not really important, just being seen by others, that was fun […] you really felt like a bad boy, 
a naughty boy when people pass you and say ‘damn’ what is that on his jacket? 
(Victor – Neo-Nazi) 
 
In accordance with the entry processes of Bjørgo, respondents (e.g. Ignace, Willem, Claude, and 
Daniel) pointed out they were drawn to the militaristic aspect of the extreme-right groups. Their 
fascination for guns and uniforms was one of the motives for joining the movement or networks.  
 
6. Triggering the personal demand for engagement 
6.1. Physical victimisation  
The duration of radicalisation depends strongly upon the different cumulative push factors towards 
the cognitive opening. However, the process of engagement can accelerate in the presence or 
occurrence of certain events (i.e. catalysts). Negative experiences within the life course, as illustrated 
above, can be considered triggering the process (e.g. Piet, Frederic, Xavier). Nevertheless, not only 
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victimisation, but also the way of dealing with violent activities influences engagement. For instance, 
Frederic remarked that he was involved in a conflict during a soccer game at secondary school. 
During that conflict Frederic was beaten up by a person of another ethnic origin. When he 
complained about the incident to his principal, he received the following reaction: 
 
 I was put under pressure to withdraw my complaint because I didn’t want to deprive the boy, 
so actually I became like a victim, the perpetrator. Above that, they asked me ‘Are you sure 
you are not a racist?’ But I was 15 years old. I was a young guy and I had never been involved 
with politics, I didn’t bother, me … I mean, of course I wasn’t able to vote, my parents 
weren’t interested in politics, that was boring. I was like, I’m what now? (Frederic – National 
solidarist) 
 
Linked to his further career on the Flemish right-wing scène, this event surely triggered his 
involvement in an anti-immigrant discourse. From then on Frederic started to look for answers and 
was attracted by a poster of extreme-right political party Vlaams Blok which addressed the issue of 
impunity of immigrant groups. His search for answers finally led him to join the Flemish right-wing 
scene and evolve towards a National Solidarist discourse. To this end, victimisation does not have to 
be restricted to direct or actual forms of violence. Indirect forms of victimisation (e.g. violence 
towards family and friends) and perceptions of victimisation seem to exert an equal effect on 
enhancing the process of engagement.   
 
6.2. Verbal victimisation   
Victimization cannot be restricted to the direct impact of physical violence. Bo, for instance, 
indicated that she grew up in a Flemish nationalist environment because her family was closely 
involved in the Flemish nationalist scene. Being aware of ‘indoctrination’ she was subjected to in the 
right-wing nationalist group, Bo argued that she would have never become this Flemish-minded if 
there had not been so many anti-Flemish minded people stigmatizing the right-wing scene. Groups 
also often anticipate this ‘bad’ image building. Teun, for instance, indicated that the best propaganda 
for the right-wing is the leftists in that they try to create an image of the right-wing being the big 
fascist monster. In so doing, out-groups tend to encourage both rebellious and stigmatized 
characters of the extreme-right groups. 
 
Most people enter because of left counter-propaganda and at a certain moment we just put, 
under a fake name, on their forum [anti-fascist] the question, ‘why didn’t they organise a 
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counter-demonstration or a counter campaign?’ Because in that way we knew that, we 
would attract more people. (Teun- Right-wing nationalist) 
 
This example illustrates that, to some extent, extreme-right groups may equally benefit from their 
established negative reputation. To this end, rightist groups continue to widen the polarisation, 
aiming to attract more individuals by pointing out the exaggerated stigmatisation of their opponents. 
Consequently, potential members become more sensitised to and feel more reassured about 
protesting against the accusations of out-groups.   
 
6.3. Bridge burning  
The example of Frederic suggests that coping with negative events may instigate the search for 
radical messages. Negative life events, such as the loss of spouse or the disconnection of family ties 
might equally trigger openness to radical ideas. Nico (a former neo-Nazi), for instance, was 14 years 
old when his family ties were cut. After telling his parents the news that he would become a father, 
Nico was thrown out of the house. In his struggle of surviving he came into contact with right-wing 
skinheads. Although he indicated that he already had some interest in historical events of the NSDAP 
before entering the skinhead group, it was actually accidental that he ended up with a group of 
skinheads living in a house squat. 
 
7. Creating an attractive environment  
7.1. Supply ‘meets’ demand 
Openness to radical ideologies depends not only on the demand of individuals, but also on the 
presence of a desirable supply side. Nonetheless, findings reveal that although the extreme-right 
demand may be present, people are often unable to connect with ‘formal’ extreme-right groups. 
Louis, for instance, had a strong desire to become a member of Blood and Honour. However, the 
supply was inadequate as the group was disbanded before he became interested. Regardless of the 
fact that Louis was not a member, he felt closely connected to the neo-Nazi scene and often met like-
minded people at skinhead concerts. This suggests that ‘supply’ covers a broad network of ‘formal’ 
and ‘informal’ groups and individuals may have the option of a varied selection of groups from 
radical to extremist both in and outside the extreme-right scène. It is therefore not surprising that 
most of the respondents have been members of multiple groups throughout their careers, moving 
from radical to extremist groups and vice versa.  
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7.2. Recruitment  
In order to boost the demand of extreme-right voices, members of Flemish extreme-right groups 
revealed three main recruitment activities, i.e. taking action, building an image through propaganda 
and targeted recruitment. First, activities are crucial to attracting members and creating a public 
profile. In this regard, the way in which groups undertake action strongly influences the sort of 
individuals a group want to attract. Ulbrecht indicated that carrying out controversial actions also 
had the aim to separate the wheat from the chaff. 
 
 We invaded the student house in Ghent that was actually; yeah… we were going to do that 
when most of the students went to go eat. So a lot of attention … So we got in with a group, 
we chased everyone and put them outside, barricaded the doors and the adrenaline you feel 
and the tension […] And you have, like, nine out of ten who will be scared and turn away, but 
we don’t need those nine out of ten, we are interested in that one individual. (Ulbrecht –
National Solidarist, former right-wing nationalist and Neo-Nazi) 
 
Attracting people through action might serve as an effective recruitment channel. Yet, in profiling the 
group through action, groups face the dilemma between working in- or outside the legal framework. 
Taking into account the historical perspective to right-wing nationalist groups over the years, Gerard 
mentioned that both sides of the dilemma have their advantages.    
 
 Sometimes it is more interesting to obtain your goal by situations like we had in the 
Voerstreek because when you came home that evening you still saw some images on the TV 
and you heard it on the radio and you read it in the paper and so on. And now, when there is 
a demonstration which is prohibited, but you demonstrate anyway, after 15 minutes the 
media is gone because nothing happens […] On the other side, the positive thing is that if we 
apply to do something with X (Right-wing nationalist group), I have to be honest, in almost 99 
percent of the cases we can do our thing, within certain acceptable arrangements. (Gerard – 
Right-wing nationalist) 
 
The latter example indicates that the group may struggle with what Van Donselaar described as the 
‘adaptability dilemma’ (Van Donselaar, 1995) which implicates that groups face the problem of 
choosing between, on the one hand, going to the mainstream and agreeing to work within the legal 
frame and, on the other hand, rejecting the legal frame with the risk of being convicted. Currently, 
the group tries to work within the legal frame by conducting legal actions which are approved by the 
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police and the city administration. This choice for legal actions under the surveillance of the police 
has restricted them to attracting more radical individuals to the scene. These latter individuals search 
their salvation in more radical non-conformist groups.   
 
Second, groups try to build up a certain image using propaganda. Through the use of posters, music, 
and clothing, groups tend to create a comprehensive group identity suitable to attract newcomers. 
As indicated, one of the most powerful tools to distribute the groups’ identity is certainly the internet 
and the use of social media. Nevertheless, in case of providing members with radical messages, 
respondents indicate that the internet might not always be the most appropriate medium. Victor 
alluded to the fact that groups struggle to provide their ‘true colours’ on the internet.  
 
 I have looked at different national socialist websites […] Once I visited the homepage of the 
Ku Klux Klan and so … But websites are not really reliable stuff because they hide a lot on 
websites and they will never show their true colours. They will never put their whole 
manifesto on websites or they leave pieces out of it. […] I knew a couple of friends who were 
in it [group X] but on their website there is little written about it [ideology], but then they 
gave me a magazine in which I could look and there, of course, all the things were written 
down. So the most reliable lecture is the written lecture of the source itself. (Victor – Neo 
Nazi) 
 
This example indicates that certain groups work with a hidden agenda, where the distributed front-
office information stands in contrast with the back-office preached ideology. In so doing, groups 
hope to address a great number of individuals with different ideological opinions.  
 
Finally, group members may adopt a direct active approach to convince individuals of joining the 
group. Members indicate that to convince individuals who are on the edge of the cognitive opening, 
a social approach is needed. Eric (a National solidarist) mentioned that to convince people it is not 
necessary to instil in individuals theories on nationalism, but rather ‘convince them with the 
stomach’ (i.e. food and drinks). The latter example emphasises the importance of socialization with 
group members prior to engaging in extreme-right groups (see below). 
 
8. Manufacturing an ideological framework 
Having become receptive to extreme-right discourse, respondents indicated a gradual process of 
mentality change. We noted that our respondents joined the group primarily because of their 
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concerns about the Flemish identity aspects or the immigration theme. Those who joined the 
movement in support of the Flemish aspect indicated their motivation as being related to (1) the 
Flemish-Walloon conflict and sense of justice, (2) intensifying their Flemish feeling and (3) having a 
romantic image of the Flemish movement. As indicated, distinction needs to be made between 
sympathy for the Flemish aspects and Flemish nationalist support. Achiel showed that, in his case, 
the initial sympathy for the Flemish linguistic aspects (Flamingantism) led to his ideological support 
for an independent Flanders:  
 
The feelings of nationalism actually grew out of my support for Flamingantism. In the 
beginning you fight for equal rights for the Dutch speaking and then I came to the conclusion 
that in fact we speak Dutch because we are a nation of people and there I drew the 
conclusion that our own nation of people has the right to have its own identity and an 
independent nation. And all those things have made me to become a nationalist. (Achiel – 
Right-wing nationalist) 
 
In contrast, Daniel indicated that he did not specifically joined the Flemish extreme-right on the 
Flemish nationalistic ground, but rather because the Flemish right-wing nationalist groups demanded 
amnesty rights for those who had collaborated during the war. As son of a father who collaborated 
with the Germans during the Second World War, Daniel took his first steps into the movement 
because it addressed the deprived situation of ‘those who were wrong during the war’. Besides the 
initial frame bridging of the Flemish aspect, most respondents of the sociocultural groups illustrated 
that the migration theme brought them into the movement. In fact, the frame bridging process was 
often triggered by (1) becoming personal physical or verbal victimization by immigrants (as illustrated 
by Piet and Frederic), or (2) indirect exposure to or word-of-mouth stories about immigrant violence.   
 
Once the initial link is established between individual and group, further frame amplification and 
extension can be achieved. In the organised movements, elaborate interests in certain subjects are 
reinforced by lectures, debates and discussions. Loosely structured networks, on the other hand, 
often lack this form of knowledge introduction. 
 
 No you don’t get an education in X (Neo-Nazi Network), only propaganda. I’m not going to 
say that Y (Right-wing nationalist movement) are not involved in propaganda … They might 
put things into a more romantic perspective than they are in reality, for example, the actions 
in the ‘Voerstreek’ and so … but they have good education and those actions were 
historically supported and correct.  (Piet –Right-wing nationalist, former neo-Nazi) 
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In his research on neo-Nazi gangs in Sweden, Kimmel (2007) indicated a similar role of the lack of 
education. He mentioned that neo-Nazi tends to take its ideology for granted. Therefore, nothing is 
to be learned from education or lectures. Ulbrecht underlined this point by linking to his own efforts 
to educate neo-Nazis. 
 
 I was recruited to give education … but yeah it should be possible and most of these guys had 
their basic beliefs […] but were not open for a solid doctrinal education. Afterwards, in other 
movements, I have experienced good education, for example, in W (Modern NS), W was and 
still is, much better than Z (neo-Nazi Network) in the case of education. (UIbrecht – National 
Solidarist, former right-wing nationalist and Neo-Nazi)    
 
Better organised movements, such as the right-wing nationalist groups, not only intensify the beliefs 
of the respondents by addressing the root causes of the problems, such as migration, but equally 
offer some practical values or guidelines for new members. Gerard, for instance, indicated that 
within his group, members receive many benefits. As such, militants who participate in risky actions 
approved by the movement can count on support from the movement when things turn out badly.  
 
 So as you get arrested for actions that need to be undertaken on behalf of X (Right-wing 
nationalist group) and things were done the way they should been done, then X will pay 
everything, but really everything from the first until the last nickel: attorney fees, litigation 
costs, fines, everything. If that man has to go to jail, then we even go to his house and if he 
has a wife and children we ensure that they have no problems considering rent, food, and 
beverage and so on. On the other hand, we require that militants need to do what they are 
supposed to do. For example, there is no one who is allowed to drink alcohol before and 
during actions. (Gerard — Right-wing nationalist) 
 
Gerard’s example indicates that the movement transcends the idea of a group of friends; it is 
concerned with defending or achieving a mutual goal for which informal agreements are reached. 
Inherent to these agreements is reward which may appear in different forms: respect, giving a voice, 
participation in action, responsibility, acceptance and other elements. 
 
When remaining in the group for a long period of time, people are likely to have undergone an 
ideological evolution. As presented above, Achiel’s personal discourse has been extended over the 
years. As a result, he not only extended his initial interest in Flemish linguistic matters into a broader 
Flemish nationalistic discourse, he also adopted issues that had previously seemed irrelevant, such as 
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migration. Different respondents acknowledged a similar awareness shift from Flemish identification 
to a strong contra-identification with Walloons, with immigrants and the political system that allows 
migration. They also remarked that they experienced an evolution from a narrowly Flemish 
nationalist ideology to a wider geo-political ideological framework. Teun, for instance, revealed that 
his student organisation not only focused on Flemish nationalism, but gradually shifted towards a 
broader framework within which the anti-Israel party, Hezbollah, was strongly supported. Other 
respondents pinpointed the importance of a European-Russian collaboration, a framework that was 
completely absent before. Key figures within the Flemish nationalist scene have discussed this theme 
and inserted it into the Flemish right-wing agenda.  
 
9. Becoming an integrated member 
Although framing is important in order to convince and indoctrinate members, socialisation is vital to 
maintain membership. Members often withdrew from a diversity of groups stating that personal 
disagreements caused them to leave the group. In order to achieve strong socialisation with other 
group members, mutual trust needs to be built. In right-wing nationalist organised movements, trust 
is often based on the strength of the engagement, commitment to various events, helping with the 
organisation of events, plastering posters together. Nevertheless, Nico and Teun indicated that trust 
or respect is also built through non-ideological activities: 
 
I really could follow their [skinheads] way of thinking … just what they said … yes, and you 
arrive in that group and so you have a closer bond with these guys and, yes, if they ask you if 
you want to continue, then you just continue and just go with the flow […] I was always the 
first one who was ready for action [violent action] and, yeah, they had sympathy for that … 
the more you do for them, the higher they think of you. You get more respect, they know if 
they need you that you are ready and that is … that is the key … Brotherhood, being able to 
depend on each other even when it is difficult. Even when it’s hard, you’re there for each 
other. (Nico – former Neo-Nazi) 
 
 X (Flemish student movement) was just more fun, the actions, that was fighting with the 
police, fighting with leftists when they attacked us. I was a shy person, not anymore. And you 
come into the student life and that was just more fun, that people … I was able to support a 
group of friends and I still believe that if you get drunk together, you have been attacked 
together by a big group that creates a bond which is impossible to break. (Teun –Right-wing 
nationalist) 
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These statements clearly show that ideological reasons are not the sole reason for engagement in 
both right-wing nationalist and neo-Nazi groups when it comes to long-term membership. The power 
of group involvement and cohesion lies in the processes of building trust and respect within the 
extreme-right community.  
 
10. Discussion and conclusion  
This article has offered evidence of the resemblance between the different manifestations of radical 
segments in society regarding the engagement process. Similar to the pathways that lead to radical 
Islam groups, it is noted that people initially become interested as a result of the interplay of various 
influences. The initial phase of creating a cognitive opening proves essential for engaging in radical 
and extremist groups (Mellis, 2007). People who are not open for radical messages will not consider 
group engagement as a possible action alternative. Nevertheless, moral values and beliefs are not 
static and may change by the occurrence of triggering events. Sometimes members even engage 
without the knowledge of entering an extreme-right group. Furthermore, results indicate that group 
engagement is strongest when individuals socially and mentally align with the group. In this 
perspective, it is difficult to analyse the chronological order and possible causal relationship of 
framing and socialization processes (cf. Bjørgo and Horgan, 2008). Rather, it can be argued that these 
two processes influence each other reciprocally.  
 
At the basis of engagement lies the contextual breeding ground. In this light we have pointed to the 
importance of contextual factors as possible risk factors (cf. Boehnke, Hagan and Merkens, 1998). 
These risk factors of social exclusion (i.e. discrimination, loneliness, etc.) are noted, but appear to be 
absent in a majority of cases. The absence of a breeding ground of social exclusion is not illogical 
considering the fact that not everyone joins extreme-right groups driven by an urge of social 
belonging. It was noted that certain individuals engaged because of an ideological quest (e.g. Kristof, 
Stijn) or, at least, a search for finding like-minded people (e.g. Hanne). Most ideologists were 
retrieved in right-wing nationalist movement, while in line with Bjørgo (2002) Neo-Nazi members 
were mostly driven by non-ideological reasons. To this end, individuals indicated aspects, such as a 
personal search for an exploration of their personal identity (e.g. Kristof), provocation by ideological 
opponents (e.g. Bo), anger (e.g. Frederic) and search for adventure and sensation (e.g. puncturing 
bubbles)(e.g. Victor, Daniel).  
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On the other hand, personal motivations are stimulated by the presence of the supply. In order to 
convince individuals of group engagement, groups tend to use active70 and passive71 recruitment 
techniques. In a passive manner groups try to create awareness about their presence in the social 
field by setting up a webpage, online weblogs, putting up posters and conduct ‘normal’ group 
activities (i.e. lectures, debates, music concerts, demonstrations etc.). On the other hand, group 
members also actively recruit individuals by addressing their personal network (i.e. family and 
friends) (De Witte, 2006) or conducting targeted actions. Certain groups use subtle, soft measures to 
convince persons (e.g. dinner parties and lectures), while other groups explicitly express their 
uncompromising approach (e.g. Ulbrecht). Most respondents tend to see the benefit in these 
uncompromising acts due to the stimulating effect of media coverage on engagement. Nevertheless, 
it is noted that contemporary groups currently tend to perceive the costs of these actions as too high 
(e.g. conviction, loss of good relations with police, etc.). On the contrary, National Solidarist and Neo-
Nazi groups have learned from the past (e.g. convictions after organizing concerts, convictions for 
hate speech in public areas, etc.) and currently prefer clandestine activities. 
 
Noticeable, however, is that extreme-right groups are facing various difficulties in regard of 
mobilising individuals and sympathisers. Example of this is the limited number of activists that 
movements can motivate to turn out for public protests. Pegida72, for instance, a movement 
organised against the Islamisation of Europe, was able to attract the support of almost 10,000 
individuals on social media, and yet, could only rely on approximately 200 to 250 protesters when it 
comes to (legal and illegal) action (Knack, 2015). There are a number of reasons for this 
phenomenon. First, it may be argued that such right-wing nationalist groups face the difficulty of 
addressing the total demand, varying from radicals to extremists. Currently, movements tend to 
work within the legal framework and, hence, tend to lose the more extreme voices. As Victor 
indicates certain groups only proclaim a ‘front-office’ ideological discourse on websites to prevent 
penalization. To this end, extremist may perceive Pegida or other right-wing nationalist as to weak in 
regard of beliefs and boldness. Second, the discrepancy between followers and activists is not only 
noticeable within right-wing nationalist groups, sociocultural networks also suffer from a similar lack 
of mobilisation. From this perspective, Watts indicated that extreme-right groups have long been 
supported by (often politically neutral) skinheads, hooligans and motorcycle gang members (Watts, 
2001). These groups shared symbols, ideas, and cultural events due to the appealing ‘bad image’ of 
the group. As Bjørgo (2002) stated, rebels take part in protests simply because that there is hardly 
                                                          
70
 With active we mean a clear approach towards individuals with the aim to persuade individuals of group engagement 
71
 With passive we mean that the activities are part of the ‘normal’, ‘daily routine’ activities of the group 
72
 This stands for ‘Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes‘ or Patriotic Europeans against 
Islamisation of the Occident. 
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anything more provocative than wearing Nazi symbols. Nevertheless, Neo Nazi groups73 do not 
facilitate public recruitment of individuals due to their clandestine, underground method of 
operation. Third, as underlined by the political opportunity theory, problems of organisational 
strength are both internal and external to the group (Tarrow, 1994). Within the group, respondents 
often indicated that right-wing nationalist groups tend to hold on to an old-fashioned structure with 
a lack of leadership. External to the group, it is noted that partners on the Flemish extreme-right side 
meet each during certain events. However, groups do not tend to work together on a structural basis 
and certain groups even express great rivalry towards other groups on the right-wing side.  
 
An additional motivating effect on the decision to participate may come in the form of crucial life 
events (i.e. triggering events). These catalysts can occur at different moments during the life course, 
either as a turning point or as a sign of acceleration of the engagement process. Relying on gang 
theory, Thornberry et al. (2003), indicated that in the process of engaging in deviant groups (such as 
gangs), group members might facilitate the use of violence. Nevertheless, our results indicate that 
becoming part of a Flemish right-wing group might also facilitate or enhance the risk of direct 
victimisation. Members who engage in extreme-right groups often openly show their ‘true colours’ 
by wearing symbols, clothing, hair style etc., thus, triggering the risk of conflicts with out-groups. 
Furthermore, it is noted that indirect victimisation can similarly trigger engagement in radical groups. 
In general, these findings demonstrate the salient role of coping with victimization and working on a 
comprehensive approach targeting all involved actors (Vynckier, 2012). Moreover, it appeared that 
individuals may likewise feel triggered by verbal accusations, creating strong polarization between 
left and right. This form of polarization in combination with the creation of collective fear may work 
as major platform for extremism (Van Stekelenburg, Oegema and Klandermans, 2010). 
 
In addition to the pushing effect of triggering events, individuals likewise need to accept or, at least, 
tolerate the ideological aspects of the extreme-right group (Opp, 2009). The results show that 
individuals undergo a gradual cognitive process which starts with fragmented cognitive beliefs in 
order to progress towards a coherent discourse. Results indicated that right-wing nationalists and 
National solidarists undergo an (almost) complete process of framing values, beliefs and practical 
guidelines (Doosje et al., 2013). On the contrary, Neo-Nazi groups are less organized and lack 
leadership within their group. Conversely, structurally organized groups provide members with 
regular meetings (lectures, debates, informal discussions, etc.) where the ideological themes are 
discussed. Neo-Nazi members are mostly not interested in extensive theoretical insights, but rather 
                                                          
73
 Moreover, this grouping makes it more difficult to track the presence and prevalence of relevant groups in relation to 
criminal behaviour. 
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search for a group where the theme is dealt with through action (Bjørgo, 2002). Kimmel (2007) 
supported this argument by stating that ideology is often taken for granted by neo-Nazi groups. 
However, although ideology appears less important for neo-Nazi members, it does offer members a 
framework consistent with their personal beliefs and values. Therefore, it can be concluded that the 
process of framing is present among engaged neo-Nazi members but often takes place less 
intensively.  
 
Crucial for any kind of long-term membership is the aspect of socialisation. Within the Flemish right-
wing scene much mobilisation is observed with members shifting from one group to another. The 
latter demonstrates that although individuals may align with the ideological aspects of the group and 
even identify with the aims of the group, they might not connect with its members. It likewise 
indicates the importance of personal recognition (cf. self-verification theory). To this end, members 
often describe their bond as akin to blood ties, stating the importance of comrades and blood 
brotherhood. Respondents pointed out that frequent contact in combination with shared positive 
and negative experiences (e.g. victimization) create a sense of trust. As pointed out by Sela-Shayovitz 
(2011), socialisation ensures that values -not specifically ideological values - are defined, and moral 
justification is given in order to take action.  
 
As pointed out in this contribution, there are diverse aspects outside the ideological discourse (as 
cognitive aspect) which may explain engagement (e.g. puncturing bubbles). Therefore, we mark that, 
in regard of preventive initiatives a tailored approach is needed to address individuals during 
different moments in time (i.e. demand, cognitive opening and engagement).   
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PART V: CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
1. Introduction 
As the final part of this dissertation, this chapter concludes with the response to the research 
questions and the restatement of the crucial sections discussed in the previous chapters. This 
dissertation started from a historical and theoretical overview of the literature. At first, this overview 
noted that the current constellation of the extreme-right movement is inherently connected to the 
context of striving for the preservation of the subnational Flemish cultural roots. However, in relation 
to the response to research question 1, we will elaborate on how the different segments of the 
broad extreme-right movement (i.e. right-wing nationalist, Neo-Nazi and National solidarists) have 
established themselves over the years and how these segments present themselves and dissociate 
from each other. Next, the theoretical state-of-the-art view has provided the basis for the 
development of the conceptual model. Testing this model has offered us, on the one hand, 
knowledge about the breeding ground and the mechanisms of beliefs and behaviour driven by 
extreme-right sentiments, and on the other hand, an understanding of the pathways leading to 
participation in right-wing motivated disruptive groups. Then, we have directed attention to a 
specific period of the activist career which allowed us to investigate the processes and actors 
influencing the engagement in different extreme-right groups.  
 
Furthermore, we will discuss those aspects of the research which require a deeper examination.  In 
reviewing on the research limitations related to the research design, methodology and results, 
specific recommendations will be made for future research and policy workers as well as 
practitioners dealing with the phenomenon of right-wing extremism. Finally, we will end with some 
concluding remarks on the depiction of extreme-right individuals as angry white rebels.  
 
2. Responding to the research questions 
Explaining a certain social phenomenon requires insights into the quantity, the origin and the 
interrelationship of the causes. This section will clarify these issues as regards the Flemish extreme-
right phenomenon by responding to the following questions: 
 
RQ1descriptive : How was the Flemish extreme-right movement established in Belgium and what 
does this movement currently comprise?  
 
RQ2analytical: What mechanisms are related to moral support for right-wing extremist violence? 
How do these mechanisms for moral support influence the actual use of political violence?  
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RQ3analytical: Which pathways of mechanisms lead to participation in right-wing disruptive 
groups?  
 
In-depth research on extreme-right (former) members has rendered us information on the 
respondents’ life course. Informed by the insights into the gradual rapprochement of individuals 
towards extreme-right group engagement, the subsequent section provides answers to the 
interpretative research questions initially introduced in Chapter One.  
 
RQ4interpretative: What factors contribute to extreme-right group engagement and how are 
these factors constructed throughout the process of engagement?  
 
RQ5interpretative: What actors are involved in the engagement process and what are their roles 
within extreme-right group engagement?  
 
RQ6interpretative: What are the differences in engagement between the diverse extreme-right 
groups in Flanders? 
 
Q1descriptive: How was the Flemish extreme-right movement established in Belgium and 
what does this movement currently comprise? 
To understand the construction of the extreme-right groups in Flanders an insight is needed into the 
history of the Flemish Nationalist movement. Belgium is and has always been confronted with the 
distinction between the Flemish (Dutch) and the Walloon (French) people. The conflict between the 
two sub-nations goes back to the formation of Belgium, when the political elite were French 
speaking. Since the founding of Belgium, groups have fought for the rights for the oppressed Flemish 
population and their language. The breaking point for a reinforcement of these sentiments was the 
event of the World War I, where narratives indicate that Flemish soldiers were subjected to and 
often humiliated by Francophone commanders (Boijen, 1998). These feelings of suppression and 
discrimination towards the Flemish people formed a strong breeding ground for a radical ideological 
discourse74. This discourse remained intact during the Nazi era and ensured that different right-wing 
nationalists occupied local dominant positions during the war period (De Wever, 1991).  
 
The repression after the World War II ensured that Flemish Nationalist movements were forced to 
operate in secret clandestine groups which restricted them to recruiting openly individuals (Bilsen 
                                                          
74
 Pivotal to the radicalisation of the Flemish nationalist movement was the formation of the Vlaams Nationaal Verbond in 
1933 under the leadership of Staf De Clercq, which gave rise to a symbolic change of the ideology of Flemish nationalism 
(Art, 2008; De Wever, 1992). The formation marked the end of an era of disputes and organizational fragmentation, and at 
the same time, it constituted the start of an extreme- right authoritarian Flemish nationalistic model. 
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and De Witte, 1997). However, the movement gradually resurrected with groups demanding 
amnesty rights for the Nazi collaborators. Flemish nationalist groups indicated that Nazi collaborators 
motivated these acts out of dissatisfaction with the Belgian state. Collaborators were often perceived 
as role models due to their loyalty to the Flemish nation75 and the Flemish people (Coffé and Dewulf, 
2014). As a result, Flemish nationalist movement used the repression towards the Flemish ‘heroes’ as 
new focal point to recruit people. Through the recruitment and rehabilitation efforts76, it becomes 
clear that these sub-nationalist groups gradually resurrect and attract different ideological visions 
(Bilsen and De Witte, 1997). However, throughout the 70s diverse Flemish nationalist groups were 
involved in ideological unrest which led to new groups with a more radical right-wing discourse 
which focussed on the aspect of migration77 (Achterberg, 2006). It is within this time period that the 
contemporary right-wing nationalist movement was constructed as an amalgamation of a Flemish 
nationalist and right-wing discourse. 
 
Over the years, right-wing nationalist movements (i.e. VMO, Voorpost, NSV, and KVHV) have 
continuously promoted themselves as completely independent from the political party level78. These 
movements were aimed at restoring and safeguarding the nation with its unique Flemish culture and 
identity. Members of right-wing nationalist movements have indicated that they defend the interests 
of all people belonging to the Flemish cultural (and ethnic) community, aiming at creating a Flemish 
(or Dutch, see Voorpost) nation. In their ideology, Europe has to be seen as an extension of the 
nationalist discourse. The ideal Europe might, therefore, be a self-conscious Europe of free people, 
from the Atlantic to the Urals. On the militant action level, movements are striving to act within the 
legal framework of society by conducting ‘clean’ actions (Van der Valk and Van der Schans, 2011, 31). 
However, this does not exclude the fact that movements often explore the boundaries of legality. On 
2 February 2015, for instance, the president of the movement Voorpost was convicted of hanging up 
banners, distributing leaflets and putting graffiti on walls with the slogan ‘stop islamisation’ and ‘no 
Jihad in our street’. With regard to violence, Voorpost indicates on their website that although they 
are against warfare, certain circumstances might be justified, such as the urge for survival and the 
                                                          
75
 In her dissertation, Sax (2012, 117-154) elaborates on the different motives for collaboration during the World War II. 
Motives were connected to the New Order mentality, the geopolitical issues, the battle against Bolshevism, adventure, 
personal economic and financial benefits, material benefits, escaping employment in Germany, and pressure by family. This 
contribution made the important discovery that, although after-war motivation often indicated that Flemish soldiers were 
fighting for the Flemish case, personal motives often prevailed.  
76
 Since the 50s, the political party Volksunie and the social movement VMO (Flemish Militant Order) have strived for 
Amnesty rights for the collaborators during the war. In 1971, the party reached a historical score with 18.8 % of the votes 
(Art, 2008, 428). This strong electoral score was an indication that there was a breeding ground for rehabilitating the 
Flemish collaborators in society.  
77
 At first glance the focus was mainly laid upon the guest workers. Gradually, this discourse shifted to the second wave of 
immigrants (i.e. Turks and Moroccans). 
78
 Spruyt (2006) disagrees with this, indicating that Voorpost and Vlaams Belang are two branches of the same tree. 
166     Angry white rebel? Study on the mechanisms and processes of participation in ER groups      
 
right for self-defence (Voorpost, 2014). Typical actions organized by these movements are 
manifestations during royal visits79, right-wing nationalist student demonstrations or demonstrations 
against the language facilities in the suburbs of Brussels. In addition to this militant aspect, 
movements equally focus on ideological education from historical Flemish aspects to contemporary 
geopolitical themes.   
 
Because of the dissatisfaction with the militant and ideological discourse of the right-wing nationalist 
groups, a new openly National Socialist movement came to be active in Flanders. The first signs of 
these groups were noticeable at the end of the 80s. After the conviction of the VMO as private 
militia, members started to look for new informal initiatives to regroup their activities. In line with 
the emergence of the Neo-Nazi skinhead scene in Great Britain and other European countries, groups 
were slowly but surely generating an openly racist and Nazi glorifying scene. In his dissertation on 
neo-Nazi groups Bjørgo (1997, 63-71) describes this group as ‘racial revolutionaries’ with personal 
enemy images regarding Muslims and Jews. The scene has nowadays evolved to an international 
network with different groups (e.g. Blood and Honour, Combat 18, Autonomous Nationalist) in 
different geographical sections in Europe (e.g. Poland, Czech Republic, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Great Brittain and Scandinvia). Remarkable is that this international network adopts leftist symbols 
and operational tactics, such as wearing black hoodies and other clothing style (Hamm, 2009). The 
contemporary network in Flanders is marginal but present and under the leadership of individuals 
known by the judicial authorities. The activities of these groups have plummeted in recent years. 
However, as the social genealogy theory indicates, new groups tend to arise often with a similar 
ideological frame and a different name. In this regard, the latest active group within this white power 
ideology is Racial Volunteer Force (RVF). RVF is a combination of Francophone and Dutch speaking 
members of different Blood and Honour sections, and was founded in Great-Britain in 2002 as a 
splinter group of Blood and Honour. Their activity has, until now, been limited to participation in 
demonstrations, organized by other groups (mainly right-wing nationalists). 
 
In contrast with the openly national socialist oriented organisation, national solidarist groups try to 
create an alternative option besides the right-wing nationalist and National socialist groups. These 
groups reject working within the contemporary democratic political system, and propagate an 
alternative modern form of nationalism. They also hold that right-wing nationalist groups are too 
pragmatic, and overly unambiguously focussed on the Flemish independency. Thus, they tend to 
label themselves as being ‘on the left side of labour and on the right side of morality’. The left is 
                                                          
79
 Famous slogans during these manifestations are ‘put a bomb under the kingdom’ and ‘Delphine Queen’, referring to the 
illegitimate child of King Albert II 
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thereby seen as a criticism of the liberal, financial and supranational capitalist society. The task of the 
groups is therefore to present a positive message of national sovereignty grounded on a state driven 
by economic recovery and reconciliation. On the other hand, the right side reflects the call for a stop 
with granting asylum and remigrating all immigrants. In this respect, the current form of 
multiculturalism gives rise to an ethno-religious fragmentation of society, which creates the current 
clash between civilizations (Nieuw Solidaristisch Alternatief, 2013). Therefore, these groups focus not 
only on the Flemish nationalistic aspect, but also on the broader geopolitical level to deal with the 
problems of migration and alienation. In this regard, they highlight the necessity of an identitarian 
struggle to defend the peoples and their traditions. Their activities are focused on both action and 
education. Members of the groups are often represented during demonstrations of other 
movements (such as the NSV) or during typical Flemish traditional events (such as the 
Ijzerbedevaart). Besides, the groups provide education for their members in the forms of debates 
and lectures. In 2009, the NSA, a Nationalist solidarist group, planned to organize a youth congress to 
recruit radical youngsters. This event –which was filmed by national television- caused controversy 
due to the fact that members from an Italian band expressed their sympathy for the Fascist Mussolini 
regime. In addition, the president of the NSA was convicted of inciting racial hatred. These incidents 
compelled the NSA to operate underground and remain staying underground. Another noted type of 
activity of nationalist solidarist groups is their active involvement in demonstrations against 
homeless immigrant people80 and leftist81 or in support of the Golden Dawn party. It is through these 
actions that members of national solidarist are considered prone to violent activities.  
 
More recently the phenomenon of virtual extreme-right groups has entered the extreme-right 
movement. As an adaptation of the French, English and European defence leagues, Flemish 
sympathizers created a Facebook page with a Flemish defence league. This phenomenon started in 
2012 with the claim for demanding respect for the Flemish identity and forming resistance against 
the suppression of the Flemish language, tradition and habits. Their main goal is to provide evidence 
of the criminality of the Islam and Sharia. To this end, members of the Flemish defence league 
regularly portray Islamists as rapists, murderers and thieves in order to make people aware of the 
cruelty of this religious belief. Consequently, they call for an extension of the right for self-defence 
(i.e. legalisation of weapons for Flemish people). Throughout their network on Facebook, the Flemish 
defence league has reached more than 8.000 followers up until 2 September 2015.  
 
                                                          
80
 Members of Nation were arrested after beating up a Polish homeless (Metro, 06/06/2015). However, Rechts Actueel ( a 
forum for Flemish right-wingers) indicated that the members of Nation were threatened by the illegals.  
81
 During a Vlaams Belang meeting on 3 April 2014 a protest of the extreme-left ran out of hand, starting a fight between 
Nation members and extreme-leftists (see Het laatste Nieuws on 4 April 2014 for more information).  
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Finally, people do not have to be formally engaged in a group to be influenced by an extreme-right 
ideology. Loose connections between people of similar beliefs and values about societal themes (e.g. 
migration) may equally provide the opportunities for forming extreme-right informal groups. These 
loose networks of people often form a melting pot of diverse scenes with a mix of audience, such as 
football hooligans, bikers, skinheads, right-wing nationalists, national solidarists, who regularly meet 
at right-wing related concerts or events. An example of this kind of event was the HoGeSa and Pegida 
movement in Germany. This group is also active in Flanders with the claim to protect the fatherland 
against the Islamic threat. Pegida has currently attracted nearly 10,000 individuals through the social 
media. However, it appears that they are only able to recruit maximum 250 participants for their 
illegal82 and legal83 demonstrations.  
 
Q2analytical: What mechanisms are related to moral support for right-wing extremist violence? How 
do these mechanisms for moral support influence the actual use of political violence? 
In search of finding the mechanism underlying right-wing extremism, multiple causes and effects 
have been measured. Nevertheless, important in the understanding of the phenomenon is that the 
results have shown a distinction between significant effects and mechanisms related to the 
explanation of the social phenomenon (Bouhana and Wikström, 2010). Despite the fact that variables 
might reveal a significant effect on the dependent variable, they can rarely be seen as social 
mechanisms. In accordance with Sampson (2008, 128), we argue that these mechanisms may form 
the plausible contextual process that accounts for a given phenomenon, in the ideal case linking 
putative causes and effects. Based on the results in the exploratory studies presented in Chapter 2 
and 3, Table 6 provides an overview of breeding ground, mechanisms and possible outcomes of 
moral support for right-wing extremism.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
82
In the beginning of 2015, Pegida Vlaanderen submitted different applications to demonstrate in the city of Antwerp. 
Nonetheless, the applications were repeatedly refused by the Antwerp city council for safety reasons due to the increased 
level of threat after the terrorist act in Verviers on 15 January 2015 and the terrorist attacks on the employees of Charlie 
Hebdo. After several refusals, the movement decided to illegally demonstrate on the 2 March 2015. During that 
demonstration, 227 members received a municipal administrative sanction (Het Laatste Nieuws, 2 March 2015).   
83
 A reason for the limited support might have been the illegal character of the demonstrations. However, subsequent 
demonstrations indicated an equal number of 200 to 250 participants (Seveno, 14 april 2015).  
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Breeding ground for moral 
support 
Social mechanisms in the explanation of 
moral support 
Possible 
Outcomes 
M
acro
 co
n
te
xtu
al facto
rs 
Demographic 
situation 
Anomia Perceived injustice Participation in a 
RWD group 
Economic situation Authoritarianism Sensation or thrill 
seeking 
Disorder 
Personal mobility Lack of perceived 
legitimacy 
Exposure to radical 
settings or racism 
(Political) 
Vandalism 
Technological 
development 
Negative attitudes 
towards out-group  
Delinquent peers (Political) 
Violence 
M
icro
 co
n
te
xtu
al facto
rs 
Micro social-
economic position 
Superiority Perceived group threat Voting for 
extreme-right 
party 
Negative personal 
experiences 
Positive attitudes 
towards in-group  
Perceived 
discrimination 
 
Unequal treatment Social disintegration Lack of procedural 
justice 
 
Table 6: Overview of causes and outcomes of moral support for right-wing extremism 
 
Crucial in the understanding of the extreme-right phenomenon is an insight into the context in which 
the phenomenon is being shaped. On a macro level, it is noted that the transitional nature of 
globalization, migration and technology has fuelled the situation of the (post-)modern society 
(Jenkins and Gottlieb, 2007). Signals of that evolution are extremely noticeable in the changing focus 
on migration. As revealed in the descriptive part, movements in the 70s and 80s already showed 
their protest against immigration. Most of these movements enunciated their concern about or 
criticism of migration as degradation of work facilities, culture and Western values (Sela-Shayovitz, 
2012). In this respect, scholars have identified the aspect of an almost irreconcilable ‘clash of 
civilizations’ between the western modern society and the Islamic values (Huntington, 1993, Veldhuis 
and Bakker, 2007). More than ever people are confronted with (influences of) other cultures due to 
conflict zones, extensive personal mobility and capabilities of human communication (Huntington, 
1993; Quayle and Taylor, 2011). The emergence of the internet has improved communication, and 
yet has equally formed an ideal environment for extremist propaganda, practical organization and 
community building (Pauwels and Schils, 2014). Moreover, the technological development (i.e. e-
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mail, mobile phone, internet) has facilitated the spread and internationalization of extreme-right 
ideology, symbols, clothing style and music (Sela-Shayovitz, 2012) with the creation of national 
segments of international extreme-right groups (such as Blood and Honour and Autonomous 
Nationalist). 
 
In addition to the technological and demographical changes, socio-economic change might have 
equally triggered mechanisms. Historical events, such as the collapse of the class system in response 
to the economic crisis in the 1930s, have illustrated the effect of rapid economic change (Gielen, 
2008). This period produced the grassroots for different extreme-right parties which encouraged a 
disorganized, structureless mass of angry, disgruntled and desperate individuals. In short, macro-
economic decreases might instigate mechanisms such as anomia through the erosion of norms and 
values, or at least, as Opp (2009, 17) observed, lower the costs of mobilization in anti-establishment 
groups.  
 
More closely related to the individual are micro factors influencing the personal ‘at risk’ context 
(Veldhuis and Bakker, 2007). In line with Legge (2008), our research results have indicated that social 
disintegration with institutions might be an important mediating mechanism underscoring 
unemployment, vulnerability and usefulness among youngsters. Heitmeyer (2008) attributed this 
personal disintegration to the failure of social institutions and communities to provide basic material 
needs, social recognition, and personal integrity. Furthermore, this intermediate mechanism of social 
disintegration may explain the ambiguous results regarding the influence of socio-economic status 
(Vermeulen and Bovenkerk, 2012). As Eisinga (cited in Gielen, 2008) proclaimed, low education and 
income may trigger extreme-right sympathy (i.e. measured as an extreme-right vote) indirectly 
through the instigation of intermediate mechanisms, such as economic threats. Our conclusion is 
that weak social position arising from the lack of social integration, negative life events or unequal 
treatment does not automatically trigger action.  
 
In our lives some people are exposed to disadvantaged settings (e.g. unemployment, loss of spouse 
cutting ties with friends or family). However, only a minority of this population are subject to 
aberrant worldviews (Van den Bos, 2009). Personal ability or perseverance to cope with 
disadvantaged situations can help some individuals to be more resilient to setbacks (Euer et al., 
2014). On the contrary, persons receptive to setbacks might end up being in an extremely 
disadvantaged and alienated position with an increased risk to perceive radical discourses as a viable 
alternative. Moreover, people also differ as regards the perceptions of possible disadvantaged 
events. Depending on individuals’ definition of unjust, certain situations (e.g. loss of spouse) can be 
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perceived as ‘tragic, but destiny’ or ‘tragic, and unjust’. In the latter case, people might cope with 
their perceptions of injustice through anger and frustration (Agnew, 2006; Doosje et al. 2013). 
Besides, perception of threat may reinforce negative perception (De Witte, 1999; Whitley and 
Ægisdóttir, 2000). From an attacked position (e.g. impairment of norms and values, religion and 
culture) people may direct their negative perceptions towards multiple actors, i.e. procedural 
institutions (i.e. lack of procedural justice), immigrants (i.e. ethnocentrism), and political 
establishment (i.e. political powerlessness).  
 
In line with the threatening vision of the in-group, people can demonstrate strong attitudinal 
connection with authoritarian feelings. This strong focus on the preservation of religion, (Flemish or 
white) nation, (Flemish or Western) norms and values will strengthen the belief that the framework 
of the in-group is predominant (Altemeyer, 1988). To this end, people tend to promote the 
superiority of their nation by showing a symbolic Nationalist connection through a Flemish identity 
(De Witte, 2006; Lubbers, Scheepers and Jaspers, 2009). In contrast, attitudes deviating (cf. national 
traitors, deterioration of family values) from that nationalist discourse are perceived as inferior, 
which may justify unconventional actions against the out-group (cf. neutralisation technique of Sykes 
and Matza, 1957). 
 
Individual propensity for right-wing extremism develops in relation to not only personal morality, but 
also the ability of individuals to control themselves. Some people strongly support delinquent acts, 
but are capable of controlling themselves from violent behavior. It is through the interplay of moral 
support and self-control that people create a certain degree of moral propensity. This propensity 
may instigate violent behaviour when moral rules of the setting allow violent behavior and 
individuals lack the ability to control themselves (cf. high levels of thrill seeking behaviour and/or 
impulsiveness) (Wikström, 2010). On the other hand, social actions are equally determined by setting 
rules84 and exposure to racism and delinquent activity. Our results have indicated that the interaction 
of propensity and exposure might drive people to engage in a diversity of possible outcomes. 
 
Although our research has mainly focussed on the violent outcome of RWD group participation, we 
have argued that the interaction of moral propensity and exposure is likely to lead to a multitude of 
outcomes, which might enhance individuals’ chances of further engagement in the exposed group. 
                                                          
84
 There is a difference between setting and exposure. Exposure indicates a setting created by social and self-selection 
where individuals are often confronted with in daily life.  Setting is a part of the environment of the individual and a set of 
settings is the action territory of an individual. Within this setting, a situation might occur as a result of the combination of 
propensity and exposure (Wikström, 2010)   
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Then, the combination of situational and personal moral assumptions might impel individuals to opt 
for a certain type of criminal behaviour (e.g. disorder, vandalism, antisocial behaviour and violence).  
 
Q3analytical: Which pathways of mechanisms lead to participation in right-wing disruptive 
groups? 
In the light of criminal behaviour, the research results in Chapter 2 have indicated the importance of 
participation in deviant or disruptive groups. Therefore, Chapter 3 has focussed on those 
mechanisms instigating associations with delinquent actors. In order to prevent individuals from 
participation, it is crucial to understand the pathways leading to group participation. In this respect, 
our research results indicated three available pathways.  
 
The first pathways of mechanisms illustrate that participation may result from a reinforcing injustice 
model. As indicated above, people may experience diverse feelings of injustice. The analytical results 
have indicated that the feeling of injustice can be influenced by (1) social disintegration with school, 
parents and society (i.e. anomia), (2) perceived discrimination in everyday life (i.e. personal and 
group discrimination), and (3) perception of injustice by authority (i.e. procedural justice, perceived 
legitimacy). An accumulation of these feelings might grow into radical world views (e.g. 
ethnocentrism). However, the reinforcement of feelings of injustice is not merely determined by the 
absolute number of negative events, as certain situations are ‘higher’ ranked than others. In 
accordance with Agnew (2004), we have argued that the magnitude of strain (e.g. feelings of 
injustice) might be at least as important as the accumulation of feelings of injustice. Furthermore, as 
indicated above, feelings of injustice can be strengthened by threatening perceptions of the group to 
which people belong. In this regard, negative perception might be reinforced if there is frame 
consistency between injustice and threat, directed to a certain out-group (cf. Opp, 2009, 268). Lastly, 
Stappers, Reijnders and Möller (1990) state that people hold selective perceptions by screening out 
those messages in line with their beliefs and values.  Similarly, extreme-right members will signify 
favourable message (e.g. illegal actions by immigrants) and use unfavourable messages (e.g. positive 
impacts of immigration) as sign of conspiracy (Esses et al., 2001). 
 
The self-control model, in contrast, disregards the deprived situation and indicates that certain 
people have a stronger tendency to participate in risky environments. These thrill or sensation 
seekers search for short-term reward systems (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990). In this regard, RWD 
groups might provide the ideal environment for addressing feelings of excitement, thrills, 
provocation and adventure. Nonetheless, it is questionable whether these thrill seekers are able to 
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remain active for long-term participation in a certain group, as needs are not limited and thrill 
seekers might constantly need to reaffirm these feelings of sensation. Moreover, groups with 
multiple thrill seekers are more exposed to illegal behaviour (Kissner and Pyrooz, 2009) and have 
higher risk of criminal prosecution which may shrink the ‘survival’ range of the RWD group. However, 
the preventive scope may reach beyond group boundaries as the majority of hate crimes are 
committed by thrill seekers (Levin and McDevitt, 1999).  
 
In contrast to the aforementioned models, we can distinguish a third model of right-wing exposure 
inspired on the work of Thornberry et al. (1993). Thornberry and colleagues argue that there are 
three possible models between delinquent group membership (i.e. ‘gangs’) and personal delinquency 
(I.e. selection, facilitation and enhancement). These pathways indicate a selection effect with which 
the association between gang membership and delinquency is spurious due to the fact that a 
common set of factors (cf. perceived injustice, self-control) explain both delinquency and gang 
involvement. However, the facilitation and enhancement pathways additionally suggest that deviant 
group participation might facilitate or enhance these attitudes, norms, and routine activities 
associated with right-wing motivated disruptive behaviour. These moral beliefs may in turn increase 
individuals’ involvement in criminal behaviour. It is through a learning process, as well as by (re-) 
defining moral beliefs and providing opportunities for delinquent or prosocial behaviour that 
participation can be achieved (Akers, 1998). As such, we mark that exposure to racist peers may lead 
to RWD group participation. 
 
Finally, in line with Thornberry and colleagues, we can argue that there might be an enhancing aspect 
from which selection and facilitation are combined (Thornberry et al. 1993). In this respect, 
facilitation and enhancement might not operate as delineated units, but tend to have a reciprocal 
influence which may stimulate (further) engagement.   
 
Q4interpretative: what factors contribute to extreme-right group engagement and how are 
these factors constructed throughout the process of engagement?  
In line with Mellis (2007), this study has shown that a cognitive opening is created through the 
interaction of supply and demand, nourished by a breeding ground of contextual factors85 and 
obstructed by a wall of resilience (see Figure 8). Triggered by critical events86 (indicated in red arrow 
                                                          
85
 Over the years, the Flemish extreme-right scene has been able to display its discourse on various themes, i.e. amnesty 
rights for collaborators, Flemish independence, immigration and religion, in order to address feelings of injustice and 
discrimination on behalf of the native population. 
86
  Triggering events for the Flemish extreme-right scene were, for instance, the negotiations on the Egmont pact, the battle 
on linguistic matters (e.g. Leuven-Vlaams), and the 9/11. 
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in Figure 8), these instigators might increase the option of (re)considering extreme-right engagement 
as viable alternative. For instance, personal victimization may trigger people to search for answers 
(i.e. increase in demand). However, it may also push individuals who are in the process of searching 
(i.e. demand) or who are ‘cognitively open’ towards the next phase. Another option is that the event 
of victimization may transform a direct turning point into a cognitive opening. With respect to the 
supply side, critical events such as 9/11 or the influx of refugees might have changed the focus of 
some extreme-right groups on short notice. The blue arrow, on the other hand, denotes a gradual 
influencing relation. As such, it is possible that the influx of refugees might not immediately stimulate 
the supply; however, in the long term it may lead to the emergence of new anti-refugee group. 
Furthermore, from the moment people become receptive to engagement, further steps towards 
engagement depend strongly on the effectiveness of building bonds with the new social network (i.e. 
socialisation) and the personal penetration of extreme-right cognitions (i.e. framing).   
 
 
Figure 8: Process of engagement in extreme-right groups 
 
Starting from Mellis’ model on the cognitive opening, we have developed a comprehensive model 
which makes four major amendments as illustrated in Figure 8. First, an influencing (dotted arrow) 
effect (1) is added from demand towards initial social group contact. Our results have indicated that 
people are often in search for friends and belonging, without initially considering the ideology of a 
certain group of peers. Therefore, socialisation prior to cognitive change might be an alternative path 
to becoming receptive for extreme-right engagement. Second, the supply side is not restricted to 
passively (2) pulling individuals to cognitively accepting their discourse. Groups adjust and actively 
amplify their ‘frameworks’ to connect with individuals. Therefore, the supply side might actively 
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create awareness (3) through bridging the process of framing (e.g. active recruitment by groups). 
Third, people who are cognitively open to engagement (sympathizers) can be driven to actual 
engagement (4). In this phase, social mechanisms (e.g. community building) and social psychological 
mechanisms (e.g. groupthink, peer pressure) come into play by supporting both mental and social 
incentives for engagement.87 Lastly, we have opted for another construction of the breeding ground. 
Mellis (2007) reports a breeding ground of frustration containing strong perception of discrimination, 
depravity, injustice, humiliation, alienation, double standards, hostile media, Islam under attack, lack 
of perspective, democratic hypocrisy. In contrast, we have claimed that distinction has to be made 
between breeding ground and mechanisms leading to participation. The breeding ground consists of 
contextual factors on the macro and the micro level (see Q2analytical) which impact on supply (i.e. the 
amount of extreme-right groups) and demand (i.e. youngsters vulnerable for an extreme-right 
discourse).  
 
The missing link within the model of engagement seems to be the mechanisms leading to 
participation (cf. the analytical part, Chapter 2 and 3). However, in the interpretative part attention 
was paid to the construction of ‘causes’ of participation through the process of engagement. We 
have thus argued that the mechanisms of the static measure of participation may affect the dynamic 
process of engagement in three ways. First, it could be that the breeding ground leads to the 
increase in mechanisms, such as perceived injustice, group threat and anomia. To respond to these 
mechanisms, people may actively search for opportunities (supply). In this case, the mechanisms of 
participation play a guiding role for the cognitive opening. Second, another possibility is that 
individuals socialise with peers who raise their awareness of the deprived situation. In so doing, 
peers enhance the mechanisms (e.g. feelings of injustice) through the processes of framing. Finally, 
there is the intermediate option, which says that people might tend to enhance their perception of 
injustice after the processes of framing. In consequence, individuals reinforce their already high level 
of injustice after engagement. It indicates that, through the process of engagement, groups acquire 
the ability to (1) amplify the necessity and empower people to engage in extreme-right groups, (2) to 
displace their feelings of injustice from the individual to the group level and vice versa, and (3) to 
externalise the root cause of perceived injustice through scapegoating88. It is through this form of 
                                                          
87
 Ongoing debate has focused on the differences and relationship between the physical and psychological processes
87
 of 
(dis)engagement (Horgan, 2009; Noricks, 2009; Dechesne, 2011). A distinction is made between radicalisation as gradually 
becoming more receptive to a certain discourse and engagement as the physical social connection with the group. In this 
aspect, it is noteworthy that both aspects of mental and social engagement strongly interact and tend to work as a 
reinforcing spiral.  
88
 Social media pages, internet forums or paper-administered journals of extreme-right groups contain much ‘evidence’ 
which demonstrates the criminality of the out-groups, varying from scandals of left politician to accusations of rape by 
foreigners.  
176     Angry white rebel? Study on the mechanisms and processes of participation in ER groups      
 
scapegoating and collective feeling of injustice that a stronger ethnocentric (us/them) distinction, 
both on the individual and the group level, can be created (Taylor et al. 1990). 
 
Q5interpretative: Which actors are involved in the engagement process and what are their 
roles within extreme-right group engagement?  
Within the process of engagement, supply and demand are regarded as the dynamic products 
constantly under the influence of multiple actors (see Figure 9). It is within this symbiosis of 
influences that these dynamic products are shaped as receivers of influencing messages. These 
messages may be directly derived from the surrounding environment or indirectly through national 
or local media. In general, three groups of actors can be distinguished: (1) personal environment (i.e. 
family and friends), (2) social conventional environment (i.e. school, sport and youth movement) and 
(3) the out-group (i.e. political establishment, ideological opponents and police and judicial services).  
 
 
Figure 9: Influences of actors surrounding extreme-right supply and demand 
 
As in most cases, Parents and family members are the closest connection to the personal 
environment. Results have turned out that these actors might have an ambiguous influencing role in 
the engagement process. On the one hand, parents might be connected to the supply (see the 
orange dashed line) and try to transfer their extreme-right feelings to their children. Parents may 
take the role of both moral and social facilitator for engagement. De Witte (2006) describes a similar 
role of parents in his study on Flemish extreme-right militants (i.e. right-wing nationalists). He 
maintains that especially members with roots in radical families strongly support ideology, family 
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environment and the extreme-right social network. On the other hand, parents can also contribute 
to the activist career by total rejecting their children. In line with Bjørgo’s work on Neo-Nazi groups, 
our respondents indicated that breaking the bonds with their parents formed a crucial moment for 
further engagement (Bjørgo, 2002). Nonetheless, the role of parents should not be exaggerated. 
Parents or family members might have a pushing effect on engagement, but the relationship 
between family member(s) and child might also remain untouched through engagement, even when 
people engage in neo-Nazi groups89.  
 
As pointed out in the explanatory section, friends or peers may form an ideal facilitator for extremist 
behaviour. On the contrary, friends might also have an inhibitory impact on group engagement and 
delinquent behaviour. Important with regard to this inhibitory activity are (1) the strength of ties 
with their friends, (2) the extent to which friends have knowledge of the engagement90 and (3) the 
individuals’ perception of the approval of engagement by friends. When friends do not accept 
engagement, individuals are confronted with an imbalanced situation. To restore the imbalance, 
individuals have the choice between disengagement and cutting ties with friends (Opp, 2009, 275-
303). The latter option to disrupt conventional friendship ties might further open up the path for 
extreme-right community building and delinquent behaviour (Hirschi, 1969; Vitaro, Trembley and 
Bukowski, 2001).  
 
Another important factor in the polarization and engagement of extremist groups is the role of 
ideological opponents (mainly leftist and immigrant groups). Consistent with Noppe et al. (2011), our 
results have indicated that polarisation of outsiders might create a justification for taking up an 
active role in the group. Respondents even indicated that their activism is largely based on the 
negative perception by outsiders. Polarized groups magnify statements and reports on the ‘dangers’ 
of the opponents through diverse ‘in-group’ media channels (e.g. internet blogs, magazines) and 
national media. The results have thus confirmed that the supply side often actively stimulates 
polarization by encouraging opponents to act (e.g. encouraging leftist to organize a counter 
demonstration).  
 
Conventional workers within the school and recreational environment are often the first to detect 
signs of extreme-right group engagement (cf. Gielen, 2008; Grubben, 2006). Teachers, sport coaches 
                                                          
89
 This does not mean that parents are always supportive of the choice of their children. Respondents indicated that their 
parents were not always satisfied, even upset, with their choice for engagement. However, it has not led the parents to cut 
ties with their children. In this regard, respondents pointed out that their parents were especially worried that something 
would happen to them.  
90
 Some respondents indicated that most of their non-engaged friends were not always aware of (1) their engagement and 
(2) the type of group they have joined.  
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and other supervisors (e.g. scouts leaders) are generally confronted with youngsters receptive to 
new insights. For these young people, engaging in radical discourses might be one of the possible 
alternative routes for identity development (McGowan, 2006; Kimmel, 2007). Coping with the 
presence of right-wing radical youngsters is not an easy nor convenient task for institutions. In 
undertaking action, actors need to bear in mind that they might possibly reinforce radical beliefs, or, 
conversely, trigger ideological opponents (leftist, immigrants) to a radical discourse. However, 
ignoring the signs might risk behavioural escalation which may yield enormous damage to the image 
of the institution.  
 
An important role in the labelling of extreme-right is preserved for the local and national media. In 
this respect, results from this study have shown that media depictions may have both positive and 
negative effects. Negatively labelling extreme-right groups, for instance, as racist or fascists may 
ensure that a certain segment of support will leave the scene. Nonetheless, most individuals already 
have an impression of media being subjective. Therefore, media depiction can be interpreted as yet 
another confirmation of the stigmatization by mainstream society. As indicated above in Q4interpretative, 
the selective perceptions of people may lead them to an entrenched ‘tunnel vision’ ideology, leaving 
no room for dissenting opinions (Stappers, Reijnders and Möller, 1990). Furthermore, our 
respondents indicated to have been intensely attracted to the provocative and uncompromising 
character of the group (cf. Bjørgo, 2002). Fuelled by the image of the media, radical supporters might 
be attracted by the uncompromising label. In relation to this phenomenon, Bjørgo (2002)asserts that 
‘rebels go to the right’ in that there is hardly anything more provocative than the adoration for the 
Nazi or fascist regime.  
 
Lastly, a final actor intervening respondents, directly or through national media, is the government. 
The political establishment has, over the years, showed its power to implement regulations 
specifically targeting fascist and extremist organisations91. Since 1981, legal forces have been 
provided with means to combat racism and discrimination. This includes severe punishment and 
possible deprivation of civil and political rights (Deklerck et al., 2009). These legal initiatives indicate 
the standards and the (symbolic) response of the government to the evolving deviant phenomenon. 
The police and the judicial services are then provided with the means for tackling those who fall 
under the jurisdiction (Grubben, 2006). On the whole, not only the sanction aspect but also the 
                                                          
91
 A specific law against private militia was introduced before the World War II in order to ban fascist street gangs (Ponsaers 
et. al, 2013). In 1995, the negationism law came into effect and prohibited the denial, minimization, justification and 
approval of the genocide and holocaust. Furthermore, laws were included to penalize instigation and giving ‘publicity’ to 
racism, discrimination, xenophobia and homophobia. 
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treatment of police and judicial actors can influence individual behaviour (Tyler, 2003, 2006, Jackson 
et al, 2012, Van Damme and Pauwels, 2013). 
 
Throughout the life career, actors may reinforce or inhibit the propensity of individuals to engage in 
extreme-right groups. Nonetheless, the Flemish extreme-right movement is largely divided in terms 
of ideology and provocative language and style. Dependent on engagement within a certain group, 
actors may adjust their influencing relationship.   
 
Q6interpretative: What are the differences in engagement between the diverse extreme-right 
groups in Flanders? 
Van der Valk and Wagenaar (2010) mention that individuals want to connect with groups that satisfy 
their needs. In the interpretative section of this dissertation, three ideological groups (right-wing 
nationalist, national solidarists, Neo-Nazi) were distinguished. In an ‘ideal’ situation, individuals 
would have the opportunity to connect with those ideological groups that fit their desire. However, 
aspects such as the presence of a (long-term) supply, legality and accessibility to the group might 
endanger the opportunity to connect (see Table 7).  
   
First, on the organizational level, right-wing nationalist groups tend to have a more professional 
structure which enables them to ‘survive’ in the long term92. Important aspects to this survival are 
the organizational strength and the ability to attract resources (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008; 
Klandermans, 1984). The first success factor is that right-wing nationalist groups have succeeded in 
establishing a (Flemish) nationwide structure of group sections with an overarching administration. 
This core administrational board is designated over a certain long-term period and responsible for 
the structural functioning. Due to the broad geographical spread and central coordination, groups 
can deal with possible drawbacks such as the loss of leading figures. In contrast, subcultural groups 
are geographically more concentrated and have a limited number of members. In order to maintain 
active in the field, subcultural groups will need to cope with the legacy of outgoing executives. 
Furthermore, in the interest of structural functioning, groups largely depend on the long-term 
financial situation (Tilly, 1978; Jenkins, 1983).  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
92
 Contemporary right-wing nationalist groups such as Voorpost and NSV are active since the end of the seventies (De 
Waele, 2013)  
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 Right-wing Nationalist (1) Neo-Nazi (2) Modern National 
Solidarist (3) 
O
rgan
izatio
n
 
Presence of 
groups? 
Most groups active since the 
seventies or earlier 
First signs on the end 
of the 80
s
. Tend to pop 
up and disappear 
First signs on the end of the 
90
s
. Tend to pop up and 
disappear 
Structure of groups Broad and  nationwide 
Centralized in certain 
cities 
Centralized in certain cities 
Leadership and 
administration 
Central administration with 
representatives from 
different sections 
Charismatic leader 
with small amount of 
core members 
Charismatic leader with 
small amount of core 
members 
Financial situation 
Central administration 
controlling financial 
situation 
Dependent on 
temporal success 
Dependent on temporal 
success 
Stru
ctu
ral ties 
Ties with 
democratic 
institutions 
Connection with 
conventional institutions, 
such as police services, 
before and during 
demonstrations 
No connection with 
conventional 
institutions 
No connection with 
conventional institutions 
Ties with groups 
within the 
extreme-right 
movement 
Alliances and collaborations 
with other (1) groups + no 
open connection with (2) + 
tolerating (3) 
Sense of rivalry among 
(2) groups + no open 
connection with (1) + 
tolerating (3) 
Sense of rivalry among (3) 
groups + strongly criticizing 
but tolerating (1) + no open 
connection with (2) 
A
cce
ssib
ility 
Public 
accessibility? 
Low threshold for 
engagement due to publicly 
accessible events 
Higher threshold for 
engagement due to 
closed meetings 
Higher threshold for 
engagement due to closed 
meetings 
Recruitment 
General recruitment 
= 
‘the more the merrier’ 
policy 
Specific recruitment 
= 
Targeting non-
compromising youth 
Specific recruitment 
= 
Targeting people through an 
alternative modern ideology 
as an intermediation form 
between (1) and (2) 
Table 7: Overview of differences between groups 
In this respect, Cotter (1999) says that one of the main reasons for the resurrection of the skinhead 
and Neo-Nazi scène is the popularity of the white power music, providing the scene with a financial 
influx. Nevertheless, this influx has not led to structural change and expansion of organizational skills, 
resulting in the group becoming dependent on temporal ‘success’ factors, such as leadership and the 
attractiveness of the scene. All these aforementioned aspects ensure that right-wing nationalist 
groups are better equipped to deal with setbacks. As stated in the interpretative part, there has to be 
a supply to meet the demand. For instance, due to the strong volatility of Neo-Nazi groups, it is 
difficult for a Neo-Nazi individual to engage in Neo-Nazi groups for a long term. Individuals who 
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adhere to a Neo-Nazi ideology might engage in the right-wing nationalist movement93, or other 
‘rebel’ groups (i.e. hooligans, biker scene, and informal cliques) or renounce engagement. 
 
Second, engagement depends on the manner in which groups maintain contact with ‘external 
partners’ in both the in-group and out-group. On the one hand, committed alliances or collaborations 
with other groups on the Flemish extreme-right segment, as ‘partners in crime’, might be the equally 
important financial influx. These contacts may produce positive scale effects on the group through 
the exchange of resources (e.g. financial or physical support during events). Likewise, they can affect 
individual members. When people have good connection with associated groups, they are more 
likely to remain active within the extreme-right movement even when the group is disbanded. On 
the other hand, groups may have a structural advantage when they have a strong connection with 
conventional institutions. In general, right-wing nationalist groups tend to work within legality by 
maintaining contact with policy and police services. This connection lowers the personal risk of 
engagement and is extremely beneficial in light of gaining the acceptance of policy and police actors 
to legally demonstrate94. Subcultural groups, on the other hand, are more hostile towards 
democratic institutions, forcing them to operate in clandestine groups. Beneficial for these groups is 
that they are able to attract the more radical segment of the extreme-right movement. In attracting 
the radical scene, Neo-Nazi groups try to address youngsters through a combination of an appealing 
provocative scene (especially dress code and stirring music95) and an ideological narrative that  
focusses on cultural threats and conspiracy against the white race (Cotter, 1999). Thus, Neo Nazi’s 
seem more attracted to the tough image and the ability to shock people (e.g. puncturing bubbles), as 
opposed to ideological elaboration (Bjørgo, 2002). Meanwhile, engaged individuals run a greater risk 
of criminal prosecution. In Belgium, members could be convicted when it can be demonstrated that 
individuals are members of a group which repeatedly promotes racism or xenophobia96. 
 
Lastly, the underground method of Neo-Nazi groups and National solidarist groups ensure that the 
latter groups are less accessible than right-wing nationalist groups. Due to the strong anti-
establishment discourse and the, thereby affiliated, higher risk of prosecution, groups are restricted 
                                                          
93
 However, groups of right-wing nationalist movement often refuse Neo-Nazi members due to their bad reputation.  
94
 These legal and low-threshold actions may provide the optimal opportunity for sympathizers to enter the scène. 
95
 In order to maximize the shock value, punks were the first to become interested in the Nazi regime and displayed 
swastika’s on t-shirts and armbands in public (Cotter, 1999). In reaction to this politicization of the punk scène in the 70s, 
skinheads also grew into a far more politically engaged subcultural source of hate thoughts, toughness and aggressiveness 
(Moore, 1993; Cotter, 1999). The skinhead subculture underwent a transformation from a working class community which 
favoured reggae music to a hard, masculine style, noticeable in attitude, clothing and music. Diverse established racist 
groups noted the appealing counter-culture of the working-class men and started to recruit skinheads to join their political 
groups (Blazak, 2001) 
96
 See art. 22 of the law of 30 July 1981 for criminalizing certain acts of racism or xenophobia, BS 8 August 1981. 
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to recruiting from a limited pool of sympathizers. At the same time, anti-establishment groups tend 
to attract the attention of security and police services causing even more suspicion and paranoia 
among members. As a result, group leaders often opt to remain ‘small in number, but radical in 
thought’. As such, the leader can have more control of the ‘true nature’ of its members. To counter 
the limited accessibility to engagement, national solidarist groups tend to actively recruit from other 
extreme-right circles in order to attract ‘trustful’ and motivated individuals. 
 
In general, the previous overview has illuminated the differences between different groups in the 
extreme-right spectrum. Nonetheless, scholars should be mindful that membership is not restricted 
to engagement of a well-defined unit. Throughout the reconstruction of activist careers, it appears 
that members have been part of a variety of groups. After initial engagement, members are exposed 
to a plurality of groups which are often previously unknown. With the experiences gained from the 
group, members continuously choose between (1) remaining active within the extreme-right group, 
(2) leaving the scene or (3) exploring other internal (extreme-right) or external (hooligan, biker or 
leftist) environments. When the latter post-engagement process is included in the model of 
engagement, a feedback loop needs to be added for engaged extreme-right individuals who decide 
to engage in another extreme-right group (see Figure 10).  
 
 
Figure 10: Process of engagement in extreme-right groups with feedback loops 
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3. Limitations and recommendations for future research  
3.1. Analytical quantitative part 
The aim of the exploratory study was to analyse those factors contributing to the understanding of 
right-wing extremist beliefs and violent manifestation. The study thus embarked on a web survey 
targeting a broad young Flemish population. The original method used by our research group to 
target the right-wing population was a combination of school survey and online web survey97. 
However, due to the small number of schools willing to participate in the paper-and-pencil survey 
(often because of the huge demand for surveys in schools), the web survey technique offered a 
suitable substitute to reach the Flemish youth. Nevertheless, the employed research method has a 
number of drawbacks, thus leaving room for improvement regarding the use of web survey method. 
 
Method and sampling 
First, the results of the web survey indicated an overrepresentation of the school youth population. 
To test the validity of the conceptual model, future research may concentrate on the non-school 
population (e.g. working youth, unemployed youth and adults). Furthermore, research should not be 
restricted to the right-wing population. The model could be tested on other group manifestations 
(e.g. other radical groups98, cults, sects, gangs and troublesome youth group) and in relation to other 
outcomes (e.g. vandalism and disorder). Conducting these types of targeted research will extend our 
knowledge of the communalities and differences of the mechanisms influencing the manifestation of 
different criminal group participation. 
 
Second, certain individuals might be more willing to fill out the survey than others. The surveys were 
announced under the names of ‘questionnaire regarding the use of social media and political beliefs 
by youngsters’ and ‘questionnaire regarding social and political beliefs about and attitudes towards 
Flemish nationalism’. Hence, due to self-selection and disinterest, certain individuals could not be 
convinced of participation (Schmidt, 1997). However, in line with Nulty (2008), efforts were taken to 
minimalize the selection bias and maximize the response rate. Both surveys were easily accessible to 
respondents with the use of software packages (thesistools). In addition, attractive incentives (i.e. 
IPod and cinema tickets) were used as a persuasion technique for the ‘disinterested’ people. 
Furthermore, multiple reminder emails and messages were posted on Facebook and right-wing 
                                                          
97
 This method was used for the RADIMED project where 33 schools in Antwerp were contacted to conduct a paper-and-
pencil survey. However, only 9 were willing to take part. Three schools were prepared to hand out the questionnaires during 
school hours, while the other 6 schools agreed to introduce the research in class together with the remaining information 
and link to the web survey (Pauwels et al. 2014, 114-115). In addition, 6 schools agreed to put up posters in their schools 
with information on the web survey. 
98
 i.e. political (e.g. leftist), religious (e.g. Islamic, Christian, etc.) and single-issue (e.g. Animal liberation front) 
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online forums. However, certain individuals might not appreciate these repeated mails, which may 
even create hostility towards the researcher (Schmidt, 1997). During the spread of these reminder 
mails, certain negative reactions were expressed by forum members. However, they were largely 
limited to verbal insults. However, future research in this field should be cautious about possible 
hostile actions towards the researcher99.  
 
Finally, our results have indicated the limitation of cross-sectional research to measure the reciprocal 
effect of some of the measures. As noted by Thornberry and Porter (2001, 60), further research 
should focus on the strength of causes of RWD participation over time, i.e. before, during and after 
group participation. In addition, longitudinal research could also offer more information about the 
duration and propensity of criminal acts throughout the career100 (Esbensen and Huizinga, 1993). 
However, it should be noted that the disadvantages of longitudinal research method are high cost 
and long time. An alternative to reduce the cost is to design a cross-sectional questionnaire with a 
longitudinal character. Thus, it might be interesting to analyse the relationship between RWD group 
membership and delinquency in different moments in the career of group participants (Melde and 
Esbensen, 2011; Menard and Elliot, 1994; Esbensen and Huizinga, 1993). Ideally, research should also 
include longitudinal measures of victimization to analyse the exposure to risky environments. 
 
Measurements of constructs 
Despite the fact that all scales have been tested several times in research with the internal 
consistency and reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) carefully checked, several suggestions can be made to 
improve the strength of the questionnaire in future research.  
 
First, improvement can be made regarding the current definition of participation in RWD group. This 
variable was constructed as a combined scale of a personal ideological left/right positioning and gang 
identifiers. Furthermore, it is noted that respondents might have experienced difficulties positioning 
themselves on the one-dimensional left-right scale due to contradictory left/right views (e.g. left 
vision on economics, right vision on immigration). Further research might include additional 
characteristic measures of the RWD group. Besides, research might also add some self-nominating 
                                                          
99
 This is one of the reasons why we refrained from giving any personal information such as phone number and address 
about the researcher in the study. 
100
 For instance, American longitudinal studies on gangs have contradicted the media-promoted stereotypes of youth 
becoming gang membership for life (Esbensen and Huizinga, 1993). These studies indicated that very few members remain 
active for longer than a year, and many of those youth registered dislikes about gang participation. Esbensen and Huizinga 
(1993) further professed, on the basis of the longitudinal Denver study, that a majority of members are peripheral or 
transitory, drifting from one group to the other. Other longitudinal studies based on the Pittsburgh, Rochester, Seattle and 
the GREAT sample confirmed the brief trajectories of gang members (Pyrooz, Sweeten and Piquero, 2012) 
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questions on participation in political parties, social movements and subcultural network groups. In 
doing so, scholars might gain a better insight into the activist career of the respondents. 
 
Second, future research should consider the effect of self-projection when asking questions about 
relevant peers in the environment. Questions about the behaviour of peers might be very useful in 
the light of sensitive topics, such as racism and delinquency, as respondents tend to judge racist 
attitudes or delinquent behaviour of their peers instead of their own. This point has been similarly 
noted by Young et al. (2013) who hold that scholars need to be careful in interpretation of these 
variables due to the self-projection of one’s own behaviour towards the behaviour of peers (i.e. 
acceptance of racism, delinquent activity) . On the whole, the relation between delinquent peers and 
personal use of violence remains a complicated issue.101. 
 
Third, improvement can be made in relation to the additional measures of constructs. In the current 
study, the focus was on group threat towards immigrants and identification with the Flemish people. 
However, no measures were used to investigate group threat towards other out-groups (i.e. political 
establishment, Walloons, etc.) and identification with other in-groups (i.e. white people, Belgians, 
etc.). Besides, certain variables such as anomia and strain might need to be more thoroughly tested 
for more profound knowledge of their impact. 
 
Fourth, although it is impossible to involve all the relevant variables in the questionnaire, future 
research might include the following variables to improve the understanding of the phenomenon. At 
first, our research covered questions concerning social bond and control of parents (Chapter 2, social 
integration), yet we did not ask any questions about the political orientation of the parents. 
Furthermore, our research did not include absolute measures of social economic status (SES). 
Although we assumed that SES does not have a direct effect, it might be interesting to investigate the 
impact of SES on perceived injustice and the indirect relation to other causes of right-wing 
extremism.  
 
The last limitation concerns the inconsistent use variable names by scholars. During the literature 
review we noted that similar variables are often operationalized under different labels. An example is 
political powerlessness which is used in our research under the term anomia, but is often referred to 
as political alienation (Finifter, 1970; Pantoja and Segura, 2003), political legitimacy (Nagel, 1987), or 
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 Therefore, during the research period we decided to focus predominantly on the reasons underlying why youngsters 
tend to engage in these ‘RWD’ groups, rather than on the possible effect of delinquent peers on personal violence. 
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political disintegration (Alesina, Spolaore, Wacziarg, 1997). Therefore, we advocate the use of 
general applicable terms for consistency and coherence within the field. 
 
Research design  
The conducted exploratory research can be considered a theoretical simplification of reality where 
our conceptual model serves as one of diverse conceptual explanations of the dependent variables. 
This statement can be supported by the indicator of the coefficient of determination R², which 
suggests that improvement can be made as to the explanation of the variation of the dependent 
variables. In the previous section we point out that although choices have to be made about 
including certain scales in quantitative research, future research might include more measures. Our 
item non-response rate, for instance, was considerably high in our research design. Of a total of 1400 
respondents who started, only 761 fully completed the questionnaire. To compensate for this issue, 
researchers should strive to find the balance between the magnitude of the questionnaire and the 
inclusion of relevant questions.  
 
3.2. Interpretative qualitative part 
Departing from the observation that the broad extreme-right research population has never been 
scientifically investigated in Belgium, the study was aimed at combining aspects of explanatory and 
interpretative research. Building upon the results and limitations connected to the research, we 
make further recommendations to optimize academic research in this field.  
 
First, follow-up studies should focus on populations who are more difficult to reach in this study, i.e. 
women. For the in-depth interview only two female members were eager to participate. One 
explanation for this imbalance in gender is that women seem to be lesser present in extreme-right 
groups, although not entirely absent within all diverse groups. Another reason could be that a great 
number of respondents were contacted through social media because they were mentioned in 
document or publicly available criminal files. These files on group participants tend to focus mainly 
on male members. The highly limited number of female participants indicates that the study might 
be subject to gender bias. Therefore, further research should direct more attention to gender 
balance and the role of women in extreme-right groups. 
 
Second, the discussion session of the interpretative article already briefly mentions the restriction of 
self-selection and response rate. Inherent to studies on hard-to-reach populations, and especially on 
anti-establishment populations is the multitude of people who refused to contribute to research 
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owing to distrust or the intention to bury their past and prior bad experiences (Teitler, Reichman and 
Sprachman, 2003). As mentioned, people were contacted through both ‘real life’ activities (e.g. 
lectures, demonstrations) and the social media. In this respect, it is noted that respondents who 
were personally approached in real life were more eager to co-operate. One explanation might be 
the effect of - known in marketing jargon as- the ‘warm call’, i.e. a call with whom the researcher 
shared a positive prior conversation (Sadler et al. 2010, 370-71). Sadler et al. (2010) mention that 
results of the reverse ‘cold call’ related to random contacts with whom no prior relationship is built 
can be more vulnerable to self-selection and might lead to a higher refusal rate. Another explanation 
is that people of right-wing nationalist are easier to contact than people from subcultural groups. 
Right-wing nationalist are, as stated in the results section, more open and publicly oriented. They 
tend to regularly organise lectures, educations, seminars, demonstrations and other events which 
are publically available, and hence, easily accessible to researchers. On the contrary, subcultural 
groups tend to organize more closed or limited accessible meetings. In addition, members of right-
wing nationalist were not eager to provide the researcher with contact information of members of 
subcultural groups. Therefore, diverse snowball starting points were used in order to reach all actors 
within the population (Atkinson and Flint, 2001). In this respect, efforts have been made to reach a 
broad and varied population of respondents, both in terms of geographical location, number of 
groups (and group sections) and absolute number of respondents. However, to test the validity, 
further research might consider more involvement in personal contact (cf. ‘warm call’) by conducting 
participatory observations within certain groups. 
  
Third, as Mottier (2005) observes, research is restricted to the interpretation of reality by the 
respondent, and researchers are only interpreters of the interpretation by the respondent. So far 
research on the retrospective nature of engagement might have been influenced by certain memory 
errors of the respondent. In retrospect, some of our respondents were older than 60 and entered the 
group when they were teenagers, and as a result, they might have blurring or distorted memory 
which means certain key information might have lost (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). In addition, these 
interviewees might reinterpret their engagement process in the light of contemporary events102, 
exerting an influence on the supplied data. Therefore, follow-up studies need to take account of 
these possible constraints and can counter these memory and interpretation biases by back-office 
information (cf. methods part 3) and contacts with other actors surrounding the individual (parents, 
friends, opponents, etc.) to check the reliability of the narratives.   
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 Former members, for instance, might interpret their previous engagement differently from members who are still active 
in the group. 
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Fourth, the results have indicated the importance of socialization and the fact that socialization 
should be seen within a broad spectrum of social network relations (i.e. not restricted to the 
socialization of a certain group). Therefore, another aspect to enhancing our knowledge of the 
characteristics of engagement is deepening our understanding of the social embeddedness of these 
groups (Kleemans and Van den Bunt, 1999). In this sense, scholars need to transcend the traditional 
deviant network or group participation as in/out dichotomy, and study the broader social network 
picture of social structure and criminal embeddedness (Pyrooz, Sweeten and Piquero, 2012). To 
increase our understanding of the impact of group membership on the commitment of extremist 
violence, it would be useful to integrate insights from gang and organized crime literature (e.g. 
McGloin, 2005; Sarnecki, 2001; Simpson, 2010; Crenshaw, 1981; Schmid, 1996). More specifically, 
research could contribute, through the use of social network analysis (SNA), to the understanding of 
the emergence and composition of right-wing networks and the intertwining relation between 
extreme-right actors and actors both in and outside the right-wing setting. 
 
Pyrooz and colleagues (2012) suggest that there might be many similarities between the diverse 
social networks and ‘criminal’ groups. Therefore, they mention that if embeddedness extends across 
contexts, this will aid in developing a larger, more comparative knowledge base of deviant social 
networks to the benefit of gang research in particular and criminological research in general (Pyrooz 
et al. 2012, 22). Future research should delve into the field of right-wing social networks, while 
obtaining insights from studies of organized crime, gangs, and of engagement and disengagement of 
extremist groups. Rigorous research in this field is necessary to address the problems of recruitment, 
further intertwined radicalisation structures and the influence of virtual contacts (Conway and 
McInerney, 2008; Pauwels et al., 2014). Young people, especially in adolescence, are specifically 
susceptible to external influences of extremist networks. Understanding how these social networks 
function is useful for a holistic approach to general crime prevention (Rostami and Leinfelt, 2012, 
Bjørgo, 2013). 
 
4. Recommendations for policy and practice 
Confronted with the growing effect of extremist groups, policy workers are faced with the challenge 
to adequately address the phenomenon. Thus far, response to these repulsive acts has been largely 
based on (short-term) visible symbolical measure in order to show government’s willingness to act 
rather than on structural long-term solutions (Carlsson, 2006). In order to address the problem of 
right-wing extremist delinquent activity on a structural basis, it is important to deal with the causes 
with proper measures at proper time (see Table 8 for an overview). Consequently, it is crucial to find 
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and adopt a tailored prevention approach which takes the life course of radicalising youngsters into 
consideration and targets at different stages of development.  
 
 
Prevention Repression and 
after care Universal Selective Indicated 
Targeted 
population 
General 
population 
Sympathizers and 
potential perpetrators 
(i.e. cognitively open 
population) 
Population at risk =  
Group or criminal 
engagement 
Criminal 
perpetrators 
Preventive 
focus ~ 
model & 
actors of 
engagement 
- reducing 
breeding ground 
- reducing 
personal demand 
- strengthening 
wall of resilience 
- media policy  
- social policy ~ 
school, leisure 
time,   
  
- providing ‘alternative’ 
narratives to counter 
receptiveness to an 
extreme-right 
discourse 
- responding to 
vulnerability (e.g. 
victimization) 
- increasing knowledge 
of frontline worker 
~detection 
- crime prevention 
through 
empowerment 
conversation by 
frontline workers 
- the inclusion of 
parents within the 
prevention of crime 
- the inclusion of 
desisters as experts 
- turning to 
specialized 
custom-made 
support 
- increasing 
knowledge of 
frontline worker 
~detection (i.e. 
prison staff) 
-increasing 
procedural justice 
Aim 
Resilience to 
radical messages  
 
Early detection Preventing (further) 
criminal behaviour 
Preventing 
(further) criminal 
behaviour 
Table 8: Preventive approach in regard of right-wing extremist behaviour 
 
Universal prevention  
With the aim of providing a tailored approach to prevent ideological inspired criminal activities, 
policy makers should not shift their focus on certain manifestations of extremist inspired criminal 
activity. In order to tackle the diversity of outcomes of right-wing extremism, general forms of crime 
prevention are necessary in order to better monitor the breeding ground of feelings of injustice, 
discrimination and alienation, which has the potential to propagate anti-democratic actions.  
 
In line with Carlsson (2006), we recommend that the available preventive initiatives and possibilities 
among the institutional frameworks be analysed before new (symbolic) institutions are introduced, 
aiming at solving the ‘pathology’ of extreme-right engagement. In fact, many preventive initiatives 
appear to be hidden in the daily work activities of public institutions. Therefore, as the research of 
Noppe et al. (2011) on installing preventive measures for radicalisation in Belgium indicates, policy 
makers should primarily focus on (1) strengthening the present social policy initiatives (especially 
education, employment and integration) and (2) providing regional and local work packages. In the 
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aftermath of the departure of several foreign fighters, the Flemish government103 decided to develop 
a strategic framework and action plan to combat radicalisation (read: Islamic radicalisation). The 
preventive chapter of the action plan denotes a diversity of positive preventive initiatives to support 
the needs of local actors with the emphasis on welfare, scholarly education and employment 
(Vlaamse Regering, 2015). In specific, the Flemish government refers to investments for pathways to 
employment of radicalised youngsters (and former foreign fighters104) in ‘affected cities and 
municipalities’. Nevertheless, preventive issues on community development, social work, education 
and employment pathways must not become a preferential treatment for certain populations. Policy 
makers must be aware of the possible stigmatization of other populations in society in areas critical 
to general crime prevention.  
 
Special attention should be paid to the school and educational context of youngsters. Schools need 
to strive to narrow the in-out group gap between people with different (ethnic) backgrounds. 
Grubben (2006) indicates that schools often try to decrease this diversity by making children aware 
of the presence of different cultures within a certain country, without truly explaining the native 
culture. However, in order to thoroughly understand the diversities of and similarities between 
cultures, school might first explain the internal diversity of the Flemish culture (Grubben, 2006, 61). It 
is from the historic and cultural perspectives that an insight can be gained into issues such as socio-
economic position, migration, culture, religious diversity and feelings of discrimination and racism.  
 
Aside from strengthening the traditional forms of social policy on a general level, people might need 
to reinforce their ‘wall of resilience’. National and international studies have indicated that building 
resilience and empowering youngsters against radical and extremist messages through training show 
positive results (Gielen, 2008; Euer et al. 2014). The aims of these trainings are to develop skills and 
competences such as critical thinking, to enhance problem solving skills and self-confidence, and to 
create stronger awareness of tolerance for other people, self-reflection, negotiation, and team work. 
Since early 2015 the ‘Bounce resilience tools’ project has started in Belgium (Euer et al. 2014). This is 
a first step towards empowering and integrating youngsters in society. On the long term further 
research should clarify whether the current tool is effective in dealing with the various 
manifestations of radical and criminal behaviour in a Flemish context. However, these resilience 
                                                          
103
 The federal structure of the Belgian government ensures that the prevention of radicalisation is controlled by both the 
Federal state and the sub-state communities. The federal level is responsible for safety measures such as data and 
information exchange, prosecution, denial access to the territory, withdrawal of nationality, arrangement with respect to 
internet and social media, whereas the sub-state government is in charge of prevention, sensitization and early detection of 
the phenomenon (Vlaamse Regering, 2015) 
104
 The employment measures targeting foreign fighters need to be seen as curative, and therefore, further initiatives seem 
desirable to rehabilitate foreign fighters. 
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training sessions are part of the-often-hidden daily life activities (Carlsson, 2006). Therefore, it is 
difficult to measure the exact effect of such activities on the prevention of delinquent behaviour.  
As the last universal prevention recommendation, policy makers should have greater awareness of 
media channels as important catalyst in the process of engagement (see above). It is through the use 
of personalized extreme-right magazines that members are periodically provided with information 
on ideology, upcoming events and (music) style. Although the use of internet has, to a large extent, 
taken over this source of information, group magazines still appear periodically in the form of paper, 
online blogs or private mail newsletters. These forms of media are largely private and, as long as 
being acceptable within the purview of human rights, not subject to repression. In this respect, 
preventive and repressive policy measures should be avoided being turned into an ‘ideological police’ 
instrument, regulating the cognitions of individuals (Pauwels et al. 2014).However, policy makers 
might reconsider the possibility of supporting the distribution of ‘alternative’ narratives on topics 
such as immigration, religion and Flemish culture105. 
 
Selective prevention 
In an urge of exploring one’s own identity, people often actively search for a group to fulfil their 
personal needs. In the interest of preventing sympathizing youngsters from entanglement with 
extreme-right groups or networks, it is recommended that the emerging phenomenon be detected 
at an early stage. Grounded on our results, three initiatives are provided to enhance early detection.  
 
First, it is noted that different respondents indicated victimization by immigrants prior to their 
engagement. These forms of victimization might occur in various modalities (physical or verbal, direct 
or indirect), and give rise to various forms of coping. In line with Vynckier (2012), we argue that 
victims might search for forms of compensation to answer their feelings of anger, frustration or fear. 
Especially in highly charged conflicts based on ethnic, cultural, linguistic or ideological differences, it 
remains crucial not to stigmatize or blame the parties involved in the conflict. The victims searching 
for compensation can be accomplished by (informal) victim/offender mediation or, when mediation 
is not desirable106, allowing the victim to express his feelings (of revenge). Dependent on the 
circumstances, this role of ‘conflict mediator’ can be carried out by different actors, from school 
teacher/principal, police officer or trained social to judicial worker.  
 
                                                          
105
 These narratives might be used during popular media events to enlighten a positive message. Example of this technique 
is the ‘say no to racism’ campaign supported by the UEFA and FIFA where in a commercial football stars said no to racism in 
different languages.  
106
 In certain cases, it might be undesirable to confront victim and offender, when there is, for instance, a great risk of 
escalation. In addition, in criminal cases it might be impossible to conduct victim/offender victimization, when the offender 
has disappeared or is unknown. 
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Second, early detection might only become effective when ‘frontline workers’ are aware of the 
signals of possible (further) radicalisation. In this regard, the European Commission launched the 
CoPPRa107 project which produced tools for frontline police officers to detect and prevent 
radicalisation (Debroux, 2010). During a one-day training, police officers are informed of the symbols 
and the external characteristics and backgrounds of diverse extremist groups (Clerix, 2010)108. 
Nevertheless, in order to increase the chances of early detection, police services might externalize 
their knowledge. In so doing, an adjusted version of the CoPPRa training could be taught to possible 
external ‘frontline’ partners such as schools, social or street workers, prison staff (in case of 
repression) and other interested parties. 
 
Finally, it is noted that certain people are more vulnerable to engagement than others (e.g. victims, 
people in deprived situations, etc.). Therefore, prevention initiatives might employ narratives that 
specifically counter or, at least, provide an alternative message to those targeted radicalizing 
population. Ongoing debate on the effectiveness of counter-narratives in counteracting Islamic 
radicalisation has provided scholars with knowledge of how narratives can be used to raise doubt 
about cognitions and the use of violent actions (Ashour, 2011, Leuprecht et al, 2010, Weilnböck, 
2013). Crucial in the effectiveness of projects in using the technique of counter narratives is that 
messages are delivered by trusted sources without (visible109) connection to government 
organisations. In this regard, preventive workers need to rely on the trustworthy and credible 
relation between radicalising youngsters within a certain ‘vulnerable’ community and the messenger 
of the narratives. Therefore, it is recommended that prevention focus on parallel actions combining 
‘recreational’ activities (e.g. sport events, team-building activities) with lecture series on related 
topics (e.g. testimonials110, video material) (cf. Helmus et al., 2013).  
 
Indicated prevention 
As the final element in the preventive measures, it is recommended that policy makers aim at 
targeting people engaged in right-wing extremist groups111. In the light of harm reduction112, 
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 The COPPRA project stands for the Community Oriented Policing and Prevention of Radicalisation. 
108
 To use this information in the field, police officers receive a pocket guide containing the relevant information. 
109
 The Government can have a structural and financial supportive role in the establishment and continuation of these 
projects.  
110
 Personal biographies or testimonials from former members who have experienced similar events through the life course 
might address sympathisers of that group more directly and intensively (Weilnböck, 2013, 405).    
111
 The term ‘right-wing extremist’ groups refers, in this context, to those groups preaching hate towards society. In the 
Flemish extreme-right scene specific attention is devoted to National Solidarist groups and Neo-Nazi groups, in considering 
the fact that they openly reject democracy and preach hate towards society and/or immigrants. In contrast, right-wing 
nationalist groups mostly try to work within the democratic system. However, this does not exclude the fact that some right-
wing nationalist groups might promote more illegal actions.  
112
 Harm reduction both for society (direct and indirect victimization) and the extreme-right member (e.g. criminal 
prosecution).  
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initiatives should primarily focus on preventing (further) criminality and violence. In order to prevent 
youth from proceeding into violence, policy makers should provide a comprehensive approach of 
multiple actors.  
 
As frontline workers, police officers are often the first conventional institution to get into contact 
with extreme-right groups in relation to criminal activity. As pointed out by our in-depth research, 
police and public services tend to maintain a good relationship with most right-wing nationalist 
groups on the basis of reaching mutual agreements on duration, security rules and magnitude of 
public actions. Relevant to this, it is recommended that these ties be preserved and a secure 
environment be offered so that these groups can express their ideology113. However, it is more 
difficult for police officers to openly engage with members of subcultural groups, regarding the 
clandestine character of these groups. Nonetheless, grounded on good practices in Scandinavia, it is 
recommended that police officers install the so-called ‘empowerment conversation’114 (Fangen and 
Carlsson, 2013), which forms a response to certain signals or illegal actions of youngsters engaged in 
extremist groups. The purpose of such a conversation is not to penalize and label the youngsters as 
criminal, but rather to identify those motives for engagement (and criminal activities). Meanwhile, 
this conversation can make youngsters and their parents aware of the possible negative outcomes of 
further group engagement. With these efforts in place, police officers115 can then create a basis for 
reorientation and behavioural change. Evaluation of this technique has shown positive results, 
although questions remain in the Scandinavian countries concerning the implementation this 
technique in youth work and educational institutions (Carlsson, 2006). On the contrary, Bjørgo and 
Carlsson (2005) point out that one of the strengths of this technique is that the police, as messenger, 
makes a distinct strong impression on both youngster and parent. Therefore, as good practice and in 
line with the community oriented approach of the Belgian police, much can be learned from this 
informal technique in daily life practices of frontline police workers.   
 
Furthermore, initiatives should consider including parents within the prevention programme of 
further criminal activity (Rieker, 2006). However, as indicated in the results section, it might be 
practically impossible or undesirable to involve parents in the preventive work. Parents may hold 
similar ideological opinions (Huijgens, 2004) or conversely, may be completely detached from their 
children. Nevertheless, especially concerning the latter detached situations, social work should 
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 As long as the expression of the ideology remains within legal boundaries. 
114
 Noticeable is that this practice of empowerment conversation not only might be used towards right-wing extremist 
members, but can be installed as a general crime prevention technique utilized by police officers.  
115
 Important to mention is that Norwegian police corps, even the small ones, have a minimal occupancy of one preventive 
police officers per police corps (Fangen and Carlsson, 2013).  
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encourage parents not to turn their back to their children (Carlsson and Decker, 2005). Further 
preventive work will only be hampered if the relations between parents and child are jeopardised. In 
some instances, parents also benefit from contact with ‘partners in misfortune’. Therefore, 
prevention initiatives might reconsider the implementation of parental networks, through which 
parents can exchange mutual experiences, understanding, support, and supervision to restore trust 
with the child (Wagner, 2001; Carlsson, 2006; Bjørgo, 2011). Yet, involvement of parents in the 
project should always be guided by a mediating social or preventive worker, preceded by an analysis 
of the family situation.  
 
Finally, it is recommended that former right-wing extremist group members be involved in any 
prevention project. As indicated in the descriptive part, over the years these formerly involved 
members have contributed to the success of the project ‘Exit – Leaving Violent Youth Groups’ 
(Bjørgo, 1997; Bovenkerk, 2011; Kimmel, 2007). Yet, when including former members in prevention 
project, policy makers and preventive workers need to make a risk assessment regarding these 
formerly involved members. Furthermore, De Jong (2014) remarks that crime prevention 
organizations or institutions might face the difficulty of explaining to their employees and partners 
that they are working together with people with a criminal record. Nevertheless, various 
disengagement projects have demonstrated the positive role of including former members in daily 
life activities. Basing upon their own experiences, former members are capable of connecting with 
radicalising youngsters through shared experiences, emotions and sentiments. As a result, former 
extremist members may offer a rich source of information. Therefore, preventive initiatives should 
investigate how this source can be implemented within the organization, varying from passively 
providing information about the group to actively working for disengagement projects.  
 
Repression and after care  
If lessons can be learned from historical events, policy makers must agree that repression is not a 
panacea in the combat against violent extremism. In contrast, repression against the collaborators 
after the Second World War and the banning of the VMO as private militia has not led to a long-term 
solution to the problem. On the contrary, it has often formed a pushing mechanism for further (and 
more radical) action and engagement. However, as the final point of a safety approach to right-wing 
extremist illegal behaviour, imprisonment measures might be necessary as the last resort. Research 
on criminal careers has already pointed out that recidivism rates are higher among detainees 
(Wartna, 2009). In specific, penalization of politically motivated crimes might be another 
confirmation of the marginalization and stigmatization by the justice system of the extreme-right 
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ideology (Veldhuis and Bakker, 2007). On the other hand, isolation during imprisonment might 
discourage members to continue this life style. 
 
Repressive actions should be carried out with the aim of restoring trust between perpetrator and the 
criminal justice system. Members of ideologically aberrant groups have an overall lack of trust in the 
police and the judicial services, and thus tend to challenge their legitimacy. Yet, contact with these 
services can be another confirmation of this negative perception by which people are triggered to 
accept violence as a legitimate act (cf. quantitative part). On the contrary, various studies on 
procedural justice have indicated the impact of good treatment by the police and criminal justice 
system (Tyler, 2003, 2006, Jackson et al, 2012, Van Damme and Pauwels, 2013). In order to 
rehabilitate people in society, negative sanctions should be accompanied by positive tailored 
incentives such as opportunities for self-fulfilment, (re-)introducing ‘healthy’ friendships, 
employment and sports interventions. Seen from the explanatory results, feelings of perceived 
injustice might arise from more deeply rooted causes of social disintegration or perceptions of 
discrimination. Therefore, preventive workers will need to manufacture a customized after-care 
approach to treating all underlying causes in the prevention of (further) criminal behaviour. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
In 1938 Robert K. Merton wrote his work on social structure and anomie that rebellion could be seen 
as an alternative reaction to deviancy, a way in which individuals seek to institutionalize new 
procedures oriented toward revamped cultural goals shared by members of the society, change the 
existing structure rather than to perform accommodative actions within this structure. (Merton, 
1938, 681). This bears a striking resemblance to our contemporary image of extremism that on the 
extreme-right side Angry white rebels form the image of a rebellious individual striving to restore the 
right of the white nation. Especially the Neo-Nazi and National solidarist groups fit this depiction. 
However, in contrast to the depiction of rebels, the majority of groups within the extreme-right 
movement appear to be willing to work within the conventional frameworks in compliance with the 
goals and means of mainstream society. In this sense, a major responsibility, but concurrently an 
opportunity lies with the government. When the mechanism is examined, it is noteworthy that social 
problems often lie at the root of the process. Our respondents have indicated that aspects of ‘social 
loneliness’ and ‘vulnerability’ have driven them to become receptive to extreme beliefs. As such, this 
expression of extremism is equally a problem with the mechanisms of disintegration, injustice, 
anomia, alienation, threat and other emotions. Therefore, in our society we must strive to 
strengthen social cohesion and include individuals in social conventional networks. As Carlsson 
(2006) states, preventive actions are often hidden within everyday practices of actors in society. The 
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topic of extreme-right thus should not be taken out of perspective to influence mental processes 
(deradicalisation). In contrast, policy initiatives should grant people’s willingness or right to freedom 
of expression within certain boundaries. They should also implement the approach to manifestation 
of radicalisation within a broader scope of crime prevention scheme in which solutions are provided 
to tackle social mechanisms. Only then can an effective integrated approach be developed, together 
with the efforts of various willingly involved (frontline) actors, to provide a solution to criminal 
activity instigated by extreme-right motives.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: One-visit observations 
1) Demonstration by the Flemish Nationalist Student organisation NSV in Leuven (08/03/2013) 
2) Lecture by a former SS officer of the Flemish youth battalion, organized by the Flemish 
Nationalist student organisation KVHV (18/03/2013) 
3) Lecture by Prof. De Wever at the headquarter of the KVHV on the Flemish movement 
(04/11/2013) 
4) Ijzerbedevaart, Annual pilgrimage in memory of the fallen Flemish soldiers (11/11/2013) 
5) Colloquium “we are the youth. Revolutionary youth in the Evening Land” organised by the 
NSV in Antwerpen, (30/11/2013) 
6) Observation at the courtroom in Dendermonde for the hearing of the members of the 
Flemish Combat 18 splinter group Bloed Bodem Eer en Trouw (BBET) (11/12/2013-
12/12/2013 + 07/02/2014 + 04/11/2014)  
7) Debate organized by NSV Antwerpen between the president of the youth sections of the 
Flemish Nationalist parties NVA and Vlaams Belang (20/02/2014) 
8) Lecture organized by NSV Gent on the Ukraine revolution (13/03/2014) 
9) Demonstration by the NSV in Antwerpen (20/03/2014) 
10) Demonstration by the Flemish movement VVB in Brussel for self-determination and 
independence (30/03/2014) 
11) Lecture organized by the NSV gent on the Marnix organization (01/04/2014) 
12) Memorial service in remembrance of Dr. August Borms, Flemish Nationalist executed in 1946 
(13/04/2014)  
13) Lecture organized by Voorpost on “the peoples of Europe” in Duffel (17/04/2014) 
14) Lecture organized by NSV Leuven on “New paganism as sociological answer on religious 
radicalisation” (22/04/2014) 
15) Ijzerwake, Annual pilgrimage in memory of the fallen Flemish soldiers . More radical version 
of the Ijzerbedevaart (24/08/2014) 
16) Debate on Europe organized by NSV Leuven (15/10/2014) 
17) Ijzerbedevaart (11/11/2014) 
18) Observation in Flemish Nationalist bar in Antwerp (14/11/2014) 
19) Colloquium organized by Voorpost in Edegem on Identitaire resistance in Europe 
(30/11/2014) 
20) Demonstration by NSV against the NAVO in Gent (12/03/2015) 
 
204     Angry white rebel? Study on the mechanisms and processes of participation in ER groups      
 
Appendix 2: Respondent selection and snowball sampling 
 
  Mail 
  Telephone 
  Facebook 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Achiel 
 Gerard 
 Bo 
 Eric 
 Frederic 
 Claude 
 Daniel 
 Hanne 
 Quinten 
 Raphael 
 Ignace 
 Kristof 
 Louis  Michiel 
 Nico 
 Olivier 
 Piet 
 Observation 
 Cold Call 
 Observation 
 Cold Call 
 Cold call 
 Ulbrecht 
 Observation 
 Stijn  Teun 
 Victor  Willem 
 Xavier 
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Appendix 3: Topic list 
Personal information respondent 
Name 
Date of interview 
Place of interview 
Place of residence 
Age 
Gender 
Group activity 
Religion 
 
List of concepts (respondent indicates whether the concept is applicable and indicates why this is 
applicable to him or her) 
Radical 
Militant  
National solidarist 
National socialist 
Anti-Belgium 
Belgian 
European 
Extreme-right 
Flamingant 
Euro-Russian 
Democrat 
Anti-Democrat 
Republican 
Green-right 
Capitalist 
Youth and education 
Role of parents within the activist career 
Experiences during youth 
 Home  
 School 
 Leisure time 
Experiences with other cultures 
Life events related to engagement 
 
Ideology 
Development of ideology over the years 
Vision on the multicultural society 
Influencing actors in the construction of ideology 
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Reasons for choosing activist career (above political career) 
 
Membership 
Entrance in the group 
Actors influencing the engagement 
Positive aspect of participation 
Negative aspects of participation  
Relations with other members 
Size of the group 
Reasons to leave the group or possible considerations to leave the group 
Internal structure of the group  
 
Activities 
Number of activities  
Sort of activities 
Participation in activities 
Violence during activities 
 
Violence within the group 
Violence among members  
Conflict with out-groups 
Willingness to use violence 
Experiences in regard of violence 
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Appendix 4: Question wording and factor loading 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Police procedural justice (five-point scale): the police . . . “treats adolescents with respect”, “respects 
the rights of adolescents”, “takes the time to listen to people”, “takes fair and impartial decisions”, 
“is prepared to explain their decisions and actions when asked”. (scale from European social survey, 
round 5; also Jackson et al. 2012) 
 
Overall police legitimacy is measured by combining two highly correlated legitimacy subscales (r= 
0.80, p < 0.001). Obedience to the police (five-point scale) “It is your duty to do what the police tell 
you even if you disagree?”, “it is always unacceptable to disobey the police”, “I back the decisions 
made by the police even when I disagree with them”, “When the police orders me to do something I 
do it, even if I don't like how they treat me”. Moral alignment (five-point scale) “Police have the 
same sense of right and wrong as me”, “if the police does not arrest somebody, they will have a good 
reason for that”, “I generally support how the police act”, “I have respect for the police”. (based on 
the scale from European social survey116, round 5; also Jackson et al. 2012) 
 
Perceived personal discrimination (five-point scale): “It makes me angry when I think of how I am 
treated in comparison to others”, “I think I am worse off than others in Belgium”, “I have the feeling 
of being discriminated”, “If I compare myself with others in Belgium than I feel unfairly treated ”. 
(Van den Bos, Loseman, and Doosje 2010)  
 
Perceived group discrimination: (five-point scale): “I think the group to which I belong is worse off 
than other people in Belgium”, “It makes me angry when I think of how my group is treated in 
comparison to other groups in Belgium”, “I have the feeling that the group to which I belong is 
discriminated, “If I compare the group to which I belong with other groups in Belgium, I think we are 
treated unfair”. (Van den Bos, Loseman, and Doosje 2010) 
 
                                                          
116
 See further information on questionnaire at www.europeansocialsurvey.org 
Scale construct Cronbach’s  
alpha 
Scale construct Cronbach’s 
alpha 
Perceived procedural 
justice 
0.84 Anomia (Political 
powerlessness) 
0.85 
Perceived legitimacy 0.80 Moral support for RWE 0.89 
Group discrimination 0.95 Peer racism 0.68 
Religious authoritarianism 0.89 Peer delinquency 0.70 
Impulsiveness 0.63 Political violence 0.87 
Thrill-seeking behaviour 0.73 School social bond 0.59 
Social bonds with parents 0.84 School integration 0.80 
Social control by parents 0.82 Personal discrimination  0.89 
Table 9: Overview of scale constructs and reliabilities 
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Religious authoritarianism (five-point scale): “People should pay less attention to religion and should 
instead develop their own moral standards”, “God has given a flawless and complete way to 
happiness and salvation. This path must be followed without exception”, “A figure like Satan does 
not exist”, “It is more important to be a good person than to believe in God and religion”, “Whenever 
science and sacred scripture conflict, science must be wrong”, “In fact, there are only two kinds of 
people: righteous people whom God will reward and the others who will not be rewarded”, “No 
single book of religious teachings contains all the intrinsic,fundamental truths about life”, “To lead 
the best, most meaningful life, one must belong to the one, fundamentally true religion (Altemeyer, 
1996; Altemeyer and Hunsberger 2004) 
 
Support for right-wing extremism (five-point scale): “I understand that some right-wing extremists 
use violence against the people who have the power in Belgium”, “I can understand right-wing 
extremists who disrupt the order”, “I can understand right-wing extremists who use violence against 
others”. (Van den Bos, Loseman, and Doosje 2010) 
 
Peer delinquency (four-point scale): Have your friends been involved in . . . “taking something from a 
shop/supermarket”, “stealing money or other goods from somebody”, “damaging or destroying 
something”, “hitting someone on purpose so that the person needed care”, “breaking into a 
car/building”. (Ceccato and Wikström 2012) 
 
Pro-racist peers (four-point scale): Do you think your friends would think it is OK if . . . “you would 
say that you don’t want to have anything to do with immigrants?”, “you would write ‘stop 
immigration’ on a public wall”, “if you would fight with an immigrant without any reason”. (Van den 
Bos, Loseman, and Doosje 2010) 
 
Impulsiveness (five-point scale): “I always say what I think, even if it is not nice or smart”, “If I want 
something, I do it immediately”, “I lose my temper easily”, “When I am really angry, other people 
better stay away from me”. (Grasmick et al. 1993)  
 
Thrill-seeking behaviour (five-point scale): “I sometimes find it exciting to do things that could be be 
dangerous”, “I often do things without thinking of the consequences”, “Sometimes I will take a risk 
just for the fun of it”. (Grasmick, Title, Bursik, and ARneklev 1993) 
 
Parental attachment is measured using following items: “I can get along well with my parents”, “I 
think the comments of my parents are important”, “I like to spend my free time with my parents”, “I 
can talk well with my parents”. (scale from European social survey) 
 
Parental control (five-point scale): “My parents know with who I am when I am not at home”, “My 
parents know where I am when I am not at home”, “My parents know how I behave when I am not 
at home”. (scale from European social survey) 
 
School social bonds (five-point scale): “I put little effort in studying”, “I am not interested in getting 
high points”, “Studying is very important for me”, “I always study, even if I know there will be no 
test”. (scale from European social survey) 
 
School social integration (five-point scale): “I can get along well with most of my classmates”, “I have 
the feeling of belonging to the group in my class”, “I can count on the help of pupils in my class”, “I 
feel left alone in my school”. (scale from European social survey) 
 
Self-reported politically motivated vandalism (four-point scale): Have you ever . . . “vandalised 
anything in the street or at the public transport stations (e.g. bus stops, bicycles, streetlights or 
something else)”, “ participated in a political action that was not allowed”, “thrown stones at the 
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police during a demonstration?”, “destroyed something on the streets because of your political or 
religious belief”, “damaged someone’s property because of your political or religious belief”, “set 
something on fire because of your political or religious belief”. (Gavray, Fournier, and Born 2012) 
 
Self-reported politically motivated violence (four-point scale): Have you ever . . . “fought with 
someone because of your political or religious belief”, “threatened someone on the internet because 
of your political or religious belief”, “threatened someone in the streets because of your political or 
religious belief”, “hit a foreigner”, “… hit a capitalist”. (Brottsförebyggande rådet och 
Säkerhetspolisen 2009) 
 
Descriptives  
Variable Min Max Mean Std 
Gender 0 1 0.3591 0.47983 
Age 0 2 0.8642 0.58943 
Attend religious services 0 4 3.0507 0.91615 
Importance of religion 0 2 1.4048 0.89727 
Social bonds -1.1245 3.2855 -0.0829 0.97054 
Police procedural justice -3.0570 5.6186 0.0749 1.02303 
Police legitimacy -3.5758 2.6864 0.0581 1.01688 
Perceived personal discrimination -0.8848 3.5191 -0.0116 1.02786 
Perceived group discrimination -0.7039 3.3538 -0.0117 1.01625 
Religious authoritarianism -1.2302 4.8277 0.0852 1.02287 
Impulsiveness -2.4666 2.8454 -0.1643 0.96293 
Thrill-seeking behaviour -1.5737 2.8975 0.0975 1.00746 
Anomia -2.1882 2.2212 0.0523 1.01430 
Support for RW extremism 2 4 2.6876 0.84991 
Peer racism -1.0651 4.8409 0.0085 1.0095 
Peer delinquency -0.9522 8.9788 -0.0247 1.0457 
Table 10: Descriptive statistics 
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Correlations 
 
Table 11: Correlations 
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Appendix 5: Question wording and scale construct 
Perceived injustice (five-point scale translated from Van den Bos Loseman and Doosje 2009): “It 
makes me angry when I think of how I am treated in comparison to others”, “I think I am worse off 
than others in Belgium”, “I have the feeling of being discriminated”, “If I compare myself with others 
in Belgium than I feel unfairly treated ”. “I think the group to which I belong is worse off than other 
people in Belgium”, “It makes me angry when I think of how my group is treated in comparison to 
other groups in Belgium”, “I have the feeling that the group to which I belong is discriminated, “If I 
compare the group to which I belong with other groups in Belgium, I think we are treated unfair”. “I 
think I am being treated with justice” (R), “I think I am being treated with respect” (R), “I think that, 
most of the time, I am being treated fairly” (R), “I think that if I have complaints about anything, that, 
normally, people listen to my opinion” (R). 
 
Group threat  (five-point scale translated from Van den Bos Loseman and Doosje 2009): “In Belgium, 
Muslim themselves as better than Belgians”, “Most Muslims in Belgium will never understand how 
Belgians are”, “In Belgium, people from other countries do not understand what is written in the 
Belgian constitution (for instance, that everyone can say what he or she thinks and everyone has to 
be treated equally)”, “In Belgium, people from other countries have the right to be more important 
than Belgians”, “People from other countries get to much money from the Belgian government in 
comparison to the Belgians”, Non-Muslims in Belgium do not get the respect that they deserve from 
Muslims”, “In Belgium, people from other countries do not understand how Belgian see the world”, 
“In Belgium, Muslims have, in comparison to Non-Muslims, other values about their work”, “If you do 
business with the Jews, you have to be extremely careful”, “Belgians do not get the respect that they 
deserve from Jews”, “Jews want to dominate everything”, “Most Jews think that they are better than 
others”, “Muslims should not try to change the norms and values of Belgians”, “In Belgium, people 
from other countries have other norms and values than Belgians”, “Many companies in Belgium will 
prefer to work with people from other countries, instead of Belgians, even if Belgians are more 
suitable for the job”, “Jews incite war and give us the blame”  
 
Superiority (five-point scale translated from Van den Bos, Loseman and Doosje 2009): “What I think 
is the truth”, “I think that if everyone would properly reflect, they would think the same as me”, “I 
think that everyone should be like me”, “When people think differently, they are less valuable to 
me”, “it scares me if people think different than me”, “I actually never met people who think 
different than me” 
 
212     Angry white rebel? Study on the mechanisms and processes of participation in ER groups      
 
Anomia (five-point scale from Srole’s study of personal alienation 1956, dimension of political 
powerlessness) “There is no sense in voting, the parties do what they want to do anyway”, “Parties 
are only interested in my vote, not in my opinion”, “So many people vote in elections that my vote 
doesn't make any difference”, “During the elections parties promise things, but eventually nothing 
changes”, “Most politicians promise a lot, but nothing is done”, “Politicians have never learned to 
listen to people like me”, “Actually there is not even one politician that I would trust”, “In general, we 
can support on our political leaders to take the best decisions” (R) 
 
Negative attitudes towards the out-group (in this case immigrants) (five-point scale derived and 
translated from the SCIF117 questionnaire): “Immigrants come here to exploit our social security”, 
“Immigrants are a threat to our culture and customs”, “In general, immigrants can’t be trusted”, “If 
the number of jobs decreases, the immigrants should be sent back to their own countries”, “The 
presence of different cultures in is an enrichment for our society”(R), “Immigrants contribute to the 
wealth of our country”(R), “We should welcome the immigrants who want to live in Belgium” 
 
Authoritarianism (five-point scale derived from Altemeyer 1988): “obedience and respect for 
authority are the two most important virtues children have to learn”, “young people are often 
rebellious, but the will have to adapt as they get older”, “what we need most, more than laws and 
institutions, is a few courageous and devoted leaders in whom people can put their faith”, “People 
can be divided into two distinct classes: the weak and the strong”, “Sex crimes, such as rape and 
attacks on children, deserve more than mere imprisonment; such criminals ought to be publicly 
whipped, or worse.” , “Most of our social problems would be solved if we could somehow get rid 
of the immoral, crooked, and feebleminded people”, “If people would talk less and work more, 
everybody would be better off”, “People should have more respect for our national heritage and 
habits”, “those who break the law must be strongly punished to learn what is right and wrong”, 
“Laws need to be executed, especially regarding rioters and revolutionaries”   
 
Flemish identity (five-point scale, translated from Van den Bos, Loseman and Doosje 2009): “It is 
important to me to be Flemish”, “I am proud of being Flemish”, “The fact that I am Flemish is totally 
not important to me” (R), “I think that there can only be a beautiful world if everyone is proud to be 
Flemish”, “It makes me scared that people are not proud to be Flemish”  
 
Moral Support for right-wing extremism (five-point scale translated from Van den Bos Loseman and 
Doosje 2009): “I understand that some right-wing extremists use violence against the people who 
                                                          
117
 Social cohesion indicators in Flanders (SCIF) 
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have the power in Belgium”, “I can understand right-wing extremists who disrupt the order”, “I can 
understand right-wing extremists who use violence against others”. 
 
Positive attitudes towards racism  (four-point scale, derived and translated from Van den Bos 
Loseman and Doosje 2009): Do you think your friends would think it is OK if . . . “you would say that 
you don’t want to have anything to do with immigrants?”, “you would write ‘stop immigration’ on a 
public wall”, “you would fight with an immigrant without any reason”. 
 
Thrill-seeking behavior (five-point scale derived from Grasmick Title Bursik and Arneklev 1993): “I 
sometimes find it exciting to do things that could be dangerous”, “I often do things without thinking 
of the consequences”, “Sometimes I will take a risk just for the fun of it”.  
 
Left/Right identification (seven-point scale from extreme left to extreme right): Where do you 
position yourself on a scale from (1) extreme-left to (7) extreme-right.  
 
Participation in disruptive groups (five-point scale derived from the Eurogang definition and left-
right identification questionnaire): “Do you consider yourself to be a member of a group of friends 
(no organisation or association) that frequently meets and considers itself as a group? ” (1 = yes, 0 = 
no). Four follow-up questions were (1) How long have you been a member of the group? (2)How big 
is your group? (3) “Do members of this group get involved in fights with other cliques?” (4) “Are 
members of this group involved in law-breaking?”. To maintain the right-wing disruptive group 
respondents need to score positive on the introduction question, question (1) and (2) and question 
(3) or (4). Furthermore they had to indicate a score 6 or 7 on the left/right scale. 
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Table 13: Descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
 
Scale construct Cronbach’s  
alpha 
Scale construct Cronbach’s 
alpha 
Positive attitudes 
towards racism by peers 
0.85 
 
Group threat  0.76 
Perceived injustice 0.62 Authoritarianism 0.92 
Flemish identity 0.83 Superiority 0.76 
Moral support for right-
wing extremism 
0.87 Low self-control 0.71 
Anomia 0.87 Negative attitudes 
towards out-group 
0.88 
Table 12: Overview of scale constructs and reliabilities 
Variable Min Max Mean Std 
Perceived Injustice -1,02 4,28 0 1 
Authoritarianism -2,65 2,93 0 1 
Anomia  -2,48 2,78 0 1 
Group threat -2,69 3,17 0 1 
Flemish identity -1.94 1.75 0 1 
Negative att. tow. out-group -2,24 3,01 0 1 
Superiority -1.25 3.79 0 1 
Thrill seeking behavior -1.54 3.21 0 1 
Positive attitudes towards racism -1.83 2.99 0 1 
Moral support for  
right-wing extremism 
-1.45 4.16 0 1 
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Appendix 6: Indirect effects 
Total indirect effects of independent variables on the dependent variable 
Independent 
variables 
Perceived 
injustice 
Anomia Authoritari-
anism 
Group 
Threat 
Flemish 
identity 
Negative 
attitudes 
tow.  
out-group 
RWD group 
participation 
0.067 
(0.000) 
0.089 
(0.000) 
0.170          
(0.000) 
0.266 
(0.000) 
0.050 (0.001) 0.295 (0.000) 
Independent 
variables 
Superiority TSB Moral 
support for 
RWE 
Positive 
attitudes 
towards 
racism 
  
RWD group 
participation 
0.028 
(0.029) 
0.115 
(0.000) 
/ /   
  
Strongest specific indirect effects 
- Perceived injustice (0.067***) 
Perceived injustice >  Group Threat > Negative attitudes towards out-group > Positive 
attitudes towards racism > Participation in RWD groups (0.033**) 
- Anomia (0.089***) 
Anomia > Authoritarianism > Group Threat > Negative attitudes towards out-group > Positive 
attitudes towards racism > Participation in RWD groups (0.029***) 
- Authoritarianism (0.170***) 
Authoritarianism > Group Threat > Negative attitudes towards out-group > Positive attitudes 
towards racism > Participation in RWD groups (0.155***) 
- Group threat (0.266***) 
Group Threat > Negative attitudes towards out-group > Positive attitudes towards racism > 
Participation in RWD groups (0.179***) 
- Negative attitudes towards out-group (0.295***) 
Negative attitudes towards out-group > Positive attitudes towards racism > Participation in 
RWD groups (0.225***) 
- Flemish identity (0.050**) 
Flemish identity > Negative attitudes towards out-group > Positive attitudes towards racism > 
Participation in RWD groups (0.038**) 
- Superiority (0.028*) 
Superiority > Moral support for RW extremism > Participation in RWD groups (0.028*) 
- Thrill seeking behavior (0.115***) 
Thrill seeking behavior > Positive attitudes towards racism > Participation in RWD groups 
(0.072**)  
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Appendix 7: Characteristics respondents 
Category 
Age Gender Membership TOTAL 
<30 30- 40 > 40 Men Women Involved Former  
RW Nationalist 5 1 3 7 2 7 2 9 
Neonazi 5 1 2 8 0 4 4 8 
Nat. Solidarist 1 2 3 6 0 6 0 6 
TOTAL 11 4 8 21 2 17 6 23 
Table 14: Characteristics Respondents 
 
